

केन्द्रीय पुस्तकालय

वनस्थली विद्यापीठ



श्रेणी संख्या \_\_\_\_\_

पुस्तक संख्या \_\_\_\_\_

अवाप्ति क्रमांक \_\_\_\_\_

# SELECTIONS FROM FRANK RUSSELL

ON THE

THE U

THE I

THE P

"USELESS"

IN PRAISE

IS HAPPY

THE ETHIC

THE WORLD

No.

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

SALGAONKAR, M.A., LL.B.

Atabsinh College of Commerce and Economics,  
Baroda

Banasthali Vidyapith

15679



104 S31S

Central Library

JACMILLAN & CO. LIMITED  
BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS, LONDON

1947

COPYRIGHT  
First Edition, 1946.  
Reprinted 1947

PRINTED BY G. F. BEST, AT THE L. S. S. D. PRESS,  
95 B, CHITTARANJAN AVENUE,  
OPPOSITE MEDICAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL, CALCUTTA.

# CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	v
ON THE VALUE OF SCEPTICISM . . . . .	i
THE UNIVERSITY . . . . .	16
THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE CITIZEN . . . . .	25
THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN A LIBERAL EDUCATION . . . . .	41
"USELESS" KNOWLEDGE . . . . .	54
IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS . . . . .	67
IS HAPPINESS STILL POSSIBLE? . . . . .	83
THE ETHICS OF POWER . . . . .	95
THE WORLD AS IT COULD BE MADE . . . . .	105
<i>Notes</i> . . . . .	127





## INTRODUCTION

Probably there is no other English writer whose thoughts are entitled to greater attention and respect in the troubled state of the world today than those of the Honourable Earl Russell, or to call him by his more popular name, Mr. Bertrand Russell. The world has just passed through the greatest crisis in its history and is facing gigantic problems of the future. Everywhere old creeds are dead or dying, new ideologies are being formed and the old order is expected soon to yield place to the new. At such a critical time conflicts are bound to arise between the "supporters of status quo" and the champions of drastic reform. And if the world wants to discover a right course of action in this welter of clashing ideologies, it will have to seek for itself proper guidance on constructive and acceptable lines. Bernard Shaw, Dean Inge, H. G. Wells are some of the names that suggest themselves to us as qualified to provide such a guidance today. But though they are great in their own spheres none of them is so eminently fitted for such a benevolent mission by his temperament, training and work as Mr. Bertrand Russell.

Mr. Russell occupies among the thinkers of today a unique position. Regarded as one of the keenest intellects of the age, he is, as Mr. Gideon says, "practically the only English philosopher who writes for a large public with whom he enjoys a tremendous credit". Declaring that Mr. Russell's is assuredly the most brilliant and active mind in the philosophic world, one writer has compared his position in contemporary thought with that of Hume in the middle of the 18th century. But what makes Mr. Russell remarkable as

a thinker to the layman is that he has not been contented with the pursuit of mere abstract philosophical inquiry. Starting as a philosopher, he devoted himself entirely to the study and teaching of philosophy until the last World War came like a tornado and shook the very foundations of our modern civilization. Then it was that he found himself, like many of his thoughtful contemporaries, profoundly disturbed by the destructive forces unleashed by the war, and was driven by some inner urge to discard philosophy and seek "fresh woods and pastures new" in which his great energy and constructive passion could find full scope. Since then pacifism, education, politics, ethics and sociology have been only some of the subjects that have occupied his unremitting attention. Consequently, since 1914, a steady stream of books on a variety of subjects has flowed from his pen and given him the high position he enjoys in contemporary thought.

It must be admitted, however, that neither the guidance Mr. Russell's books provide nor his teachings have been universally accepted. For his unorthodox opinions on several vital social, political and religious questions have offended a large section of the public, which views his agnosticism and his general attitude towards morals with grave misgiving. Hence while in certain quarters his books have been hailed as a valuable contribution to the solution of the world's complex problems, in others they have been received with protest and indignation. In spite of these differences of opinion regarding the value of Mr. Russell's work, even his most violent of critics have agreed that he is a visionary who has been moved entirely by love of truth. They know that no other writer today has championed the cause of freedom, justice, peace and brotherhood with greater vigour and eloquence than Mr. Russell

has done. As the *Times Literary Supplement* once said, he has "a way of asking right questions" and making the people think hard about them, whether they accept his solutions of these questions or not. It would be profitable, therefore, to consider how he looks upon the problems of the world and what panacea he offers for the ills of "this troubled, passionate planet."

"My outlook on the world is, like other people's the product partly of circumstance and partly of temperament," says Mr. Russell in his contribution to the Symposium *I Believe*. Consequently, if we have to understand him properly, we shall have to learn a few important details of his life and try to appreciate the robust personality behind his work. For while there are certain writers whose work can be understood without such reference to their life, there are others, like Shelley or Lamb, the understanding of whom largely depends upon a proper understanding of their life. Which reader has not been bewitched by the complete fusion of personal detail, thought and feeling, which characterizes, for instance, Shelley's *Ode to the West Wind* or Lamb's *Old China* and which constitutes their chief charm? Though, by the very nature of his work and ideals, Mr. Russell cannot rise to the lyrical heights of which these writers are capable, his work often reveals a similar fusion of thought and autobiographical detail. His thoughts have been inspired by an inherent desire to do good and eliminate the evil that he has seen in the world, and his knowledge and experiences have strengthened the conclusions at which he has arrived. That is why one finds, throughout his work, numerous personal references which are brought in support of his arguments. It is time, therefore, that we turned our attention to some important aspects of his career.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell was born in 1872 in an aristocratic family, his father being a son of Lord John Russell and his mother a daughter of the second Lord Stanley of Alderly. His father was a free-thinker and, when he died, he wished his three-year old son to be brought up without superstition, and so appointed two free-thinkers as his son's guardians. But the Courts set aside the will and had the boy educated in the Christian faith. But, as Mr. Russell points out, the result was disappointing and he became an agnostic and a far-going revolutionist. He was privately educated and acquired a perfect knowledge of French and German. In 1890 he went to Trinity College, Cambridge, from which he graduated with great distinction in Mathematics and Philosophy and was appointed a Fellow of his college in the autumn of 1895. From 1895 to the outbreak of the World War in 1914 he led a simple, quiet life of study, teaching and writing, first in a suburb of London and later at Cambridge where he was appointed a lecturer in his old college in 1910. It was during this period that his great books on Mathematics were published and earned for him the Fellowship of the Royal Society.

When the war broke out in 1914, Mr. Russell found himself torn between two loyalties. One was the loyalty to his own ideals of peace and international brotherhood, the other was the loyalty to his own country whose very existence was threatened by a powerful enemy. Unhesitatingly Mr. Russell accepted the claims of the former and wholeheartedly threw himself into pacific work. He took an active part in the "No Conscription Fellowship" and was fined £100 for a leaflet describing an early Christian conscientious objector. He lost his lectureship and though he was offered a professorship at Harvard, a passport was re-

fused to him. In 1918 he was sentenced to six months imprisonment for an article in the *Tribunal*. In 1920 he went to China to lecture on philosophy at the Peking University. Returning in 1921 after a dangerous illness he was engaged during the next six years in serious philosophical work as well as in lecturing, journalism and writing popular books on social topics. In 1927 he started with the help of his second wife, Mrs. Dora Russell, a school for young children. In this school he wanted to put into practice the educational ideals for which he stood. His conception of freedom in the nursery school shocked the English, and many of his friends deplored the time he spent in the school as a comrade of children to the detriment of his philosophical work. Yet the school was a success in every way except financially and had to be closed in 1931, the year in which Mr. Russell succeeded to the earldom on the death of his brother, the second Earl Russell.

Mr. Russell's life simply proves that the world has not travelled far since the days of Shelley when people were ostracized and vicitimized for their opinions. For Mr. Russell has had his full share of suffering for his principles. There is no doubt something heroic in the manner in which he has given up a peaceful, comfortable, scholastic life for an active stormy career guided only by his ideals, because he has felt that, "if the intellectual has any function in society, it is to preserve a cool, unbiassed judgment in the face of all solicitations to passion." Feeling an instinctive responsibility in regard to public affairs through the rich aristocratic political tradition he imbibed in his childhood, he has descended from the ivory tower and calmly inquired into the present state of the world. He has found that there is something radically wrong with modern life. War, injustice, poverty, falsehood, all these seem to

have cut deep into the core of our life and created unhealthy conditions. It is primarily with the destruction of these evils that Mr. Russell is concerned. ④

Nevertheless he is an optimist. Troubled as he is by the dark picture the modern world presents, he has an implicit faith in the ultimate victory of human goodness. While in several young people of his time, despair gave way to cynicism, Mr. Russell has maintained an aristocratic calm and dispassionateness in his outlook of the world. He believes that it is not by violence and cruelty and despotism that happiness of the world can be secured. It is through a new orientation in politics and education that mankind can hope to reach Utopia. But this is not enough. We must also bring to the consideration of all questions—whether social, religious, moral or political—a new scientific turn of mind, cold, objective, searching and comprehensive, which will tear off the veils that hide the truth. It is only then that the millennium that we consider as an impossibility will be within our reach. For Mr. Russell does not think that Utopia is a mere vision. He believes that it is entirely practicable provided mankind aspires to it and makes for it one determined attempt, forgetting all petty animosities, false beliefs, wrong values. It is only then that this unhappy world can be turned into an earthly paradise.

Mr. Russell finds that “the basis of international anarchy is men’s proneness to fear and hatred.” Our life is full of several evils some of which arise from nature, some from defects of character and others from the misuse of power. It is the fear of these evils that generates hatred and drives people to methods of self-defence which are themselves evil. Thus people love power because they think that it will protect them from aggression; they try to encourage orthodoxy among the

young because that gives them a feeling of security; and because they are afraid of enemies, they turn, especially during war-time, virtues such as sobriety, thrift and industry into mere handmaids of the forces of destruction. Most of these fears are in fact irrational, because there are several effective methods of combating these different evils. Science can control and has controlled the evils of nature; sound educational and psycho-analytical methods can effectively cure defects in character; while proper control of social and political institutions can successfully check the evils of power. The road to Utopia, according to Mr. Russell, is clear; "it lies partly through politics and partly through changes in the individual". But instead of following these methods with fearlessness and intelligence, men succumb to their fears and pursue wrong ends.

As much of Mr. Russell's work is concerned with the development of human personality, it will be necessary first to consider his views on this subject before turning our attention to the sort of Government he would like to see set up. Mr. Russell finds that much harm has been done in the world by irrationality and he believes that, if people would adopt a rational or sceptical attitude towards life's questions, it would completely transform our social life and our political system. To him the terms rational, sceptical and scientific are more or less synonymous. They involve an attitude of mind that takes nothing for granted unless it is verified by personal experience, observation or expert opinion. He defines it as "the habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving at a belief", while in questions of practice, it is "the habit of remembering all our relevant desires, and not only the one which happens at the moment to be strongest". He believes that incalculable harm has been done because people have



been inclined to accept implicitly ready-made opinions, age-old conventions and beliefs. Religious dogma; political creeds, ethical ideas have thus been accepted and acted upon, whereas a sceptical mind would have found that many of them are wrong and harmful, if it had only taken the trouble to examine them in the cold light of reason. Consequently "our current ethic is a curious mixture of superstition and rationalism" and passion plays not a small part in our actions and opinions. Again we are inclined to maintain the "status quo" and support empty shibboleths through our inability to face new ideas and order. Hence; according to Mr. Russell, intellectual integrity alone can save us from much of the hypocrisy that clouds our life and "it is to intelligence, increasingly wide-spread, that we must look for the solution of the ills from which our world is suffering."

But it is not enough that people be trained to develop rationalism; it is also necessary that they be given proper education in their childhood to fit them for the Utopia in which they will have to play a vital part. Education, according to Mr. Russell, does not merely mean instruction. He gives it a much wider meaning and defines it as "the formation, by means of instruction, of certain mental habits and a certain outlook on life and the world". It is on this broad conception that his theory and practice of education have been based. Orthodox educational theory, on the other hand, looks upon children as raw materials to be moulded for certain purposes, social or political, by the teacher. This theory ignores the fact that children have their own desires, instincts and impulses. In fact the whole of their personality cries to be developed and set free from the prison-walls of the narrow-minded school. That is why the teacher must look upon

children not as means but as ends and love them "better than his State or his Church". It is only then that he can be called an ideal teacher.

But if the teacher has to carry out his duties and responsibilities properly, he must also have a right conception of the qualities he is expected to encourage in the young minds under his charge. The most important among these qualities which form the very basis of human excellence are vitality, courage, sensitiveness and intelligence. Mr. Russell stresses the importance of encouraging these qualities because he believes that if children are to be turned into *good* men and women, what is essential is that they should be instructed in the value of positive virtue. For, according to the current conception, *goodness* lies not in doing good things, but in not doing things that are considered harmful according to the prevailing ethical and social standards. Consequently, a whole system of repression and inhibition has been built up and healthy instincts, especially among children, are crushed and replaced by fear and superstition. It is essential, therefore, that positive courage be stimulated in children by teaching them the importance of self-respect with an impersonal outlook on life. And so also should the qualities of sensitive-ness and curiosity, which are natural in children, be encouraged. Mr. Russell does not, however, believe that good life means creating feelings of exclusiveness or inculcating a superiority complex in children. After all life depends upon co-operation and what education is expected to do is to draw out and develop all that is best in children so that, as men and women, they may take their rightful place in the corporate life of the country. ✱

Mr. Russell does not look upon universities as places for a few gentlemen of leisure. The time when they

existed only for the privileged classes has gone. Now they exist for two purposes; firstly, to train men and women for certain professions, and secondly, to pursue learning and research without regard to immediate utility. As regards the first purpose, Mr. Russell wants to maintain the aristocratic tradition of the older universities, but in a totally different manner. He wants to create in the universities an intellectual aristocracy, whereby only those students who show special aptitude and merit will be allowed to enter them, irrespective of social or financial status and not merely those who are expected to be "gentlemen".

What is far more important in Mr. Russell's view, however, is the disinterested pursuit of learning which the universities must encourage among its students and professors. While admitting the importance of the education that prepares students for the professions, Mr. Russell points out that a merely utilitarian view of education is likely to blind itself to the beneficent effects of liberal education which, as Newman points out, is "simply the cultivation of the intellect as such and whose object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence". This pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is a theme that constantly recurs in the writings of Mr. Russell and while discussing its joys, he occasionally rises to almost lyrical heights. He appreciates the utility of useful education, because it has made the world of today. But he strongly deplors the modern tendency to regard knowledge as merely an ingredient in technical skill, for he believes that there was something nobly grand in the Renaissance tradition which is unfortunately dead at present. Learning was, during the Renaissance, part of *joie de vivre*, while at present it is valuable only because of its utility. It is for this reason that Mr. Russell would like to create

such a tradition under modern conditions. Modern science has created conditions by which slowness and drudgery of work have been eliminated and men have been enabled to enjoy greater leisure. Civilization has always been an outcome of leisure and there is no reason why, with the leisure universally available to-day, a new civilization should not arise. Carlyle found perennial joy in work, but Mr. Russell finds that there is a lack of balance among modern people, due to a "ruthless pursuit of mere professional competence or the conscious activity concentrated on some one definite purpose". If, therefore, they are educated to find pleasure in thought rather than in action and develop an impersonal outlook on life and things, they would create a culture which would improve some of the worst features of the modern world.

It is on similar grounds that he recommends the study of science as against the study of classical languages. A purely classical and literary education has no doubt certain advantages over a scientific education. But Mr. Russell believes that too much pre-occupation with the past, which a classical education must involve, creates a certain peevishness and undue fastidiousness towards the present. A study of science, on the other hand, produces certain habits of mind which Mr. Russell considers essential for culture. Apart from the constructive instinct which it satisfies, the study of science develops the scientific outlook which consists in a disinterested pursuit of truth, without any preconceptions, without bias, or without any thought of utility. The free intellect, thus developed, "will see as God might see, without a *here* and *now*, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire for know-

ledge—knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. And the mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion”.

Mr. Russell does not believe that the perfection of human individuality to be achieved in such a manner will in any way conflict with the ideals of citizenship. The manner in which citizenship has been conceived at present is highly defective; for the virtues such as patriotism, loyalty to the State, orthodoxy which it emphasizes and encourages, often take unhealthy forms. The ideals of citizenship also often involve the killing of the creative instincts in the individual. Nevertheless modern industrialism and civilized conditions of life have made co-operation essential. The world is becoming narrower and, what is important today, is not only a sense of national cohesion, but also a sense of the whole human race as one co-operative unit. As we are aspiring to and gradually moving towards the ideal of a world federation of nations “the most vital need of the near future will be the cultivation of a vivid sense of citizenship of the world”. Thus, in Mr. Russell’s view, while the development of the individual is in no way to be retarded, he is to be trained in the ideals of international citizenship to enable him to play his part in the future brotherhood of nations.

Mr. Russell’s political ideals cannot be summarized better than in the following quotation from Lao-Tzu, the Chinese philosopher, given by the writer on the title-page of his *Roads to Freedom*: “Production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination”. For he is an uncompromising enemy of capitalism which he holds responsible

for much of the poverty, want and slavery that we see in the world today. At present the capitalist exercises through his wealth an excessive power over the lives of others and is able to enjoy political power which he often misuses for his own selfish ends. If, however, a democratic form of government with the communal ownership of means of production is introduced, men and women will be able to enjoy economic freedom under it and consequently economic fear and the desire to control others will be automatically removed. In the preface to his *Bolshevism: Practice and Theory* (1920) Mr. Russell says, "A fundamental economic reconstruction, bringing with it far-reaching changes in ways of thinking, and feeling, in philosophy and art and private relations, seems absolutely necessary if industrialism is to become the servant of man instead of his master". There can be no doubt that the whole of Mr. Russell's social philosophy is based upon this fundamental necessity.

The end of the last World War saw a number of theories being urged as cures for the unhappiness of the world. State Socialism, Anarchism, Syndicalism, Guild Socialism, Fascism were the most important of these and some of them were actually put into practice. Mr. Russell's view is that of these Guild Socialism is the nearest approach to a political ideal which present conditions can allow, though Anarchism which wants to abolish the state altogether may be the ultimate goal. Those who read *The World as It could be Made* will find that Mr. Russell is almost a socialist, but it would be difficult to pigeonhole him. The danger that he sees in the socialist programme is loss of individual freedom and domination of officialdom and bureaucracy because, to him, want of individual freedom is the very negation of life. Guild Socialism, on the other

hand, avoids the difficulties and dangers that are inherent in both Socialism and Anarchism, while it concedes what is valid in the claims of both these systems. Accepting Guild Socialism, therefore, as an ideal political and economic system under present conditions, Mr. Russell paints in brilliant colours a picture of the life as it may be lived under it. It may be thought that he has drawn too rosy a picture of the ideal conditions in which life may be led and has totally ignored the defects to which men, as well as nations, are prone. It may be pointed out, however, that *Roads to Freedom*, from which this chapter is taken, was written before Mr. Russell had any opportunity to study the methods employed by the Russians in creating a socialist society. When he visited Russia later, he was disappointed to find that the Russian Government could not risk even such a measure of democracy as had seemed to him the very basis of a liberal philosophy.

Though Anarchism looks upon the abolition of the State and the tremendous power it wields as its ultimate ideal, Mr. Russell does not believe that any government can exist without power. Nor does he think that it will be possible for a long time to come to replace even the most democratic form of government by some other beneficent system. Power in itself is not bad, but what makes it an evil is the harmful purposes to which it is often consciously or unconsciously turned. The history of kingly, priestly or economic power makes it abundantly clear that in unscrupulous hands power can be a terrible weapon. But it is quite possible for men to use power for beneficent purposes. This can be achieved if power were not desired as an end in itself, but were employed for some good ends which do not clash with the desires of others and which produce some positively good effect. Mr. Russell does

not think that man is incapable of improvement. Therefore, even though some people are inclined to misuse their power, their temperament can be improved by providing suitable environment, opportunities for such misuse can be minimized by raising the standards of life and the skill of the people can be directed into constructive channels. Thus power would cease to be corruptible and would only produce good.

But it is happiness that we all desire and even if we were to live under ideal conditions, it is still quite possible that we may remain unhappy. For happiness is essentially a condition of the mind and Mr. Russell firmly believes that the conquest of happiness is possible through conscious effort. Narcissists, sinners, megalomaniacs are some of the unhappy people in the world; others suffer from, what Mr. Russell calls, Byronic unhappiness, believing that our life's tragedy is that it offers less to us than it takes away from us. Psychoanalysis can cure the unhappiness of these people, but what really can make life happy is zest in the work that one does, a friendly but self-less interest in persons and occasionally a belief in some righteous cause. In his essay *The Ideals of Happiness* Mr. Russell contrasts the happy condition of the Chinese with the unhappiness which is universal among the Western people. The main reason for this, in his view, is that while the former aim at enjoyment, the latter aim at power. He also finds that in the West a certain listlessness and want of an ideal has inclined especially young people towards cynicism, while the Chinese are happy because they are conscious of playing an important part in their national life. What is wanted, therefore, to make people happy is friendliness, joy in co-operation, absorption in some work, zest and an attitude of mind which never demands from life more than it has to give.



Mr. Russell tells us in *The Conquest of Happiness* that, though as a child his favourite hymn was "Weary of earth and laden with my sin", his life has been completely happy because he has been guided throughout by these rules.

"Whoever contemplates the world in the light of an ideal—whether what he seeks be intellect, or art, or love, or simple happiness, or all together—must feel a great sorrow in the evils that men needlessly allow to continue, and—if he be a man of force and vital energy—an urgent desire to lead men to the realization of the good which inspires his creative vision". No more eloquent tribute to Mr. Russell's work and personality can be paid than these words from his preface to *Roads to Freedom*. His entire work has been characterized by a rare sincerity and candour, while it has been inspired by an idealism that aims at making life richer, more full of joy and more free from preventable evils than it is at present. He has never professed to be a guide to the new Jerusalem, but has been content to be a sort of a citizen of the world, censuring those whose heritage is fear and whose philosophy of life is complacency. His work has, therefore, been one long crusade against bigotry, fear, war, capitalism and a host of other ills that beset this mad world of ours. It is true that his critics do not take such a charitable view of his work. They say that Mr. Russell often presents only one side of the picture in his discussion of complex problems and resorts to the methods of the official propaganda that he so strongly condemns. Others say that his scepticism generally takes the form of cynicism towards much that the public considers good and they compare him with Voltaire. Still others have taken strong objections to his ethics and his theory of harmonious desires.

Nevertheless none can question his love of mankind and his honest belief in Utopia, to which struggling humanity one day shall attain.

What is specially remarkable in the work of Mr. Russell is the admirable English in which his thought has been clothed. His is a prose extraordinarily lucid and effortless, marked by constant flashes of wit and insight. It is at the same time characterized by "an almost naive simplicity, crystal clarity, a calm Olympian irony and a gift for compressed epigrammatic statement". Mr. Russell has a hard, logical and original mind and he has the rare faculty of summing up a complex situation in a few clear and simple sentences. He can penetrate to the heart of a subject, however complex it is, and can, in a few brief statements, strip it of all distracting complexities. In his conversations with Mr. Russell, Mr. Dilip Kumar Roy once expressed his great appreciation of the former's style—especially its economy of words and restraint—and asked him whether he had cultivated the art. Mr. Russell's reply was, "I used in my boyhood to toy with different ideas to see in how few words I could express them. I have profited much by this early pastime". It is this quality as well as his wit and humour that often give a touch of sprightliness and gaiety to his treatment of even essentially abstruse topics. In addition to this, the encyclopædic knowledge that he brings in support of his arguments gives to his thought a weight and breadth that we rarely find except in a few of his contemporaries. His early essays, such as *A Free Man's Thought*, have been full of a lyrical grace which one does not find in his more recent work. Even in later essays, like *Science and Culture*, *The World as It could be Made* and in parts of others, one can still catch the echoes of that early romantic prose.

This discussion of Mr. Russell's work and personality has tried to make valid the claim that was made on his behalf at the beginning of this essay. "The frantic stampede towards disaster" that one sees in the world today has forced many a thoughtful mind to meditate on the causes of our life's maladies and suggests methods of curing them. Some thinkers, like Dean Inge, have taken refuge in pessimism; others, more optimistic like Mr. H. G. Wells, have suggested various remedies which have not found much support. Combining the qualities of a philosopher, a practical politician and an active educationalist, Mr. Russell, on the other hand, has faced facts as they are and suggested methods of world improvement which are entitled to receive the close attention of everyone interested in the making of a better world. Equipped with great scholarship and a penetrating mind, he has stressed the need of the most militant doubt in the evaluation of our present social problems, not because he takes a cynical pleasure in unlicensed doubt, but because he has felt that a questioning mind and fresh outlook will clear away the fog that confuses us in the solution of our problems.

In fact it will be found that Mr. Russell's work has been primarily concerned with the "Four Freedoms", now immortalized by the authors of the Atlantic Charter. What impedes the achievement of these freedoms is, in Mr. Russell's opinion, man's selfishness, his pugnacity, his worship of wrong values and his stubborn refusal to change the old order. Mr. Russell's ambition, therefore, is to set human character and institutions on a firm and incorruptible basis and enable man to reach the new millennium to which he has ever aspired.

Mr. Russell knows that our life in itself is not a happy one and that man is a puny creature in the pre-

sence of the gigantic forces of evil that try to engulf him. But he does not encourage a mind that withdraws within itself and turns its back upon the evils of life. True freedom lies the other way. It lies, as he eloquently describes in *A Free Man's Worship*, "in determination to worship only the God created by our own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which inspires the insight of our best moments. In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces, but in thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow man, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death. Let us learn, then, that energy of faith which enables us to live constantly in the vision of the good; and let us descend, in action, into the world of facts, with that vision always before us".



## SELECTIONS FROM BERTRAND RUSSELL

---

### ON THE VALUE OF SCEPTICISM

I wish to propose for the reader's favourable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true. I must, of course, admit that if such an opinion became common it would completely transform our social life and our political system; since both are at present faultless, this must weigh against it. I am also aware (what is more serious) that it would tend to diminish the incomes of clairvoyants, bookmakers, bishops and others who live on the irrational hopes of those who have done nothing to deserve good fortune here or hereafter. In spite of these grave arguments, I maintain that a case can be made out for my paradox, and I shall try to set it forth.

First of all, I wish to guard myself against being thought to take up an extreme position. I am a British Whig, with a British love of compromise and moderation. A story is told of Pyrrho, the founder of Pyrrhonism (which was the old name of scepticism). He maintained that we never know enough to be sure that one course of action is wiser than another. In his youth, when he was taking his constitutional one afternoon, he saw his teacher in philosophy (from whom he had imbibed his principles) with his head stuck in

a ditch, unable to get out. After contemplating him for some time, he walked on, maintaining that there was no sufficient ground for thinking he would do any good by pulling the old man out. Others, less sceptical, effected a rescue, and blamed Pyrrho for his heartlessness. But his teacher, true to his principles, praised him for his consistency. Now I do not advocate such heroic scepticism as that. I am prepared to admit the ordinary beliefs of common sense, in practice if not in theory. I am prepared to admit any well-established result of science, not as certainly true, but as sufficiently probable to afford a basis for rational action. If it is announced that there is to be an eclipse of the moon on such-and-such a date, I think it worth while to look and see whether it is taking place. Pyrrho would have thought otherwise. On this ground, I feel justified in claiming that I advocate a middle position.

There are matters about which those who have investigated them are agreed; the dates of eclipses may serve as an illustration. There are other matters about which experts are not agreed. Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. Einstein's view as to the magnitude of the deflection of light by gravitation would have been rejected by all experts twenty years ago, yet it proved to be right. Nevertheless the opinion of experts, when it is unanimous, must be accepted by non-experts as more likely to be right than the opposite opinion. The scepticism that I advocate amounts only to this: (1) that when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; (2) that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert; and (3) that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive opinion exist, the ordinary man would do well to suspend his judgment.

These propositions may seem mild, yet, if accepted, they would absolutely revolutionize human life.

The opinions for which people are willing to fight and persecute all belong to one of the three classes which this scepticism condemns. When there are rational grounds for an opinion, people are content to set them forth and wait for them to operate. In such cases, people do not hold their opinions with passion; they hold them calmly, and set forth their reasons quietly. The opinions that are held with passion are always those for which no good ground exists; indeed the passion is the measure of the holder's lack of rational conviction. Opinions in politics and religion are almost always held passionately. Except in China, *a man is thought a poor creature unless he has strong opinions on such matters; people hate sceptics far more than they hate the passionate advocates of opinions hostile to their own.* It is thought that the claims of practical life demand opinions on such questions, and that, if we became more rational, social existence would be impossible. I believe the opposite of this, and will try to make it clear why I have this belief. ¶

Take the question of unemployment in the years after 1920. One party held that it was due to the wickedness of trade unions, another that it was due to the confusion on the Continent. A third party, while admitting that these causes played a part, attributed most of the trouble to the policy of the Bank of England in trying to increase the value of pound sterling. This third party, I am given to understand, contained most of the experts, but no one else. Politicians do not find any attractions in a view which does not lend itself to party declamation, and ordinary mortals prefer views which attribute misfortune to the machinations of their enemies. Consequently people fight for and



against quite irrelevant measures, while the few who have a rational opinion are not listened to because they do not minister to any one's passions. To produce converts, it would have been necessary to persuade people that the Bank of England is wicked. To convert Labour, it would have been necessary to show that directors of the Bank of England are hostile to trade unionism; to convert the Bishop of London, it would have been necessary to show that they are "immoral". It would be thought to follow that their views on currency are mistaken.

Let us take another illustration. It is often said that socialism is contrary to human nature, and this assertion is denied by socialists with the same heat with which it is made by their opponents. The late Dr. Rivers, whose death cannot be sufficiently deplored, discussed this question in a lecture at University College, published in his posthumous book on *Psychology and Politics*. This is the only discussion of this topic known to me that can lay claim to be scientific. It sets forth certain anthropological data which show that socialism is not contrary to human nature in Melanesia; it then points out that we do not know whether human nature is the same in Melanesia as in Europe; and it concludes that the only way of finding out whether socialism is contrary to European human nature is to try it. It is interesting that on the basis of this conclusion he was willing to become a Labour candidate. But he would certainly not have added to the heat and passion in which political controversies are usually enveloped.

I will now venture on a topic which people find even more difficulty in treating dispassionately, namely marriage customs. The bulk of the population of every country is persuaded that all marriage customs

other than its own are immoral, and that those who combat this view only do so in order to justify their own loose lives. In India, the re-marriage of widows is traditionally regarded as a thing too horrible to contemplate. In Catholic countries, divorce is thought very wicked, but some failure of conjugal fidelity is tolerated, at least in men. In America, divorce is easy, but extra-conjugal relations are condemned with the utmost severity. Mohammedans believe in polygamy, which we think degrading. All these differing opinions are held with extreme vehemence, and very cruel persecutions are inflicted upon those who contravene them. Yet no one in any of the various countries makes the slightest attempt to show that the custom of his own country contributes more to human happiness than the custom of others.

When we open any scientific treatise on the subject, such as (for example) Westermarck's History of Human Marriage, we find an atmosphere extraordinarily different from that of popular prejudice. We find that every kind of custom has existed, many of them such as we should have supposed repugnant to human nature. We think we can understand polygamy, as a custom forced upon women by male oppressors. But what are we to say of the Tibetan custom, according to which one woman has several husbands? Yet travellers in Tibet assure us that family life there is at least as harmonious as in Europe. A little of such reading must soon reduce any candid person to complete scepticism; since there seem to be no data enabling us to say that one marriage custom is better or worse than another. Almost all involve cruelty and intolerance towards offenders against the local code, but otherwise they have nothing in common. It seems that sin is geographical. From this conclusion, it is

only a small step to the further conclusion that the notion of "sin" is illusory, and that the cruelty habitually practised in punishing it is unnecessary. It is just this conclusion which is so unwelcome to many minds, since the infliction of cruelty with a good conscience is a delight to moralists. That is why they invented Hell:

Nationalism is of course an extreme example of fervent belief concerning doubtful matters. I think it may be safely said that any scientific historian, writing now a history of the Great War, is bound to make statements which, if made during the war, would have exposed him to imprisonment in every one of the belligerent countries on both sides. Again with the exception of China, there is no country where people tolerate the truth about themselves; at ordinary times, the truth is only thought ill-mannered, but in war-time it is thought criminal. Opposing systems of violent belief are built up, the falsehood of which is evident from the fact that they are only believed by those who share the same national bias. But the application of reason to these systems of belief is thought as wicked as the application of reason to religious dogmas was formerly thought. When people are challenged as to why scepticism in such matters should be wicked, the only answer is that myths help to win wars, so that a rational nation would be killed rather than kill. The view that there is something shameful in saving one's skin by wholesale slander of foreigners is one which, so far as I know, has hitherto found no supporters among professional moralists outside the ranks of the Quakers. If it is suggested that a rational nation would find ways of keeping out of wars altogether, the answer is usually mere abuse.

What would be the effect of a spread of rational scepticism? Human events spring from passions.

which generate systems of attendant myths. Psychoanalysts have studied the individual manifestations of this process in lunatics, certified and uncertified. A man who has suffered some humiliation invents a theory that he is King of England, and develops all kinds of ingenious explanations of the fact that he is not treated with that respect which his exalted position demands. In this case, his delusion is one with which his neighbours do not sympathize, so they lock him up. But if, instead of asserting only his own greatness, he asserts the greatness of his nation or his class or his creed, he wins hosts of adherents, and becomes a political or religious leader, even if, to the impartial outsider, his views seem just as absurd as those found in asylums. In this way a collective insanity grows up, which follows laws very similar to those of individual insanity. Every one knows that it is dangerous to dispute with a lunatic who thinks he is King of England; but as he is isolated, he can be over-powered. When a whole nation shares a delusion, its anger is of the same kind as that of an individual lunatic if its pretensions are disputed, but nothing short of war can compel it to submit to reason.

The part played by intellectual factors in human behaviour is a matter as to which there is much disagreement among psychologists. There are two quite distinct questions: (1) how far are beliefs operative as causes of actions? (2) how far are beliefs derived from logically adequate evidence, or capable of being so derived? On both questions, psychologists are agreed in giving a much smaller place to the intellectual factors than the plain man would give, but within this general agreement there is room for considerable differences of degree. Let us take the two questions in succession.

(1) How far are beliefs operative as causes of action? Let us not discuss the question theoretically, but let us take an ordinary day of an ordinary man's life. He begins by getting up in the morning, probably from force of habit, without the intervention of any belief. He eats his breakfast, catches his train, reads his newspaper, and goes to his office, all from force of habit. There was a time in the past when he formed these habits, and in the choice of the office, at least, belief played a part. He probably believed, at the time, that the job offered to him there was as good as he was likely to get. In most men, belief plays a part in the original choice of a career, and therefore, derivatively, in all that is entailed by this choice.

At the office, if he is an underling, he may continue to act merely from habit, without active volition, and without the explicit intervention of belief. It might be thought that, if he adds up columns of figures, he believes the arithmetical rules which he employs. But that would be an error; these rules are mere habits of his body, like those of a tennis player. They were acquired in youth, not from an intellectual belief that they corresponded to the truth, but to please the schoolmaster, just as a dog learns to sit on its hind legs and beg for food. I do not say that all education is of this sort, but certainly most learning of the three R's is.

If, however, our friend is a partner or director, he may be called upon during his day to make difficult decisions of policy. In these decisions it is probable that belief will play a part. He believes that some things will go up and others will go down, that so-and-so is a sound man, and such-and-such on the verge of bankruptcy. On these beliefs he acts. It is just because he is called upon to act on beliefs rather than

mere habits that he is considered such a much greater man than a mere clerk, and is able to get so much more money—provided his beliefs are true.

In his home-life there will be much the same proportion of occasions when belief is a cause of action. At ordinary times, his behaviour to his wife and children will be governed by habit, or by instinct modified by habit. On great occasions—when he proposes marriage, when he decides what school to send his son to, or when he finds reason to suspect his wife of unfaithfulness—he cannot be guided wholly by habit. In proposing marriage, he may be guided by mere instinct, or he may be influenced by the belief that the lady is rich. If he is guided by instinct, he no doubt believes that the lady possesses every virtue, and this may seem to him to be a cause of his action, but in fact it is merely another effect of the instinct which alone suffices to account for his action. In choosing a school for his son, he probably proceeds in much the same way as in making difficult business decisions; here belief usually plays an important part. If evidence comes into his possession showing that his wife has been unfaithful, his behaviour is likely to be purely instinctive, but the instinct is set in operation by a belief, which is the first cause of everything that follows.

Thus although beliefs are not directly responsible for more than a small part of our actions, the actions for which they are responsible are among the most important, and largely determine the general structure of our lives. In particular, our religious and political actions are associated with beliefs.

(2) I come now to our second question, which is itself twofold: (a) how far are beliefs in fact based upon evidence? (b) how far is it possible or desirable that they should be?

(a) The extent to which beliefs are based upon evidence is very much less than believers suppose. Take the kind of action which is most nearly rational: the investment of money by a rich City man. You will often find that his view (say) on the question whether the French franc will go up or down depends upon his political sympathies, and yet is so strongly held that he is prepared to risk money on it. In bankruptcies it often appears that some sentimental factor was the original cause of ruin. Political opinions are hardly ever based upon evidence, except in the case of civil servants, who are forbidden to give utterance to them. There are of course exceptions. In the tariff reform controversy which began twenty-five years ago, most manufacturers supported the side that would increase their own incomes, showing that their opinions were really based on evidence, however little their utterances would have led one to suppose so. We have here a complication. Freudians have accustomed us to "ration-alizing", i.e., the process of inventing what seem to ourselves rational grounds for a decision or opinion that is in fact quite irrational. But there is, especially in English-speaking countries, a converse process which may be called "irrationalizing". A shrewd man will sum up, more or less subconsciously, the pros and cons of a question from a selfish point of view. (Unselfish considerations seldom weigh subconsciously except where one's children are concerned.) Having come to a sound egoistic decision by the help of the unconscious, a man proceeds to invent, or adopt from others, a set of high-sounding phrases showing how he is pursuing the public good at immense personal sacrifice. Anybody who believes that these phrases give his real reasons must suppose him quite incapable of judging evidence, since the supposed public good is not

going to result from his action. In this case a man appears less rational than he is; what is still more curious, the irrational part of him is conscious and the rational part unconscious. It is this trait in our characters that has made the English and Americans so successful.

Shrewdness, when it is genuine, belongs more to the unconscious than to the conscious part of our nature. It is, I suppose, the main quality required for success in business. From a moral point of view, it is a humble quality, since it is always selfish; yet it suffices to keep men from the worse crimes. If the Germans had had it, they would not have adopted the unlimited submarine campaign. If the French had had it, they would not have behaved as they did in the Ruhr. If Napoleon had had it, he would not have gone to war again after the Treaty of Amiens. It may be laid down as a general rule to which there are few exceptions that, when people are mistaken as to what is to their own interest, the course that they believe to be wise is more harmful to others than the course that really is wise. Therefore anything that makes people better judges of their own interest does good. There are innumerable examples of men making fortunes because, on moral grounds, they did something which they believed to be contrary to their own interests. For instance, among early Quakers there were a number of shopkeepers who adopted the practice of asking no more for their goods than they were willing to accept, instead of bargaining with each customer, as everybody else did. They adopted this practice because they held it to be a lie to ask more than they would take. But the convenience to customers was so great that everybody came to their shops, and they grew rich. (I forget where I read this, but if my memory serves



me it was in some reliable source.) The same policy *might* have been adopted from shrewdness, but in fact no one was sufficiently shrewd. Our unconsciousness is more malevolent than it pays us to be; therefore the people who do most completely what is in fact to their interest are those who deliberately, on moral grounds, do what they believe to be against their interest. Next to them come the people who try to think out rationally and consciously what is to their own interest, eliminating as far as possible the influence of passion. Third come the people who have instinctive shrewdness. Last of all come the people whose malevolence overbalances their shrewdness, making them pursue the ruin of others in ways that lead to their own ruin. This last class embraces 90 per cent. of the population of Europe.

I may seem to have digressed somewhat from my topic, but it was necessary to disentangle unconscious reason, which is called shrewdness, from the conscious variety. The ordinary methods of education have practically no effect upon the unconscious, so that shrewdness cannot be taught by our present technique. Morality, also, except where it consists of mere habit, seems incapable of being taught by present methods; at any rate I have never noticed any beneficent effect upon those who are exposed to frequent exhortations. Therefore on our present lines any deliberate improvement must be brought about by intellectual means. We do not know how to teach people to be shrewd or virtuous, but we do know, within limits, how to teach them to be rational: it is only necessary to reverse the practice of education authorities in every particular. We may hereafter learn to create virtue by manipulating the ductless glands and stimulating or restraining their secretions. But for the present it is easier to create

rationality than virtue—meaning by “rationality” a scientific habit of mind in forecasting the effects of our actions.

(b) This brings me to the question: How far could or should men’s actions be rational? Let us take “should” first. There are very definite limits, to my mind, within which rationality should be confined; some of the most important departments of life are ruined by the invasion of reason. Leibniz in his old age told a correspondent that he had only once asked a lady to marry him, and that was when he was fifty. “Fortunately,” he added, “the lady asked time to consider. This gave me also time to consider, and I withdrew the offer.” Doubtless his conduct was very rational, but I cannot say that I admire it.

Shakespeare puts “the lunatic, the lover, and the poet” together, as being “of imagination all compact”. The problem is to keep the lover and the poet, without the lunatic. I will give an illustration. In 1919 I saw *The Trojan Women* acted at the Old Vic. There is an unbearably pathetic scene where Astyanax is put to death by the Greeks for fear he should grow up into a second Hector. There was hardly a dry eye in the theatre, and the audience found the cruelty of the Greeks in the play hardly credible. Yet those very people who wept were, at that very moment, practising that very cruelty on a scale which the imagination of Euripides could have never contemplated. They had lately voted (most of them) for a Government which prolonged the blockade of Germany after the armistice, and imposed the blockade of Russia. It was known that these blockades caused the death of immense numbers of children, but it was felt desirable to diminish the population of enemy countries: the children, like Astyanax, might grow up to emulate their fathers.

Euripides the poet awakened the lover in the imagination of the audience; but lover and poet were forgotten at the door of the theatre, and the lunatic (in the shape of the homicidal maniac) controlled the political actions of these men and women who thought themselves kind and virtuous.

Is it possible to preserve the lover and the poet without preserving the lunatic? In each of us, all three exist in varying degrees. Are they so bound up together that when the one is brought under control the others perish? I do not believe it. I believe there is in each of us a certain energy which must find vent in actions not inspired by reason, but may find vent in art, in passionate love, or in passionate hate, according to circumstances. Respectability, regularity, and routine—the whole cast-iron discipline of a modern industrial society—have atrophied the artistic impulse, and imprisoned love so that it can no longer be generous and free and creative, but must be either stuffy or furtive. Control has been applied to the very things which should be free, while envy, cruelty, and hate sprawl at large with the blessing of nearly the whole bench of Bishops. Our instinctive apparatus consists of two parts—the one tending to further our own life and that of our descendants, the other tending to thwart the lives of supposed rivals. The first includes the joy of life, and love, and art, which is psychologically an offshoot of love. The second includes competition, patriotism, and war. Conventional morality does everything to suppress the first and encourage the second. True morality would do the exact opposite. Our dealings with those whom we love may be safely left to instinct; it is our dealings with those whom we hate that ought to be brought under the dominion of reason. In the modern world, those whom we effec-

tively hate are distant groups, especially foreign nations. We conceive them abstractly, and deceive ourselves into the belief that acts which are really embodiments of hatred are done from love of justice or some such lofty motive. Only a large measure of scepticism can tear away the veils which hide this truth from us. Having achieved that, we could begin to build a new morality, not based on envy and restriction, but on the wish for a full life and the realization that other human beings are a help and not a hindrance when once the madness of envy has been cured. This is not a Utopian hope; it was partially realized in Elizabethan England. It could be realized to-morrow if men would learn to pursue their own happiness rather than the misery of others. This is no impossibly austere morality, yet its adoption would turn our earth into a paradise.

*From Sceptical Essays (1928).*

## THE UNIVERSITY

In previous chapters we have considered the education in character and knowledge which, in a good social system, should be open to everybody, except for serious special reasons, such as a musical genius. (It would have been unfortunate if Mozart had been obliged to learn ordinary school subjects up to the age of eighteen.) But even in an ideal community there would, I think, be many people who would not go to the University. I am convinced that, at present, only a minority of the population can profit by a scholastic education prolonged to the age of twenty-one or twenty-two. Certainly the idle rich who at present infest the older universities very often derive no benefit from them but merely contract habits of dissipation. We have therefore to ask on what principle we are to select those who should go to the University. At present they are in the main those whose parents can afford to send them, though this principle of selection is being increasingly modified by the scholarship system. Obviously, the principle of selection ought to be educational, not financial. A boy or girl of eighteen, who has a good school education, is capable of doing useful work. If he or she is to be exempted for a further period of three or four years, the community has a right to expect that the time will be profitably employed. But before deciding who is to go to the University, we must have some view as to the function of the University in the life of the community.

British universities have passed through three stages, of which, however, the second is not yet wholly displaced by the third. At first, they were training colleges for the clergy, to whom, in the Middle Ages, learning was almost wholly confined. Then, with the

Renaissance the idea gained ground that every well-to-do person ought to be educated, though women were supposed to need less education than men. "The education of a gentleman" was given at the universities throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and is still given at Oxford. This ideal, which was formerly very useful, is now out-of-date; it depended upon aristocracy, and cannot flourish either in a democracy or in an industrial plutocracy. If there is to be an aristocracy, it had better be composed of educated gentlemen; but it is better still to have no aristocracy. I need not argue this question, since it was decided in England by the Reform Bill and the repeal of the Corn Laws, and in America by the War of Independence. It is true that we still have, in this country, the forms of aristocracy, but the spirit is that of plutocracy, which is quite a different thing. Snobbery makes successful business men send their sons to Oxford to be turned into "gentlemen", but the result is to give them a distaste for business, which reduces their children again to comparative poverty and the need of earning a living. The "education of a gentleman" has therefore ceased to be an important part of the life of the nation, and may be ignored in considering the future.

The universities are thus reverting to a position more analogous to that which they occupied in the Middle Ages; they are becoming training schools for the professions. Barristers, clergymen, and medical men have usually had a university education; so have the first division of the civil service. An increasing number of engineers and technical workers in various businesses are university men. As the world grows more complicated and industry becomes scientific, an increasing number of experts are required, and in the

main they are supplied by the universities. Old-fashioned people lament the intrusion of technical schools into the haunts of pure learning, but it continues nonetheless, because it is demanded by plutocrats who care nothing for "culture". It is they, much more than the insurgent democracy, who are the enemies of pure learning. "Useless" learning, like "art for art's sake", is an aristocratic, not a plutocratic, ideal; where it lingers, it is because the Renaissance tradition is not yet dead. I regret the decay of this ideal profoundly; pure learning was one of the best things associated with aristocracy. But the evils of aristocracy were so great as easily to outweigh this merit. In any case, industrialism must kill aristocracy, whether we desire it or not. We may as well make up our minds, therefore, to save what we can by attaching it to new and more potent conceptions; so long as we cling to mere tradition, we shall be fighting a losing battle. Ø.

If pure learning is to survive as one of the purposes of universities, it will have to be brought into relation with the life of the community as a whole, not only with the refined delights of a few gentlemen of leisure. I regard disinterested learning as a matter of great importance, and I should wish to see its place in academic life increased, not diminished. Both in England and in America, the main force tending to its diminution has been the desire to get endowments from ignorant millionaires. The cure lies in the creation of an educated democracy, willing to spend public money on objects which our captains of industry are unable to appreciate. This is by no means impossible, but it demands a general raising of the intellectual level. It would be much facilitated if our learned men would more frequently emancipate themselves from the attitude of hangers-on of the rich, which they have in-

herited from a time when patrons were their natural source of livelihood. It is, of course, possible to confound learning with learned men. To take a purely imaginary example, a learned man may improve his financial position by teaching brewing instead of organic chemistry; he gains, but learning suffers. If the learned man had a more genuine love for learning, he would not be politically on the side of the brewer who endows a professorship of brewing. And if he were on the side of democracy, democracy would be more ready to see the value of his learning. For all these reasons, I should wish to see learned bodies dependent upon public money rather than upon the benefactions of rich men. This evil is greater in America than in England, but it exists in England, and may increase.

Leaving aside these political considerations, I shall assume that universities exist for two purposes: on the one hand, to train men and women for certain professions; on the other hand, to pursue learning and research without regard to immediate utility. We shall therefore wish to see at the universities those who are going to practise these professions, and those who have that special kind of ability which will enable them to be valuable in learning and research. But this does not decide, by itself, how we are to select the men and women for the professions.

At present, it is very difficult to enter upon such a profession as law or medicine unless one's parents have a certain amount of money, since the training is expensive and earnings do not begin at once. The consequence is that the principle of selection is social and hereditary, not fitness for the work. Take medicine as illustrative. A community which wished to have its doctoring done efficiently would select for medical



training those young people who showed most keenness and aptitude for the work. At present this principle is applied partially, to select among those who can afford the training; but it is quite probable that many of those who would make the best doctors are too poor to take the course. This involves a deplorable waste of talent. Let us take another example of a somewhat different kind. England is a very thickly populated country, which imports most of its food. From a number of points of view, but especially from that of safety in war, it would be a boon if more of our food were produced at home. Yet no measures are taken to see that our very limited area is efficiently cultivated. Farmers are selected mainly by heredity: as a rule, they are the sons of farmers. The others are men who have bought farms, which implies some capital but not necessarily any agricultural skill. It is known that Danish methods of agriculture are more productive than ours, but no steps are taken to cause our farmers to know about them. We ought to insist that every person allowed to cultivate more than a small holding should have a diploma in scientific agriculture, just as we insist on a motorist having a licence. The hereditary principle has been abandoned in government, but it lingers in many other departments of life. Wherever it exists, it promotes the inefficiency to which it formerly led in public affairs. We must replace it by two correlative rules: first, that no one shall be allowed to undertake important work without having acquired the necessary skill; secondly, that this skill shall be taught to the ablest of those who desire it, quite independently of their parents' means. It is obvious that these two rules would enormously increase efficiency.

University education should therefore be regarded as a privilege for special ability, and those who possess

the skill but no money should be maintained at the public expense during their course. No one should be admitted unless he satisfies the tests of ability, and no one should be allowed to remain unless he satisfies the authorities that he is using his time to advantage. The idea of the University as a place of leisure where rich young men loaf for three or four years is dying, but, like Charles II, it is an unconscionable time about it.

When I say that a young man or woman at the University should not be allowed to be idle, I must hasten to add that the tests of work must not consist in a mechanical conformity to system. In the newer universities in this country, there is a regrettable tendency to insist upon attendance at innumerable lectures. The arguments in favour of individual work, which are allowed to be strong in the case of infants in a Montessori school, are very much stronger in the case of young people of twenty, particularly when, as we are assuming, they are keen and exceptionally able. When I was an undergraduate, my feeling, and that of most of my friends, was that lectures were a pure waste of time. No doubt we exaggerated, but not much. The real reason for lectures is that they are obvious work, and therefore business men are willing to pay for them. If university teachers adopted the best methods, business men would think them idle, and insist upon cutting down the staff. Oxford and Cambridge, because of their prestige, are to some extent able to apply the right methods; but the newer universities are unable to stand up against business men, and so are most American universities. The teacher should, at the beginning of the term, give a list of books to be read carefully, and a slight account of other books which some may like and others not. He should set papers, which can only be answered by noticing the important points

in the books intelligently. He should see the pupils individually when they have done their papers. About once a week or once a fortnight, he should see such as care to come in the evening, and have desultory conversations about matter more or less connected with their work. All this is not very different from the practice at the older universities. If a pupil chooses to set himself a paper, different from that of the teacher but equally difficult, he shall be at liberty to do so. The industry of the pupils can be judged by their papers.

There is, however, one point of great importance. Every university teacher should be himself engaged in research, and should have sufficient leisure and energy to know what is being done in his subject in all countries. In university teaching, skill in pedagogy is no longer important; what is important is knowledge of one's subject and keenness about what is being done in it. This is impossible for a man who is overworked and nervously exhausted by teaching. His object is likely to become distasteful to him, and his knowledge is almost sure to be confined to what he learnt in youth. Every university teacher ought to have a Sabbatical year (one in every seven) to be spent in foreign universities or in otherwise acquiring knowledge of what is being done abroad. This is common in America, but European countries have too much intellectual pride to admit that it is necessary. In this they are quite mistaken. Then men who taught me mathematics at Cambridge were almost wholly untouched by the Continental mathematics of the previous twenty or thirty years; throughout my undergraduate time, I never heard the name of Weierstrass. It was only by subsequent travel that I came in contact with modern mathematics. This was no rare or exceptional cir-

cumstance. Of many universities at many periods similar things could be said.

There is in universities a certain opposition between those who care most for teaching and those who care most for research. This is almost entirely due to a wrong conception of teaching, and to the presence of a number of students whose industry and capacity are below the level which ought to be exacted as a condition of residence. The idea of the old-fashioned school-master persists to some extent at universities. There is a desire to have a good moral effect on students, and a wish to drill them in old-fashioned, worthless information, largely known to be false, but supposed to be morally elevating. Students ought not to be exhorted to work, but they should not be allowed to remain if they are found to be wasting their time, whether from idleness or from lack of ability. The only morality which can be profitably exacted is that of work; the rest belongs to earlier years. And the morality of work should be exacted by sending away those who do not possess it, since evidently they had better be otherwise employed. A teacher should not be expected to work long hours at teaching, and should have abundant leisure for research; but he should be expected to employ this leisure wisely. Re

Research is at least as important as education, when we are considering the functions of universities in the life of mankind. New knowledge is the chief cause of progress, and without it the world would soon become stationary. It could continue, for a time, to improve by the diffusion and wider use of existing knowledge. but this process, by itself, could not last long. And even the pursuit of knowledge, if it is utilitarian, is not self-sustaining. Utilitarian knowledge needs to be fructified by disinterested investigation, which has

no motive beyond the desire to understand the world better. All the great advances are at first purely theoretical, and are only afterwards found to be capable of practical applications. And even if some splendid theory never has any practical use, it remains of value on its own account; for the understanding of the world is one of the ultimate goods. If science and organization had succeeded in satisfying the needs of the body and in abolishing cruelty and war, the pursuit of knowledge and beauty would remain to exercise our love of strenuous creation. I should not wish the poet, the painter, the composer, or the mathematician to be preoccupied with some remote effect of his activities in the world of practice. He should be occupied, rather, in the pursuit of a vision, in capturing and giving permanence to something which he has first seen dimly for a moment which he has loved with such ardour that the joys of this world have grown pale by comparison. All great art and all great science springs from the passionate desire to embody what was at first an unsubstantial phantom, a beckoning beauty luring men away from safety and ease to a glorious torment. The men in whom this passion exists must not be fettered by the shackles of a utilitarian philosophy, for to their ardour we owe all that makes man great.

From *On Education*

## THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE CITIZEN

That education is desirable is the opinion of all modern civilized States, but is, nevertheless, a proposition which has at all times been disputed by some men whose judgment commands respect. Those who oppose education do so on the ground that it cannot achieve its professed objects. Before we can adequately examine their opinion, we must, therefore, decide what it is that we should wish education to accomplish if possible: on this question there are as many divergent views as there are conceptions of human welfare. But there is one great temperamental cleavage which goes deeper than any of the other controversies, and that is the cleavage between those who consider education primarily in relation to the individual psyche, and those who consider it in relation to the community.

Assuming that education should do something to afford a training and not merely to prevent impediments to growth, the question arises whether education should train good individuals or good citizens. It may be said, and it would be said by any person of Hege-  
lian tendencies, that there can be no antithesis between the good citizen and the good individual. The good individual is he who ministers to the good of the whole, and the good of the whole is a pattern made up of the good of individuals. As an ultimate metaphysical truth I am not prepared either to combat or to support this thesis, but in practical daily life the education which results from regarding a child as an individual is very different from that which results from regarding him as a future citizen. The cultivation of the individual mind is not, on the face of it, the same thing as the production of a useful citizen, Goethe, for example, was a less useful citizen than James Watt.

but as an individual must be reckoned superior. There is such a thing as the good of the individual as distinct from a little fraction of the good of the community. Different people have different conceptions of what constitutes the good of the individual; and I have no wish to argue with those who take a view different from my own. But whatever view may be taken, it is difficult to deny that the cultivation of the individual and the training of the citizen are different things.

What constitutes the good of the individual? I will try to give my own answer without in any way suggesting that others should agree with me.

First and foremost, the individual, like Leibniz's monads, should mirror the world. Why? I cannot say why, except that knowledge and comprehensiveness appear to me glorious attributes, in virtue of which I prefer Newton to an oyster. The man who holds concentrated and sparkling within his own mind, as within a *camera obscura*, the depths of space, the evolution of the sun and planets, the geological ages of the earth, and the brief history of humanity, appears to me to be doing what is distinctively human and what adds most to the diversified spectacle of nature. I would not abate this view even if it should prove, as much of modern physics seems to suggest, that the depths of space and the "dark backward and abysm of time" were only coefficients in the mathematician's equations. For in that case man becomes even more remarkable as the inventor of the starry heavens and the ages of cosmic antiquity: what he loses in knowledge he gains in imagination.

But while the cognitive part of man is the basis of his excellence, it is far from being the whole of it. It is not enough to mirror the world. It should be mirrored with emotion: a specific emotion appropriate to

the object, and a general joy in the mere act of knowing. But knowing and feeling together are still not enough for the complete human being. In this world of flux men bear their part as causes of change, and in the consciousness of themselves as causes they exercise will and become aware of power. Knowledge, emotion, and power, all these should be widened to the utmost in seeking the perfection of the human being. Power, Wisdom, and Love, according to traditional theology, are the respective attributes of the Three Persons of the Trinity, and in this respect at any rate man made God in his own image.

In this we are thinking of man as an individual. We are considering him as he has been considered by Buddhists, Stoics, Christian saints, and all mystics. The elements of knowledge and emotion in the perfect individual as we have been portraying him are not essentially social. It is only through the will and through the exercise of power that the individual whom we have been imagining becomes an effective member of the community. And even so the only place which the will, as such, can give to a man is that of dictator. The will of the individual considered in isolation is the god-like will which says "let such things be". The attitude of the citizen is a very different one. He is aware that his will is not the only one in the world, and he is concerned, in one way or another, to bring harmony out of the conflicting wills that exist within his community. The individual as such is self-subsistent, while the citizen is essentially circumscribed by his neighbours. With the exception of Robinson Crusoe we are of course all in fact citizens, and education must take account of this fact. But it may be held that we shall ultimately be better citizens if we are first aware of our all potentialities as individuals before we descend



to the compromises and practical-acquiescences of the political life. The fundamental characteristic of the citizen is that he co-operates, in intention if not in fact. Now the man who wishes to co-operate, unless he is one of exceptional powers, will look about for some ready-made purpose with which to co-operate. Only a man of very exceptional greatness can conceive in solitude a purpose in which it would be well for men to co-operate, and having conceived it can persuade men to follow him. There have been such men. Pythagoras thought it well to study geometry, for which every schoolboy to this day has reason to curse him. But this solitary and creative form of citizenship is rare, and is not likely to be produced by an education designed for the training of citizens. Citizens as conceived by governments are persons who admire the *status quo* and are prepared to exert themselves for its preservation. Oddly enough, while all governments aim at producing men of this type to the exclusion of all other types, their heroes in the past are of exactly the sort that they aim at preventing in the present. Americans admire George Washington and Jefferson, but imprison those who share their political opinions. The English admire Boadicea, whom they would treat exactly as the Romans did if she were to appear in modern India. All the Western nations admire Christ, who would certainly be suspect to Scotland Yard if He lived now, and would be refused American citizenship on account of His unwillingness to bear arms. This illustrates the ways in which citizenship as an ideal is inadequate, for as an ideal it involves an absence of creativeness, and a willingness to acquiesce in the powers that be, whether oligarchic or democratic, which is contrary to what is characteristic of the greatest men, and tends, if over-

emphasized, to prevent ordinary men from attaining the greatness of which they are capable. ©

I do not mean to be understood as an advocate of rebellion. Rebellion in itself is no better than acquiescence in itself, since it is equally determined by relation to what is outside ourselves rather than by a purely personal judgment of value. Whether rebellion is to be praised or deprecated depends upon that against which a person rebels, but there should be the possibility of rebellion on occasion, and not only a blind acquiescence produced by a rigid education in conformity. And what is perhaps more important than either rebellion or acquiescence, there should be the capacity to strike out a wholly new line, as was done by Pythagoras when he invented the study of geometry.

The issue between citizenship and individuality is important in education, in politics, in ethics, and in metaphysics. In education it has a comparatively simple practical aspect, which can be to some degree considered apart from the theoretical issue. The education of the young of a whole community is an expensive business, which, in the main, is bound to fall to the lot of the State. The only other organization sufficiently interested in forming the minds of the young to have any really important share in education is the Church. The purpose of the State is, of course, to train citizens. For certain historical reasons, this purpose is as yet considerably mitigated by tradition. In the Middle Ages education meant the education of the priest. From the Renaissance until recent times it meant the education of a gentleman. Under the influence of snobbish democracy, it has come to mean an education which makes a man seem like a gentleman. Many things of little utility to the citizen as such are taught in schools, with a view to

making the scholars genteel. Other elements in education remain from the ecclesiastical tradition of the Middle Ages, of which the purpose was to enable a man to apprehend the ways of God. Gentility and godliness are attributes of the individual rather than of the citizen. The Christian religion as a whole is a religion of the individual, owing to the fact that it arose among men destitute of political power. It is concerned primarily with the relation of the soul to God; and while it considers the relation of a man to his neighbour, it considers it as resulting from the man's own emotions, not from laws and social institutions.

The political element in Christianity, as it exists at the present day, came in with Constantine. Before his day it was the Christian's duty to disobey the State, while since his day it has, as a rule and in the main, been the Christian's duty to obey the State. The anarchic origin of Christianity has, however, left a leaven which has led, throughout its history, to revivals of the primitive attitude of disobedience. The Cathari, the Albigenses, the Spiritual Franciscans, all in their various ways rejected authority in favour of the inner light. Protestantism began in a revolt against authority, and has never found any logical justification for such exercise of theological jurisdiction as it has been inclined to claim after it had acquired control of the government. Consequently, Protestantism has been driven by an inner logic to the acceptance of religious toleration, a view which Catholicism has never adopted in theory, and has only accepted in practice for reasons of temporary convenience. In this, Catholicism represents the tradition of the Roman Emperor, while Protestantism has reverted to the individualism of the Apostles and the Early Fathers.

Religions may be divided into those that are politi-

cal and those that concern the individual soul. Confucianism is a political religion: Confucius, as he wandered from court to court, became concerned essentially with the problem of government, and with the instilling of such virtues as to make good government easy. Buddhism, on the contrary, in spite of the fact that in its early days it was the religion of princes, is essentially non-political. I do not mean that it has always remained so. In Tibet it is as political as the papacy, and in Japan I have met high Buddhist dignitaries who reminded me of English archdeacons. Nevertheless, the Buddhist, in his more religious moments, considers himself essentially as a solitary being. Islam, on the contrary, was from its very beginning a political religion. Mahomet made himself a ruler of men, and the Caliphs who succeeded him remained so until the conclusion of the Great War. It is typical of the difference between Islam and Christianity that the Caliph combined within himself both temporal and spiritual authority, which to a Mahometan are not distinct; whereas Christianity, by its non-political character, was led to create two rival politicians, namely, the Pope and the Emperor, of whom the former based his claims to temporal power upon the unimportance of secular rule. Communism, as it has developed in Russia, is a political religion analogous to Islam. It is, however, unavoidably influenced by Byzantine tradition; and there is a possibility that the Communist party may take the place of the Church, leaving the secular government to that degree of independence of ecclesiastical authority which it possessed before the Revolution. In this, as in other matters, Russia is divided between an Eastern and a Western mentality. In so far as Russia is Asiatic, the Communist party takes the place of the Caliphate;

while in so far as Russia is European, the Communist party takes the place of the Church.

The purpose of this bird's-eye view of the history of religions has been to suggest that the elements in current education which are concerned with individual culture are, in the main, products of tradition, and are likely to be more and more replaced by education in citizenship. Education in citizenship, if it is wise, can retain what was best in individual culture. But if it is in any way shortsighted, it will stunt the individual in order to make him a convenient tool of government. It is therefore important to realize the dangers inherent in the ideals of citizenship when narrowly conceived. Those who institute State systems of education will cause men to deteriorate, even as citizens, if they take a narrow view of what constitutes a good citizen. Only men of wide individual culture are capable of appreciating what individual culture has to contribute to citizenship. Unfortunately, in the present day, such men tend to be replaced more and more by men of executive ability, or by mere politicians who must be rewarded for their services.

An education of which the purpose is to make good citizens has two very different forms, according as it is directed to the support or to the overthrow of the existing system. It might be supposed, in view of the importance of the State in education, that education would be almost always directed to the support of the *status quo*. This however, is not the case. Except in Russia, the influence of religion and of the middle class is sufficiently strong to cause a very large part of education to remain reactionary wherever Socialists have acquired power. On the other hand, before the French Revolution, and again before the Russian Revolution, education, while not widespread, was in

the main anti-governmental. In the more backward parts of the United States at the present day there is a similar tendency. State Universities tend to teach, more or less unintentionally, doctrines which are repugnant to the ignorant farmers who pay the taxes on which the Universities live. The farmers, not unnaturally, think that those who pay the piper should call the tune, but when they cannot understand the piper, or know what tune he is playing, they find this a little difficult. But in spite of these exceptions, education in the modern world tends to be a reactionary force, supporting the government when it is conservative, and opposing when it is progressive. Unfortunately, also, the elements of good citizenship which are emphasized in schools and Universities are the worst elements and not the best. What is emphasized most of all is patriotism in a somewhat militant form: that is to say, a narrow devotion to the persons living in a certain area, as opposed to those living elsewhere, and willingness to further the interests of the persons in the chosen area by the use of military force. With regard to the internal affairs, citizenship, as generally taught, perpetuates traditional injustices. The great majority of well-to-do young men, for example, felt patriotic during the General Strike when they acted as blacklegs. Hardly any of them had been so educated as to be able to conceive the case in favour of the strikers. Wherever an injustice exists, it is possible to invoke the ideal of legality and constitutionality in its support. Educators in every country except Russia tend to be constitutionally timid, and, either by their income or by their snobbery, to be adherents of the rich. On both grounds their teaching tends to over-emphasize the importance of the law and the constitution, although these give the past a paralysing hold

over the present. By reaction against this over-emphasis, those who desire any radical improvement in the world are compelled to be revolutionary, and the revolutionary's conception of duty to the community is liable to be just as narrow, and in the long run just as dangerous, as that of the advocate of law and order.

There are, however, certain respects in which the advocate of change is likely to give better education than the advocate of the *status quo*. Animal habit is sufficient by itself to make a man like the old ways, just as it makes a horse like to turn down a road which it usually turns down. None of the higher mental processes are required for conservatism. The advocate of change, on the contrary, must have a certain degree of imagination in order to be able to conceive of anything different from what exists. He must also have some power of judging the present from the standpoint of values, and, since he cannot well be unaware that the *status quo* has its advocates, he must realize that there are at least two views which are possible for a sane human being. Moreover, he is not obliged to close his sympathies against the victims of existing cruelties, or to invent elaborate reasons to prove that easily preventable sufferings ought not to be prevented. Both intelligence and sympathy, therefore, tend to be less repressed by an education hostile to the *status quo* than by one which is friendly to it.

To this, however, there are certain limitations. Hostility to the *status quo* may be derived from either of two sources: it may spring from sympathy with the unfortunate or from hatred of the fortunate. If it springs from the latter, it involves just as much limitation of sympathy as is involved in conservatism. Many revolutionaries in their day-dreams are not so much concerned with the happiness that is to come to the

common people as with the vengeance that they will be able to wreak upon the insolent holders of power from whom they are suffering in the present. On the intellectual side, again, there is a tendency for advocates of change to organize themselves into groups, welded together by a narrow orthodoxy, hating heresy, and viewing it as moral treachery in favour of prosperous sinners. Orthodoxy is the grave of intelligence, no matter what orthodoxy it may be. And in this respect the orthodoxy of the radical is no better than that of the reactionary.

One of the most important ways in which individual culture conflicts with the education of the citizen, narrowly conceived, is in respect of the scientific attitude towards doubtful questions. Science has developed a certain technique, which is essentially a technique of discovery, that is to say, of change. The scientific frame of mind is, broadly speaking, that which facilitates discovery, not that which causes a man to have an unwavering belief in the present tenets of science. A well-educated citizen is likely to be incapable of discovery, since he will respect his elders and betters, reverence the great men of the past generation, and look with horror upon all subversive doctrines. The modern State, which is built upon science, is therefore in a difficulty. Some States prefer unorthodox people who invent new explosives, others prefer that their young men should be orthodox, and should carry on the great traditions of the past. The Byzantines, when they could have purchased the help of the West by a few theological concessions, chose instead to preserve their orthodoxy, and suffered defeat at the hands of the Turk. Similarly, the British Admiralty, when faced with the terrible alternative of either listening to subversive young men or becoming obsolete through ad-



miration of Nelson, prefers the latter alternative, whatever sufferings may be entailed by its reverence for the great traditions of our ancestors. So at least it is said by those who should know. (A)

It is one of the contradictions of our time that science, which is the source of power, and more particularly of governmental power, depends for its advancement upon an essentially anarchic state of mind in the investigator. The scientific state of mind is neither sceptical nor dogmatic. The sceptic holds that the truth is undiscoverable, while the dogmatist holds that it is already discovered. The man of science holds that the truth is discoverable though not discovered, at any rate in the matters which he is investigating. But even to say that the truth is discoverable is to say rather more than the genuine man of science believes, since he does not conceive his discoveries as final and absolute, but as approximations subject to future correction. Absence of finality is of the essence of the scientific spirit. The beliefs of the man of science are therefore tentative and undogmatic. But in so far as they result from his own researches, they are personal, not social. They depend, that is to say, upon what he himself has ascertained by observation and inference, not upon what society considers it prudent for the good citizen to believe. This conflict between the scientific spirit and the governmental use of science is likely ultimately to bring scientific progress to a standstill, since scientific technique will be increasingly used to instil orthodoxy and credulity. If this is not to happen, it will be necessary that boys showing a certain degree of aptitude for science shall be exempted from the usual training in citizenship, and given a licence to think. Persons reaching a certain level in examinations will be allowed to place after their names

the letters L.T., meaning "Licensed to think". Such persons shall thereafter never be disqualified from any post on the ground that they think their superiors fools.

Speaking more seriously, the whole conception of truth is one which is difficult to reconcile with the usual ideals of citizenship. It may, of course, be said, as is said by pragmatists, that the conception of truth in its traditional form has no validity, and that the truth is only what it is convenient to believe. If this be the case, truth can be determined by Act of Parliament. Leigh Hunt found it to be inconvenient to believe that the Prince Regent was fat, since this opinion caused him to be incarcerated. It follows that the Prince Regent was thin. It is difficult in such a case as this to accept the pragmatist's philosophy. One can hardly resist the conviction that there is something objectively and absolutely true about the proposition that the Prince Regent was fat. I can, of course, imagine a large number of arguments designed to escape from this conclusion. The word "fat" is a relative term. I remember that when the late Master of Christ's, by no means a small man, found himself at dinner between two of the most eminent writers of our time, he remarked that he was having the unusual experience of feeling thin. Compared to some prize pigs the Prince Regent may have been thin. Therefore, in order to make Leigh Hunt's statement accurate, it would be necessary to say that the Prince Regent belonged to the fattest one per cent. of adult males, or some such statement as that. It would be possible to say: "the ratio of the Prince Regent's weight to His Highness's height exceeds that of all but one per cent. of His Majesty's adult male subjects". This statement might, of course, be on the margin of doubt, but if so it could be made quite certainly correct by substi-

tuting two per cent. for one per cent. It cannot be seriously maintained that such a proposition is true because it is convenient to believe it, or becomes false through the fact that it is criminal to utter it. I have chosen an instance from a time more than a hundred years since, and one which no longer arouses political passion. But analogous matters of fact are at the present day of interest to governments, and there are still many propositions which no person of scientific mind can deny, but which no person who wishes to keep out of jail will utter. All the governments of the world adopt elaborate methods of concealing truths which they consider undesirable, and inflict various forms of penalty upon those who spread knowledge which is thought bad for the population. This applies especially to knowledge of the kind which is considered seditious, and the kind which is considered obscene. I shall not give instances, since, if I did, I should myself fall under the ban of the law.

For the reasons which we have been considering, education in citizenship has grave dangers. Nevertheless, the argument in favour of some education designed to produce social cohesion is overwhelming. The amenities of civilized life depend upon co-operation, and every increase in industrialism demands an increase in co-operation. China, for example, has all the requisites for prosperity and high culture, except the existence of a strong centralised government. Latin America, even since it emancipated itself from Spain and Portugal, has been kept backward by the anarchic tendencies of its inhabitants. There is some evidence that the United States is preparing to follow the example of Latin America. Certainly the greatest danger from which the United States suffers at the present time is the absence of any vivid sense of citizen-

ship on the part of a large proportion of its inhabitants. This cannot be attributed to any failure to emphasize citizenship in education; on the contrary, the whole educational machine in America, from the public schools to the Universities, is concerned to emphasize citizenship, and to impress its duties upon the youthful mind. In spite of this educational effort, the average American, owing either to the pioneering tradition or to the fact that his recent ancestors were Europeans, does not have that instinctive sense of the community which exists in the older countries of Europe. And unless he acquires it there is a danger that the whole industrial system may break down.

Apart from national cohesion within the State, which is all that State education attempts to achieve at present, international cohesion, and a sense of the whole human race as one co-operative unit, is becoming increasingly necessary if our scientific civilization is to survive. I think this survival will demand, as a minimum condition, the establishment of a world State and the subsequent institution of a world-wide system of education designed to produce loyalty to the world State. No doubt such a system of education will entail, at any rate for a century or two, certain crudities which will militate against the development of the individual. But if the alternative is chaos and the death of civilization, the price will be worth paying. Modern communities are more closely knit than those of past times in their economic and political structure; and if they are to be successful there must be a corresponding increase in the sense of citizenship on the part of individual men and women. Loyalty to a world State would not, of course, entail the worst feature of loyalty to one of the existing States, namely, the encouragement of war. But it might entail consi-

derable curtailment of the intellectual and of the æsthetic impulses. I think, nevertheless, that the most vital need of the near future will be the cultivation of a vivid sense of citizenship of the world. When once the world as a single economic and political unit has become secure, it will be possible for individual culture to revive. But until that time our whole civilization remains in jeopardy. Considered *sub specie aeternitatis*, the education of the individual is to my mind a finer thing than the education of the citizen; but considered politically, in relation to the needs of the time, the education of the citizen must, I fear, take the first place.

From *Education and the Social Order*

# THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN A LIBERAL EDUCATION

## I

Science, to the ordinary reader of newspapers, is represented by a varying selection of sensational triumphs, such as wireless telegraphy and aeroplanes, radio-activity and the marvels of modern alchemy. It is not of this aspect of science that I wish to speak. Science, in this aspect, consists of detached up-to-date fragments, interesting only until they are replaced by something newer and more up-to-date, displaying nothing of the systems of patiently constructed knowledge out of which, almost as a casual incident, have come the practically useful results which interest the man in the street. The increased command over the forces of nature which is derived from science is undoubtedly an amply sufficient reason for encouraging scientific research, but this reason has been so often urged and is so easily appreciated that other reasons, to my mind quite as important, are apt to be overlooked. It is with these other reasons, especially with the intrinsic value of a scientific habit of mind in forming our outlook on the world, that I shall be concerned in what follows.

The instance of wireless telegraphy will serve to illustrate the difference between the two points of view. Almost all the serious intellectual labour required for the possibility of this invention is due to three men—Faraday, Maxwell, and Hertz. In alternating layers of experiment and theory these three men built up the modern theory of electromagnetism, and demonstrated the identity of light with electromagnetic waves. The system which they discovered is one of profound

intellectual interest, bringing together and unifying an endless variety of apparently detached phenomena, and displaying a cumulative mental power which cannot but afford delight to every generous spirit. The mechanical details which remained to be adjusted in order to utilise their discoveries for a practical system of telegraphy demanded, no doubt, very considerable ingenuity, but had not that broad sweep and that universality which could give them intrinsic interest as an object of disinterested contemplation.

From the point of view of training the mind, of giving that well-informed, impersonal outlook which constitutes culture in the good sense of this much-misused word, it seems to be generally held indisputable that a literary education is superior to one based on science. Even the warmest advocates of science are apt to rest their claims on the contention that culture ought to be sacrificed to utility. Those men of science who respect culture, when they associate with men learned in the classics, are apt to admit, not merely politely, but sincerely, a certain inferiority on their side, compensated doubtless by the services which science renders to humanity, but nonetheless real. And so long as this attitude exists among men of science, it tends to verify itself: the intrinsically valuable aspects of science tend to be sacrificed to the merely useful, and little attempt is made to preserve that leisurely, systematic survey by which the finer quality of mind is formed and nourished.

But even if there be, in present fact, any such inferiority as is supposed in the educational value of science, this is, I believe, not the fault of science itself, but the fault of the spirit in which science is taught. If its full possibilities were realised by those who teach it, I believe that its capacity of producing those habits of

mind which constitute the highest mental excellence would be at least as great as that of literature, and more particularly of Greek and Latin literature. In saying this I have no wish whatever to disparage a classical education. I have not myself enjoyed its benefits, and my knowledge of Greek and Latin authors is derived almost wholly from translations. But I am firmly persuaded that the Greeks fully deserve all the admiration that is bestowed upon them, and that it is a very great and serious loss to be unacquainted with their writings. It is not by attacking them, but by drawing attention to neglected excellences in science, that I wish to conduct my argument.

One defect, however, does seem inherent in a purely classical education—namely, a too exclusive emphasis on the past. By the study of what is absolutely ended and can never be renewed, a habit of criticism towards the present and the future is engendered. The qualities in which the present excels are qualities to which the study of the past does not direct attention, and to which, therefore, the student of Greek civilisation may easily become blind. In what is new and growing there is apt to be something crude, insolent, even a little vulgar, which is shocking to the man of sensitive taste; quivering from the rough contact, he retires to the trim gardens of a polished past, forgetting that they were reclaimed from the wilderness by men as rough and earth-soiled as those from whom he shrinks in his own day. The habit of being unable to recognise merit until it is dead is too apt to be the result of a purely bookish life, and a culture based wholly on the past will seldom be able to pierce through everyday surroundings to the essential splendour of contemporary things, or to the hope of still greater splendour in the future.



"My eyes saw not the men of old;  
And now their age away has rolled.

'I weep—to think I shall not see  
The heroes of posterity.'" *the future*

So says the Chinese poet; but such impartiality is rare in the more pugnacious atmosphere of the West, where the champions of past and future fight a never-ending battle, instead of combining to seek out the merits of both.

This consideration, which militates not only against the exclusive study of the classics, but against every form of culture which has become static, traditional, and academic, leads inevitably to the fundamental question: What is the true end of education? But before attempting to answer this question it will be well to define the sense in which we are to use the word "education". For this purpose I shall distinguish the sense in which I mean to use it from two others, both perfectly legitimate, the one broader and the other narrower than the sense in which I mean to use the word.

*سليم* In the broader sense, education will include not only what we learn through instruction, but all that we learn through personal experience—the formation of character through the education of life. Of this aspect of education, vitally important as it is, I will say nothing, since its consideration would introduce topics quite foreign to the question with which we are concerned.

In the narrower sense, education may be confined to instruction, the imparting of definite information on various subjects, because such information, in and for itself, is useful in daily life. Elementary education—reading, writing and arithmetic—is almost wholly of this kind. But instruction, necessary as it is, does not

*per se* constitute education, in the sense in which I wish to consider it.

Education, in the sense in which I mean it, may be defined as *the formation, by means of instruction, of certain mental habits and a certain outlook on life and the world.* It remains to ask ourselves, what mental habits, and what sort of outlook, can be hoped for as the result of instruction? When we have answered this question we can attempt to decide what science has to contribute to the formation of habits and outlook which we desire.

Our whole life is built about a certain number—not a very small number—of primary instincts and impulses. Only what is in some way connected with these instincts and impulses appears to us desirable or important; there is no faculty, whether “reason” or “virtue” or whatever it may be called, that can take our active life and our hopes and fears outside the region controlled by these first movers of all desire. Each of them is like a queen-bee, aided by a hive of workers gathering honey; but when the queen is gone the workers languish and die, and the cells remain empty of their expected sweetness. So with each primary impulse in civilised man: it is surrounded and protected by a busy swarm of attendant derivative desires, which store up in its service whatever honey the surrounding world affords. But if the queen-impulse dies, the death-dealing influence, though retarded a little by habit, spreads slowly through all the subsidiary impulses, and a whole tract of life becomes inexplicably colourless. What was formerly full of zest, and so obviously worth doing that it raised no questions, has now grown dreary and purposeless: with a sense of disillusion we inquire the meaning of life, and decide, perhaps that all is vanity. The search for an outside

meaning that can *compel* an inner response must always be disappointed: all "meaning" must be at bottom related to our primary desires, and when they are extinct no miracle can restore to the world the value which they reflected upon it.

The purpose of education, therefore, cannot be to create any primary impulse which is lacking in the uneducated; the purpose can only be to enlarge the scope of those that human nature provides, by increasing the number and variety of attendant thoughts, and by showing where the most permanent satisfaction is to be found. Under the impulse of a Calvinistic horror of the "natural man", this obvious truth has been too often misconceived in the training of the young: "nature" has been falsely regarded as excluding all that is best in what is natural, and the endeavour to teach virtue has led to the production of stunted and contorted hypocrites instead of full-grown human beings. From such mistakes in education a better psychology or a kinder heart is beginning to preserve the present generation; we need, therefore, waste no more words on the theory that the purpose of education is to thwart or eradicate nature.

But although nature must supply the initial force of desire, nature is not, in the civilised man, the spasmodic, fragmentary, and yet violent set of impulses that it is in the savage. Each impulse has its constitutional ministry of thought and knowledge and reflection, through which possible conflicts of impulses are foreseen, and temporary impulses are controlled by the unifying impulse which may be called wisdom. In this way education destroys the crudity of instinct, and increases through knowledge the wealth and variety of the individual's contacts with the outside world, making him no longer an isolated fighting unit,

but a citizen of the universe, embracing distant countries, remote regions of space, and vast stretches of past and future within the circle of his interests. It is this simultaneous softening in the insistence of desire and enlargement of its scope that is the chief moral end of education.

Closely connected with this moral end is the more purely intellectual aim of education, the endeavour to make us see and imagine the world in an objective manner, as far as possible as it is in itself, and not merely through the distorting medium of personal desire. The complete attainment of such an objective view is no doubt an ideal, indefinitely approachable, but not actually and fully realisable. Education, considered as a process of forming our mental habits and our outlook on the world, is to be judged successful in proportion as its outcome approximates to this ideal; in proportion, that is to say, as it gives us a true view of our place in society, of the relation of the whole human society to its non-human environment, and of the nature of the non-human world as it is in itself apart from our desires and interests. If this standard is admitted, we can return to the consideration of science, inquiring how far science contributes to such an aim, and whether it is in any respect superior to its rivals in educational practice.

## II

Two opposite and at first sight conflicting merits belong to science as against literature and art. The one, which is not inherently necessary, but is certainly true at the present day, is hopefulness as to the future of human achievement, and in particular as to the useful work that may be accomplished by an intelligent student. This merit and the cheerful outlook which it

engenders prevent what might otherwise be the depressing effect of another aspect of science, to my mind also a merit, and perhaps its greatest merit—I mean the irrelevance of human passions and of the whole subjective apparatus where scientific truth is concerned. Each of these reasons for preferring the study of science requires some amplification. Let us begin with the first.

In the study of literature or art our attention is perpetually riveted upon the past: the men of Greece or of the Renaissance did better than any men do now; the triumphs of the former ages, so far from facilitating fresh triumphs in our own age, actually increase the difficulty of fresh triumphs by rendering originality harder of attainment; not only is artistic achievement not cumulative, but it seems even to depend upon a certain freshness and naivete of impulse and vision which civilisation tends to destroy. Hence comes, to those who have been nourished on the literary and artistic productions of former ages, a certain peevishness and undue fastidiousness towards the present, from which there seems no escape except into the deliberate vandalism which ignores tradition and in the search after originality achieves only the eccentric. But in such vandalism there is none of the simplicity and spontaneity out of which great art springs: theory is still the canker in its core, and insincerity destroys the advantages of a merely pretended ignorance.

The despair thus arising from an education which suggests no pre-eminent mental activity except that of artistic creation is wholly absent from an education which gives the knowledge of scientific method. The discovery of scientific method, except in pure mathematics, is a thing of yesterday; speaking broadly, we may say that it dates from Galileo. Yet already it has

transformed the world, and its success proceeds with ever-accelerating velocity. In science men have discovered an activity of the very highest value in which they are no longer, as in art, dependent for progress upon the appearance of continually greater genius, for in science the successors stand upon the shoulders of their predecessors; where one man of supreme genius has invented a method, a thousand lesser men can apply it. No transcendent ability is required in order to make useful discoveries in science; the edifice of science needs its masons, bricklayers, and common labourers as well as its foremen, master-builders, and architects. In art nothing worth doing can be done without genius; in science even a very moderate capacity can contribute to a supreme achievement.

In science the man of real genius is the man who invents a new method. The notable discoveries are often made by his successors, who can apply the method with fresh vigour, unimpaired by the previous labour of perfecting it; but the mental calibre of the thought required for their work, however brilliant, is not so great as that required by the first inventor of the method. There are in science immense numbers of different methods, appropriate to different classes of problems; but over and above them all, there is something not easily definable, which may be called *the* method of science. It was formerly customary to identify this with the inductive method, and to associate it with the name of Bacon. But the true inductive method was not discovered by Bacon, and the true method of science is something which includes deduction as much as induction, logic and mathematics as much as botany and geology. I shall not attempt the difficult task of stating what the scientific method is, but I will try to indicate the temper of mind out of

which the scientific method grows, which is the second of the two merits that were mentioned above as belonging to a scientific education.

The kernel of the scientific outlook is a thing so simple, so obvious, so seemingly trivial, that the mention of it may almost excite derision. The kernel of the scientific outlook is the refusal to regard our own desires, tastes, and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world. Stated thus baldly, this may seem no more than a trite truism. But to remember it consistently in matters arousing our passionate partisanship is by no means easy, especially where the available evidence is uncertain and inconclusive. A few illustrations will make this clear.

Aristotle, I understand, considered that the stars must move in circles because the circle is the most perfect curve. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he allowed himself to decide a question of fact by an appeal to æsthetico-moral considerations. In such a case it is at once obvious to us that this appeal was unjustifiable. We know now how to ascertain as a fact the way in which the heavenly bodies move, and we know that they do not move in circles, or even in accurate ellipses, or in any other kind of simply describable curve. This may be painful to a certain hankering after simplicity of pattern in the universe, but we know that in astronomy such feelings are irrelevant. Easy as this knowledge seems now, we owe it to the courage and insight of the first inventors of scientific method, and more especially of Galileo.

We may take as another illustration Malthus's doctrine of population. This illustration is all the better for the fact that his actual doctrine is now known to be largely erroneous. It is not his conclusions that are valuable, but the temper and method of his in-

quiry. As everyone knows, it was to him that Darwin owed an essential part of his theory of natural selection, and this was only possible because Malthus's outlook was truly scientific. His great merit lies in considering man not as the object of praise or blame, but as a part of nature, a thing with a certain characteristic behaviour from which certain consequences must follow. If the behaviour is not quite what Malthus supposed, if the consequences are not quite what he inferred, that may falsify his conclusions, but does not impair the value of his method. The objections which were made when his doctrine was new—that it was horrible and depressing, that people ought not to act as he said they did, and so on—were all such as implied an unscientific attitude of mind; as against all of them, his calm determination to treat man as a natural phenomenon marks an important advance over the reformers of the eighteenth century and the Revolution.

Under the influence of Darwinism the scientific attitude towards man has now become fairly common, and is to some people quite natural, though to most it is still a difficult and artificial intellectual contortion. There is, however, one study which is as yet almost wholly untouched by the scientific spirit—I mean the study of philosophy. Philosophers and the public imagine that the scientific spirit must pervade pages that bristle with allusions to ions, germ-plasms, and the eyes of shell-fish. But as the devil can quote Scripture, so the philosopher can quote science. The scientific spirit is not an affair of quotation of externally acquired information, any more than manners are an affair of the etiquette-book. [The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other desires in the interests of the desire to know—it involves sup-



pression of hopes and fears, love and hates, and the whole subjective emotional life, until we become subdued to the material, able to see it frankly, without pre-conceptions, without bias, without any wish except to see as it is, and without any belief that what it is must be determined by some relation, positive or negative, to what we should like it to be, or to what we can easily imagine it to be.

Now in philosophy this attitude of mind has not as yet been achieved. A certain self-absorption, not personal, but human, has marked almost all attempts to conceive the universe as a whole. Mind, or some aspect of it—thought or will or sentience—has been regarded as the pattern after which the universe is to be conceived, for no better reason, at bottom, than that such a universe would not seem strange, and would give us the cosy feeling that every place is like home. To conceive the universe as essentially progressive or essentially deteriorating, for example, is to give to our hopes and fears a cosmic importance which *may*, of course, be justified, but which we have as yet no reason to suppose justified. Until we have learnt to think of it in ethically neutral terms, we have not arrived at a scientific attitude in philosophy; and until we have arrived at such an attitude, it is hardly to be hoped that philosophy will achieve any solid results.

I have spoken so far largely of the negative aspect of the scientific spirit, but it is from the positive aspect that its value is derived. The instinct of constructiveness, which is one of the chief incentives to artistic creation, can find in scientific systems a satisfaction more massive than any epic poem. Disinterested curiosity, which is the source of almost all intellectual effort, finds with astonished delight that science can unveil secrets which might well have seemed for ever undiscover-

able. The desire for a larger life and wider interests, for an escape from private circumstances, and even from the whole recurring human cycle of birth and death, is fulfilled by the impersonal cosmic outlook of science as by nothing else. To all these must be added, as contributing to the happiness of the man of science, the admiration of splendid achievement, and the consciousness of inestimable utility to the human race. A life devoted to science is therefore a happy life, and its happiness is derived from the very best sources that are open to dwellers on this troubled and passionate planet.

From *Mysticism and Logic and other Essays* (1918)

## "USELESS" KNOWLEDGE

Francis Bacon, a man who rose to eminence by betraying his friends, asserted, no doubt as one of the ripe lessons of experience, that "knowledge is power". But this is not true of *all* knowledge. Sir Thomas Browne wished to know what song the sirens sang, but if he had ascertained this it would not have enabled him to rise from being a magistrate to being High Sheriff of his county. The sort of knowledge that Bacon had in mind was that which we call scientific. In emphasizing the importance of science, he was belatedly carrying on the tradition of the Arabs and the early Middle Ages, according to which knowledge consisted mainly of astrology, alchemy, and pharmacology, all of which were branches of science. A learned man was one who, having mastered these studies, had acquired magical powers. In the early eleventh century, Pope Sylvester II, for no reason except that he read books, was universally believed to be a magician in league with the devil. Prospero, who in Shakespeare's time was a mere phantasy, represented what had been for centuries the generally received conception of a learned man, so far at least as his powers of sorcery were concerned. Bacon believed—rightly, as we now know—that science could provide a more powerful magician's wand than any that had been dreamed of by the necromancers of former ages.

The renaissance, which was at its height in England at the time of Bacon, involved a revolt against the utilitarian conception of knowledge. The Greeks had acquired a familiarity with Homer, as we do with music-hall songs, because they enjoyed him, and without feeling that they were engaged in the pursuit of learning. But the men of the sixteenth century could not begin to understand him without first absorbing a

very considerable amount of linguistic erudition. They admired the Greeks, and did not wish to be shut out from their pleasures; they therefore copied them, both in reading the classics and in other less avowable ways. Learning, in the renaissance, was part of the joie de vivre, just as much as drinking or love-making. And this was true not only of literature, but also of sterner studies. Everyone knows the story of Hobbes's first contact with Euclid: opening the book, by chance, at the theorem of Pythagoras, he exclaimed, "By God, this is impossible," and proceeded to read the proofs backwards until, reaching the axioms, he became convinced. No one can doubt that this was for him a voluptuous moment, unsullied by the thought of the utility of geometry in measuring fields.

It is true that the renaissance found a practical use for the ancient languages in connection with theology. One of the earliest results of the new feeling for classical Latin was the discrediting of the forged decretals and the donation of Constantine. The inaccuracies which were discovered in the Vulgate and the Septuagint made Greek and Hebrew a necessary part of the controversial equipment of Protestant divines. The republican maxims of Greece and Rome were invoked to justify the resistance of Puritans to the Stuarts and of Jesuits to monarchs who had thrown off allegiance to the Pope. But all this was an effect, rather than a cause, of the revival of classical learning, which had been in full swing in Italy for nearly a century before Luther. The main motive of the renaissance was mental delight, the restoration of a certain richness and freedom in art and speculation which had been lost while ignorance and superstition kept the mind's eye in blinkers.

*blindness*  
The Greeks, it was found, had devoted a part of

their attention to matters not purely literary or artistic, such as philosophy, geometry, and astronomy. These studies, therefore, were respectable, but other sciences were more open to question. Medicine, it was true, was dignified by the names of Hippocrates and Galen; but in the intervening period it had become almost confined to Arabs and Jews, and inextricably inter-twined with magic. Hence the dubious reputation of such men as Paracelsus. Chemistry was in even worse odour, and hardly became respectable until the eighteenth century.

(In this way it was brought about that knowledge of Greek and Latin, with a smattering of geometry and perhaps astronomy, came to be considered the intellectual equipment of a gentleman.) The Greeks disdained the practical applications of geometry, and it was only in their decadence that they found a use for astronomy in the guise of astrology. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the main, studied mathematics with Hellenic disinterestedness, and tended to ignore the sciences which had been degraded by their connection with sorcery. A gradual change towards a wider and more practical conception of knowledge, which was going on throughout the eighteenth century, was suddenly accelerated at the end of that period by the French Revolution and the growth of machinery, of which the former gave a blow to gentlemanly culture while the latter offered new and astonishing scope for the exercise of ungentlemanly skill. Throughout the last hundred and fifty years, men have questioned more and more vigorously the value of "useless" knowledge, and have come increasingly to believe that the only knowledge worth having is that which is applicable to some part of the economic life of the community.

In countries such as France and England, which have a traditional educational system, the utilitarian view of knowledge has only partially prevailed. There are still, for example, professors of Chinese in the Universities who read the Chinese classics but are unacquainted with the works of Sun Yat-sen, which created modern China. There are still men who know ancient history in so far as it was related by authors whose style was pure, that is to say up to Alexander in Greece and Nero in Rome, but refuse to know the much more important later history because of the literary inferiority of the historians who related it. Even in France and England, however, the old tradition is dying, and in more up-to-date countries, such as Russia and the United States, it is utterly extinct. In America, for example, educational commissions point out that fifteen hundred words are all that most people employ in business correspondence, and therefore suggest that all others should be avoided in the school curriculum. Basic English, a British invention, goes still further, and reduces the necessary vocabulary to eight hundred words. The conception of speech as something capable of æsthetic value is dying out, and it is coming to be thought that the sole purpose of words is to convey practical information. In Russia the pursuit of practical aims is even more whole-hearted than in America: all that is taught in educational institutions is intended to serve some obvious purpose in education or government. The only escape is afforded by theology: the sacred scriptures must be studied by some in the original German, and a few professors must learn philosophy in order to defend dialectical materialism against the criticisms of bourgeois metaphysicians. But as orthodoxy becomes more firmly established, even this tiny loophole will be closed.

Knowledge, everywhere, is coming to be regarded not as a good in itself, or as a means of creating a broad and humane outlook on life in general, but as merely an ingredient in technical skill. This is part of the greater integration of society which has been brought about by scientific technique and military necessity. There is more economic and political interdependence than there was in former times, and therefore there is more social pressure to compel a man to live in a way that his neighbours think useful. Educational establishments, except those for the very rich, or (in England) such as have become invulnerable through antiquity, are not allowed to spend their money as they like, but must satisfy the State that they are serving a useful purpose by imparting skill and instilling loyalty. This is part and parcel of the same movement which has led to compulsory military service, boy scouts, the organization of political parties, and the dissemination of political passion by the Press. We are all more aware of our fellow-citizens than we used to be, more anxious, if we are virtuous, to do them good, and in any case to make them do us good. We do not like to think of anyone lazily enjoying life, however refined may be the quality of his enjoyment. We feel that everybody ought to be doing something to help on the great cause (whatever it may be), the more so as so many bad men are working against it and ought to be stopped. We have not leisure of mind, therefore to acquire any knowledge except such as will help us in the fight for whatever it may happen to be that we think important. (S)

There is much to be said for the narrowly utilitarian view of education. There is not time to learn everything before beginning to make a living, and undoubtedly "useful" knowledge is *very* useful. It has

made the modern world. Without it, we should not have machines or motor-cars or railways or aeroplanes; it should be added that we should not have modern advertising or modern propaganda. Modern knowledge has brought about an immense improvement in average health, and at the same time has discovered how to exterminate large cities by poison gas. Whatever is distinctive of our world, as compared with former times, has its source in "useful" knowledge. No community as yet has enough of it, and undoubtedly education must continue to promote it.

It must also be admitted that a great deal of the traditional cultural education was foolish. Boys spent many years acquiring Latin and Greek grammar, without being, at the end, either capable or desirous (except in a small percentage of cases) of reading a Greek or Latin author. Modern languages and history are preferable, from every point of view, to Latin and Greek. They are not only more useful, but they give much more culture in much less time. For an Italian of the fifteenth century, since practically everything worth reading, if not in his own language, was in Greek or Latin, these languages were the indispensable keys to culture. But since that time great literatures have grown up in various modern languages, and the development of civilization has been so rapid that knowledge of antiquity has become much less useful in understanding our problems than knowledge of modern nations and their comparatively recent history. The traditional schoolmaster's point of view, which was admirable at the time of the revival of learning, became gradually unduly narrow, since it ignored what the world has done since the fifteenth century. And not only history and modern languages, but science also, when properly taught, contributes to culture. It is



therefore possible to maintain that education should have other aims than direct utility, without defending the traditional curriculum. Utility and culture, when both are conceived broadly, are found to be less incompatible than they appear to the fanatical advocates of either.

Apart, however, from the cases in which culture and direct utility can be combined, there is indirect utility, of various different kinds, in the possession of knowledge which does not contribute to technical efficiency. I think some of the worst features of the modern world could be improved by a greater encouragement of such knowledge and a less ruthless pursuit of mere professional competence.

When conscious activity is wholly concentrated on some one definite purpose, the ultimate result, for most people, is lack of balance accomplished by some form of nervous disorder. The men who directed German policy during the war made mistakes, for example, as regards the submarine campaign which brought America on to the side of the Allies, which any person coming fresh to the subject could have seen to be unwise, but which they could not judge sanely owing to mental concentration and lack of holidays. The same sort of thing may be seen wherever bodies of men attempt tasks which put a prolonged strain upon spontaneous impulses. Japanese imperialists, Russian Communists, and German Nazis all have a kind of tense fanaticism which comes of living too exclusively in the mental world of certain tasks to be accomplished. When the tasks are as important and as feasible as the fanatics suppose, the result may be magnificent; but in most cases narrowness of outlook has caused oblivion of some powerful counteracting force, or has made all such forces seem the work of the devil, to be met by

punishment and terror. Men as well as children have need of play, that is to say, of periods of activity having no purpose beyond present enjoyment. But if play is to serve its purpose, it must be possible to find pleasure and interest in matters not connected with work.

The amusements of modern urban populations tend more and more to be passive and collective, and to consist of inactive observation of the skilled activities of others. Undoubtedly such amusements are much better than none, but they are not good as would be those of a population which had, through education, a wider range of intelligent interests not connected with work. Better economic organization, allowing mankind to benefit by the productivity of machines, should lead to a very great increase of leisure, and much leisure is apt to be tedious except to those who have considerable intelligent activities and interests. If a leisured population is to be happy, it must be an educated population, and must be educated with a view to mental enjoyment as well as to the direct usefulness of technical knowledge.

The cultural element in the acquisition of knowledge, when it is successfully assimilated, forms the character of a man's thoughts and desires, making them concern themselves, in part at least, with large impersonal objects, not only with matters of immediate importance to himself. It has been too readily assumed that, when a man has acquired certain capacities by means of knowledge, he will use them in ways that are socially beneficial. The narrowly utilitarian conception of education ignores the necessity of training a man's purposes as well as his skill. There is in untrained human nature a very considerable element of cruelty, which shows itself in many ways, great and

small. Boys at school tend to be unkind to a new boy, or to one whose clothes are not quite conventional. Many women (and not a few men) inflict as much pain as they can by means of malicious gossip. The Spaniards enjoy bull-fights; the British enjoy hunting and shooting. The same cruel impulses take more serious forms in the hunting of Jews in Germany and Kulaks in Russia. All imperialism affords scope for them, and in war they become sanctified as the highest form of public duty.

Now while it must be admitted that highly educated people are sometimes cruel, I think there can be no doubt that they are less often so than people whose minds have lain fallow. The bully in a school is seldom a boy whose proficiency in learning is up to the average. When a lynching takes place, the ring-leaders are almost invariably very ignorant men. This is not because mental cultivation produces positive humanitarian feelings, though it may do so; it is rather because it gives other interests than the ill-treatment of neighbours, and other sources of self-respect than the assertion of domination. The two things most universally desired are power and admiration. Ignorant men can, as a rule, only achieve either by brutal means, involving the acquisition of physical mastery. Culture gives a man less harmful forms of power and more deserving ways of making himself admired. Galileo did more than any monarch has done to change the world, and his power immeasurably exceeded that of his persecutors. He had therefore no need to aim at becoming a persecutor in his turn.

Perhaps the most important advantage of "useless" knowledge is that it promotes a contemplative habit of mind. There is in the world much too much readi-

ness, not only for action without adequate previous reflection, but also for some sort of action on occasions *on which wisdom would counsel inaction*. People show their bias on this matter in various curious ways. Mephistopheles tells the young student that theory is grey but the tree of life is green, and everyone quotes this as if it were Goethe's opinion, instead of what he supposes the devil would be likely to say to an undergraduate. Hamlet is held up as an awful warning against thought without action, but no one holds up Othello as a warning against action without thought. Professors such as Bergson, from a kind of snobbery towards the practical man, decry philosophy, and say that life at its best should resemble a cavalry charge. For my part, I think action is best when it emerges from a profound apprehension of the universe and human destiny, not from some wildly passionate impulse of romantic but disproportioned self-assertion. A habit of finding pleasure in thought rather than in action is a safeguard against unwisdom and excessive love of power, a means of preserving serenity in misfortune and peace of mind among worries. A life confined to what is personal is likely, sooner or later, to become unbearably painful; it is only by windows into a larger and less fretful cosmos that the more tragic parts of life become endurable. *benzene*

A contemplative habit of mind has advantages ranging from the most trivial to the most profound. To begin with minor vexations, such as fleas, missing trains, or cantankerous business associates. Such troubles seem hardly worthy to be met by reflections on the excellence or heroism or the transitoriness of all human ills; and yet the irritation to which they give rise destroys many people's good temper and enjoyment of life. On such occasions, there is much consolation

to be found in out-of-the-way bits of knowledge which have some real or fancied connection with the trouble of the moment; or even if they have none, they serve to obliterate the present from one's thoughts. When assailed by people who are white with fury, it is pleasant to remember the chapter in Descartes' *Treatise on the Passions* entitled "Why those who grow pale with rage are more to be feared than those who grow red". When one feels impatient over the difficulty of securing international co-operation, one's impatience is diminished if one happens to think of the sainted King Louis IX, before embarking on his crusade, allying himself with the Old Man of the Mountain, who appears in the Arabian Nights as the dark source of half the wickedness in the world. When the rapacity of capitalists grows oppressive, one may be suddenly consoled by the recollection that Brutus, that exemplar of republican virtue, lent money to a city at 40 per cent, and hired a private army to besiege it when it failed to pay the interests.

Curious learning not only makes unpleasant things less unpleasant, but also makes pleasant things more pleasant. I have enjoyed peaches and apricots more since I have known that they were first cultivated in China in the early days of the Han dynasty; that Chinese hostages held by the great King Kaniska introduced them into India, whence they spread to Persia, reaching the Roman Empire, in the first century of our era; that the word "apricot" is derived from the same Latin source as the word "precocious", because the apricot ripens early; and that the A at the beginning was added by mistake, owing to a false etymology. All this makes the fruit taste much sweeter.

About a hundred years ago, a number of well-meaning philanthropists started societies "for the diffu-

sion of useful knowledge", with the result that people have ceased to appreciate the delicious savour of "useless" knowledge. Opening Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* at haphazard on a day when I was threatened by that mood, I learnt that there is a "melancholy matter", but that, while some think it may be engendered of all four humours, "Galen holds that it may be engendered of three alone, excluding phlegm of pituita, whose true assertion Valerius and Menardus stiffly maintain, and so doth Fuscus, Montaltus, Montanus. How (say they) can white become black?" In spite of this unanswerable argument, Hercules de Saxonia and Cardan, Guianerius and Laurentius, are (so Burton tells us) of the opposite opinion. Soothed by these historical reflections, my melancholy, whether due to three humours or to four, was dissipated. As a cure for too much zeal, I can imagine few measures more effective than a course of such ancient controversies.

But while the trivial pleasures of culture have their place as a relief from the trivial worries of practical life, the more important merits of contemplation are in relation to the greater evils of life, death and pain and cruelty, and the blind march of nations into unnecessary disaster. For those to whom dogmatic religion can no longer bring comfort, there is need of some substitute, if life is not to become dusty and harsh and filled with trivial self-assertion. The world at present is full of angry self-centred groups, each incapable of viewing human life as a whole, each willing to destroy civilization rather than yield an inch. To this narrowness no amount of technical instruction will provide an antidote. The antidote, in so far as it is a matter of individual psychology, is to be found in history, biology, astronomy, and all those studies which, without destroying self-respect, enable the in-

dividual to see himself in his proper perspective. What is needed is not this or that specific piece of information, but such knowledge as inspires a conception of the ends of human life as a whole : art and history, acquaintance with the lives of heroic individuals, and some understanding of the strangely accidental and ephemeral position of man in the cosmos—all this touched with an emotion of pride in what is distinctively human, the power to see and to know, to feel magnanimously and to think with understanding. It is from large perceptions combined with impersonal emotion that wisdom most readily springs.

Life, at all times full of pain, is more painful in our time than in the two centuries that preceded it. The attempt to escape from pain drives men to triviality, to self-deception, to the invention of vast collective myths. But these momentary alleviations do but increase the sources of suffering in the long run. Both private and public misfortune can only be mastered by a process in which will and intelligence interact: the part of will is to refuse to shirk the evil or accept an unreal solution, while the part of intelligence is to understand it, to find a cure if it is curable, and, if not, to make it bearable by seeing it in its relations, accepting it as unavoidable, and remembering what lies outside it in other regions, other ages, and the abysses of interstellar space.

*From In Praise of Idleness and other Essays*

## IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS\*

Like most of my generation, I was brought up on the saying: "Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do". Being a highly virtuous child, I believed all that I was told, and acquired a conscience which has kept me working hard down to the present moment. But although my conscience has controlled my *actions*, my *opinions* have undergone a revolution. I think that there is far too much work done in the world, that immense harm is caused by the belief that work is virtuous, and that what needs to be preached in modern industrial countries is quite different from what always has been preached. Everyone knows the story of the traveller in Naples who saw twelve beggars lying in the sun (it was before the days of Mussolini), and offered a lira to the laziest of them. Eleven of them jumped up to claim it, so he gave it to the twelfth. This traveller was on the right lines. But in countries which do not enjoy Mediterranean sunshine idleness is more difficult, and a great public propaganda will be required to inaugurate it. I hope that, after reading the following pages, the leaders of the Y.M.C.A. will start a campaign to induce good young men to do nothing. If so, I shall not have lived in vain.

Before advancing my own arguments for laziness, I must dispose of one which I cannot accept. Whenever a person who already has enough to live on proposes to engage in some everyday kind of job, such as school-teaching or typing, he or she is told that such conduct takes the bread out of other people's mouths, and is therefore wicked. If this argument were valid, it would only be necessary for us all to be idle in order that we should all have our mouths full.

---

\* Written in 1932.



of bread. What people who say such things forget is that what a man earns he usually spends, and in spending he gives employment. As long as a man spends his income, he puts just as much bread into people's mouths in spending as he takes out of other people's mouths in earning. The real villain, from this point of view, is the man who saves. If he merely puts his savings in a stocking, like the proverbial French peasant, it is obvious that they do not give employment. If he invests his savings, the matter is less obvious, and different cases arise.

One of the commonest things to do with savings is to lend them to some Government. In view of the fact that the bulk of the public expenditure of most civilized Governments consists in payment for past wars or preparation for future wars, the man who lends his money to a Government is in the same position as the bad men in Shakespeare who hire murderers. The net result of the man's economical habits is to increase the armed forces of the State to which he lends his savings. Obviously it would be better if he spent the money, even if he spent it in drink or gambling.

But, I shall be told, the case is quite different when savings are invested in industrial enterprises. When such enterprises succeed, and produce something useful, this may be conceded. In these days, however, no one will deny that most enterprises fail. That means that a large amount of human labour, which might have been devoted to producing something that could be enjoyed, was expended on producing machines which, when produced, lay idle and did no good to anyone. The man who invests his savings in a concern that goes bankrupt is therefore injuring others as well as himself. If he spent his money, say, in giving parties for his friends, they (we may hope) would get

pleasure, and so would all those upon whom he spent money, such as the butcher, the baker, and the bootlegger. But if he spends it (let us say) upon laying down rails for surface cars in some place where surface cars turn out to be not wanted, he has diverted a mass of labour into channels where it gives pleasure to no one. Nevertheless, when he becomes poor through the failure of his investment he will be regarded as a victim of undeserved misfortune, whereas the gay spendthrift, who has spent his money philanthropically, will be despised as a fool and a frivolous person.

All this is only preliminary. I want to say, in all seriousness, that a great deal of harm is being done in the modern world by belief in the virtuousness of WORK, and that the road to happiness and prosperity lies in an organized diminution of work.

First of all: what is work? Work is of two kinds: first, altering the position of matter at or near the earth's surface relatively to other such matter; second, telling other people to do so. The first kind is unpleasant and ill paid; the second is pleasant and highly paid. The second kind is capable of indefinite extension: there are not only those who give orders, but those who give advice as to what orders should be given. Usually two opposite kinds of advice are given simultaneously by two organized bodies of men; this is called politics. The skill required for this kind of work is not knowledge of the subjects as to which advice is given, but knowledge of the art of persuasive speaking and writing, *i.e.*, of advertising.

Throughout Europe, though not in America, there is a third class of men, more respected than either of the classes of workers. There are men who, through ownership of land, are able to make others pay for the privilege of being allowed to exist and to work.

These landowners are idle, and I might therefore be expected to praise them. Unfortunately, their idleness is only rendered possible by the industry of others; indeed their desire for comfortable idleness is historically the source of the whole gospel of work. The last thing they have ever wished is that others should follow their example.

From the beginning of civilization until the Industrial Revolution, a man could, as a rule, produce by hard work little more than was required for the subsistence of himself and his family, although his wife worked at least as hard as he did; and his children added their labour as soon as they were old enough to do so. The small surplus above bare necessities was not left to those who produced it, but was appropriated by warriors and priests. In times of famine there was no surplus; the warriors and priests, however, still secured as much as at other times, with the result that many of the workers died of hunger. This system persisted in Russia until 1917\*, and still persists in the East; in England, in spite of the Industrial Revolution, it remained in full force throughout the Napoleonic wars, and until a hundred years ago, when the new class of manufacturers acquired power. In America, the system came to an end with the Revolution, except in the South, where it persisted until the Civil War. A system which lasted so long and ended so recently has naturally left a profound impress upon men's thoughts and opinions. Much that we take for granted about the desirability of work is derived from this system, and, being pre-industrial, is not adapted to the modern world. Modern technique had made it

possible for leisure, within limits, to be not the prerogative of small privileged classes, but a right evenly distributed throughout the community. The morality of work is the morality of slaves, and the modern world has no need of slavery.

It is obvious that, in primitive communities, peasants, left to themselves, would not have parted with the slender surplus upon which the warriors and priests subsisted, but would have either produced less or consumed more. At first, sheer force compelled them to produce and part with the surplus. Gradually, however, it was found possible to induce many of them to accept an ethic according to which it was their duty to work hard, although part of their work went to support others in idleness. By this means the amount of compulsion required was lessened, and the expenses of government were diminished. To this day, 99 per cent of British wage-earners would be genuinely shocked if it were proposed that the King should not have a larger income than a working man. The conception of duty, speaking historically, has been a means used by the holders of power to induce others to live for the interests of their masters rather than for their own. Of course the holders of power conceal this fact from themselves by managing to believe that their interests are identical with the larger interests of humanity. Sometimes this is true; Athenian slave-owners, for instance, employed part of their leisure in making a permanent contribution to civilization which would have been impossible under a just economic system. Leisure is essential to civilization, and in former times leisure for the few was only rendered possible by the labours of the many. But their labours were valuable, not because work is good, but because leisure is good. And with modern technique it would.

be possible to distribute leisure justly without injury to civilization.

Modern technique has made it possible to diminish enormously the amount of labour required to secure the necessities of life for everyone. This was made obvious during the war. At that time, all the men in the armed forces, all the men and women engaged in the production of munitions, all the men and women engaged in spying, war propaganda, or Government offices connected with the war, were withdrawn from productive occupations. In spite of this, the general level of physical well-being among unskilled wage-earners on the side of the Allies was higher than before or since. The significance of this fact was concealed by finance: borrowing made it appear as if the future was nourishing the present. But that, of course, would have been impossible; a man cannot eat a loaf of bread that does not yet exist. The war showed conclusively that, by the scientific organization of production, it is possible to keep modern populations in fair comfort on a small part of the working capacity of the modern world. If, at the end of the war, the scientific organization, which had been created in order to liberate men for fighting and munition work, had been preserved, and the hours of work had been cut down to four, all would have been well. Instead of that the old chaos was restored, those whose work was demanded were made to work long hours, and the rest were left to starve as unemployed. Why? because work is a duty, and a man should not receive wages in proportion to what he has produced, but in proportion to his virtue as exemplified by his industry. —

This is the morality of the Slave State, applied in circumstances totally unlike those in which it arose. No wonder the result has been disastrous. Let us take

an illustration. Suppose that, at a given moment, a certain number of people are engaged in the manufacture of pins. They make as many pins as the world needs, working (say) eight hours a day. Someone makes an invention by which the same number of men can make twice as many pins as before. But the world does not need twice as many pins: pins are already so cheap that hardly any more will be bought at a lower price. In a sensible world, everybody concerned in the manufacture of pins would take to working four hours instead of eight, and everything else would go on as before. But in the actual world this would be thought demoralizing. The men still work eight hours, there are too many pins, some employers go bankrupt, and half the men previously concerned in making pins are thrown out of work. There is, in the end, just as much leisure as on the other plan, but half the men are totally idle while half are still overworked. In this way, it is insured that the unavoidable leisure shall cause misery all round instead of being a universal source of happiness. Can anything more insane be imagined?

The idea that the poor should have leisure has always been shocking to the rich. In England, in the early nineteenth century, fifteen hours was the ordinary day's work for a man; children sometimes did as much, and very commonly did twelve hours a day. When meddlesome busybodies suggested that perhaps these hours were rather long, they were told that work kept adults from drink and children from mischief. When I was a child, shortly after urban working men had acquired the vote, certain public holidays were established by law, to the great indignation of the upper classes. I remember hearing an old Duchess say: "What do the poor want with holidays? They ought

-to *work*." People nowadays are less frank, but the sentiment persists, and is the source of much of our economic confusion.

Let us, for a moment, consider the ethics of work frankly, without superstition. Every human being of necessity consumes, in the course of his life, a certain amount of the produce of human labour. Assuming, as we may, that labour is on the whole disagreeable, it is unjust that a man should consume more than he produces. Of course he may provide services rather than commodities, like a medical man, for example; but he should provide something in return for his board and lodging. To this extent, the duty of work must be admitted, but to this extent only.

I shall not deal upon the fact that, in all modern societies outside the U.S.S.R., many people escape even this minimum of work, namely all those who inherit money and all those who marry money. I do not think the fact that these people are allowed to be idle is nearly so harmful as the fact that wage-earners are expected to overwork or starve.

If the ordinary wage-earner worked four hours a day, there would be enough for everybody, and no unemployment—assuming a certain very moderate amount of sensible organization. This idea shocks the well-to-do, because they are convinced that the poor would not know how to use so much leisure. In America, men often work long hours even when they are already well off; such men, naturally, are indignant at the idea of leisure for wage-earners, except as the grim punishment of unemployment; in fact, they dislike leisure even for their sons. Oddly enough, while they wish their sons to work so hard as to have no time to be civilized, they do not mind their wives and daughters having no work at all. The snobbish admira-

tion of uselessness, which, in an aristocratic society, extends to both sexes, is, under a plutocracy, confined to women; this, however, does not make it any more in agreement with common sense.

The wise use of leisure, it must be conceded, is a product of civilization and education. A man who has worked long hours all his life will be bored if he becomes suddenly idle. But without a considerable amount of leisure a man is cut off from many of the best things. There is no longer any reason why the bulk of the population should suffer this deprivation; only a foolish asceticism, usually vicarious, makes us continue to insist on work in excessive quantities now that the need no longer exists.

In the new creed which controls the government of Russia, while there is much that is very different from the traditional teaching of the West, there are some things that are quite unchanged. The attitude of the governing classes, and especially of those who conduct educational propaganda, on the subject of the dignity of labour, is almost exactly that which the governing classes of the world have always preached to what were called the "honest poor". Industry, sobriety, willingness to work long hours for distant advantages, even submissiveness to authority, all these reappear; moreover authority still represents the will of the Ruler of the Universe, Who, however, is now called by a new name, Dialectical Materialism.

The victory of the proletariat in Russia has some points in common with the victory of the feminists in some other countries. For ages, men had conceded the superior saintliness of women, and had consoled women for their inferiority by maintaining that saintliness is more desirable than power. At last the feminists decided that they would have both, since the pioneers



among them believed all that the men had told them about the desirability of virtue, but not what they had told them about the worthlessness of political power. A similar thing has happened in Russia as regards manual work. For ages, the rich and their sycophants have written in praise of "honest toil", have praised the simple life, have professed a religion which teaches that the poor are much more likely to go to heaven than the rich, and in general have tried to make manual workers believe that there is some special nobility about altering the position of matter in space, just as men tried to make women believe that they desired some special nobility from their sexual enslavement. In Russia, all this teaching about the excellence of manual work has been taken seriously, with the result that the manual worker is more honoured than anyone else. What are, in essence, revivalist appeals are made, but not for the old purposes: they are made to secure shock workers for special tasks. Manual work is the ideal which is held before the young, and is the basis of all ethical teaching.

For the present, possibly, this is all to the good. A large country, full of natural resources, awaits development, and has to be developed with very little use of credit. In these circumstances, hard work is necessary, and is likely to bring a great reward. But what will happen when the point has been reached where everybody could be comfortable without working long hours?

In the West, we have various ways of dealing with this problem. We have no attempt at economic justice, so that a large proportion of the total produce goes to a small minority of the population, many of whom do no work at all. Owing to the absence of any central control over production we produce hosts of things that

are not wanted. We keep a large percentage of the working population idle, because we can dispense with their labour by making the others overwork. When all these methods prove inadequate, we have a war: we cause a number of people to manufacture high explosives, and a number of others to explode them, as if we were children who had just discovered fireworks. By a combination of all these devices we manage, though with difficulty, to keep alive the notion that a great deal of severe manual work must be the lot of the average man.

In Russia, owing to more economic justice and central control over production, the problem will have to be differently solved. The rational solution would be, as soon as the necessities and elementary comforts can be provided for all, to reduce the hours of labour gradually, allowing a popular vote to decide, at each stage, whether more leisure or more goods were to be preferred. But, having taught the supreme virtue of hard work, it is difficult to see how the authorities can aim at a paradise in which there will be much leisure and little work. It seems more likely that they will find continually fresh schemes, by which present leisure is to be sacrificed to future productivity. I read recently of an ingenious plan put forward by Russian engineers, for making the White Sea and the northern coasts of Siberia warm, by putting a dam across the Kara Sea. An admirable project, but liable to postpone proletarian comfort for a generation, while the nobility of toil is being displayed amid the ice-fields and snow-storms of the Arctic Ocean. This sort of thing, if it happens, will be the result of regarding the virtue of hard work as an end in itself, rather than as a means to a state of affairs in which it is no longer needed.

The fact is that moving matter about, while a cer-

tain amount of it is necessary to our existence, is emphatically not one of the ends of human life. If it were, we should have to consider every navvy superior to Shakespeare. We have been misled in this matter by two causes. One is the necessity of keeping the poor contented, which has led the rich, for thousands of years, to preach the dignity of labour, while taking care themselves to remain undignified in this respect. The other is the new pleasure in mechanism, which makes us delight in the astonishingly clever changes that we can produce on the earth's surface. Neither of these motives makes any great appeal to the actual worker. If you ask him what he thinks the best part of life, he is not likely to say: "I enjoy manual work because it makes me feel that I am fulfilling man's noblest task, and because I like to think how much man can transform his planet. It is true that my body demands periods of rest, which I have to fill in as best I may, but I am never so happy as when the morning comes and I can return to the toil from which my contentment springs." I have never heard working men say this sort of thing. They consider work, as it should be considered, a necessary means to a livelihood, and it is from their leisure hours that they derive whatever happiness they may enjoy.

It will be said that, while a little leisure is pleasant, men would not know how to fill their days if they had only four hours of work out of the twenty-four. In so far as this is true in the modern world, it is a condemnation of our civilization; it would not have been true at any earlier period. There was formerly a capacity for light-heartedness and play which has been to some extent inhibited by the cult of efficiency. The modern man thinks that everything ought to be done for the sake of something else, and never for its own

sake. Serious-minded persons, for example, are continually condemning the habit of going to the cinema, and telling us that it leads the young into crime. But all the work that goes to producing a cinema is respectable, because it is work, and because it brings a money profit. The notion that the desirable activities are those that bring a profit has made everything topsyturvy. The butcher who provides you with meat and the baker who provides you with bread are praiseworthy, because they are making money; but when you enjoy the food they have provided, you are merely frivolous, unless you eat only to get strength for your work. Broadly speaking, it is held that getting money is good and spending money is bad. Seeing that they are *two sides of one transaction*, this is absurd; one might as well maintain that keys are good, but keyholes are bad. Whatever merit there may be in the production of goods must be entirely derivative from the advantage to be obtained by consuming them. The individual, in our society, works for profit; but the social purpose of his work lies in the consumption of what he produces. It is this divorce between the individual and the social purpose of production that makes it so difficult for men to think clearly in a world in which profit-making is the incentive to industry. We think too much of production, and too little of consumption. One result is that we attach too little importance to enjoyment and simple happiness, and that we do not judge production by the pleasure that it gives to the consumer.

When I suggest that working hours should be reduced to four, I am not meaning to imply that all the remaining time should necessarily be spent in pure frivolity. I mean that four hours' work a day should entitle a man to the necessities and elementary com-

forts of life, and that the rest of his time should be his to use as he might see fit. It is an essential part of any such social system that education should be carried further than it usually is at present, and should aim, in part, at providing tastes which would enable a man to use leisure intelligently. I am not thinking mainly of the sort of things that would be considered "high-brow". Peasant dances have died out except in remote rural areas, but the impulses which caused them to be cultivated must still exist in human nature. The pleasures of urban populations have become mainly passive: seeing cinemas, watching football matches, listening to the radio, and so on. This results from the fact that their active energies are fully taken up with work; if they had more leisure, they would again enjoy pleasures in which they took an active part.

In the past, there was a small leisure class and a larger working class. The leisure class enjoyed advantages for which there was no basis in social justice; this necessarily made it oppressive, limited its sympathies, and caused it to invent theories by which to justify its privileges. These facts greatly diminished its excellence, but in spite of this drawback it contributed nearly the whole of what we call civilization. It cultivated the arts and discovered the sciences; it wrote the books, invented the philosophies, and refined social relations. Even the liberation of the oppressed has usually been inaugurated from above. Without the leisure class, mankind would never have emerged from barbarism.

The method of a hereditary leisure class without duties was, however, extraordinarily wasteful. None of the members of the class had been taught to be industrious, and the class as a whole was not exceptionally intelligent. The class might produce one Darwin,

but against him had to be set tens of thousands of country gentlemen who never thought of anything more intelligent than fox-hunting and punishing poachers. At present, the universities are supposed to provide, in a more systematic way, what the leisure class provided accidentally and as a by-product. This is a great improvement, but it has certain drawbacks. University life is so different from life in the world at large that men who live in an academic *milieu* tend to be unaware of the preoccupations and problems of ordinary men and women; moreover their ways of expressing themselves are usually such as to rob their opinions of the influence that they ought to have upon the general public. Another disadvantage is that in universities studies are organized, and the man who thinks of some original line of research is likely to be discouraged. Academic institutions, therefore, useful as they are, are not adequate guardians of the interests of civilization in a world where everyone outside their walls is too busy for unutilitarian pursuits.

In a world where no one is compelled to work more than four hours a day, every person possessed of scientific curiosity will be able to indulge it, and every painter will be able to paint without starving, however excellent his pictures may be. Young writers will not be obliged to draw attention to themselves by sensational pot-boilers, with a view to acquiring the economic independence needed for monumental works, for which, when the time at last comes, they will have lost the taste and the capacity. Men who, in their professional work, have become interested in some phase of economics or government, will be able to develop their ideas without the academic detachment that makes the work of university economists often seem lacking in reality. Medical men will have time to

learn about the progress of medicine, teachers will not be exasperatedly struggling to teach by routine methods things which they learnt in their youth, which may, in the interval, have been proved to be untrue.

Above all, there will be happiness and joy of life, instead of frayed nerves, weariness, and dyspepsia. The work exacted will be enough to make leisure delightful, but not enough to produce exhaustion. Since men will not be tired in their spare time, they will not demand only such amusements as are passive and vapid. At least 1 per cent will probably devote the time not spent in professional work to pursuits of some public importance, and, since they will not depend upon these pursuits for their livelihood, their originality will be unhampered, and there will be no need to conform to the standards set by elderly pundits. But it is not only in these exceptional cases that the advantages of leisure will appear. Ordinary men and women having the opportunity of a happy life, will become more kindly and less persecuting and less inclined to view others with suspicion. The taste for war will die out, partly for this reason, and partly because it will involve long and severe work for all. Good nature is, of all moral qualities, the one that the world needs most, and good nature is the result of ease and security, not of a life of arduous struggle. Modern methods of production have given us the possibility of ease and security for all; we have chosen, instead, to have overwork for some and starvation for the others. Hitherto we have continued to be as energetic as we were before there were machines; in this we have been foolish, but there is no reason to go on being foolish for ever.

From *In Praise of Idleness and other Essays* (1935)

## IS HAPPINESS STILL POSSIBLE ?

From the conversation and the books of some of my friends I have been almost led to conclude that happiness in the modern world has become an impossibility. I find, however, that this view tends to be dissipated by introspection, foreign travel, and the conversation of my gardener.

Happiness is of two sorts, though, of course, there are intermediate degrees. The two sorts I mean might be distinguished as plain and fancy, or animal and spiritual, or of the heart and of the head. The designation to be chosen among these alternatives depends, of course, upon the thesis to be proved. I am at the moment not concerned to prove any thesis, but merely to describe. Perhaps the simplest way to describe the difference between the two sorts of happiness is to say that one sort is open to any human being, and the other only to those who can read and write. When I was a boy I knew a man bursting with happiness whose business was digging wells. He was of enormous height and of incredible muscles; he could neither read nor write, and when in the year 1885 he got a vote for Parliament, he learnt for the first time that such an institution existed. His happiness did not depend upon intellectual sources; it was not based upon belief in natural law, or the perfectibility of the species, or the public ownership of public utilities, or the ultimate triumph of the Seventh Day Adventists, or any of the other creeds which intellectuals consider necessary to the enjoyment of life. It was based upon physical vigour, a sufficiency of work, and the overcoming of not insuperable obstacles in the shape of rock. The happiness of my gardener is of the same species; he wages a perennial war against rabbits, of which he speaks,



exactly as Scotland Yard speaks of Bolsheviks; he considers them dark, designing and ferocious, and is of opinion that they can only be met by means of a cunning equal to their own. Like the heroes of Valhalla who spent every day hunting a certain wild boar, which they killed every evening but which miraculously came to life again in the morning, my gardener can slay his enemy one day without any fear that the enemy will have disappeared the next day. Although well over seventy, he works all day and bicycles sixteen hilly miles to and from his work, but the fount of joy is inexhaustible, and it is "they rabbits" that supply it.

But, you will say, these simple delights are not open to superior people like ourselves. What joy can we experience in waging war on such puny creatures as rabbits? The argument, to my mind, is a poor one. A rabbit is very much larger than a yellow-fever bacillus, and yet a superior person can find happiness in making war upon the latter. Pleasures exactly similar to those of my gardener so far as their emotional content is concerned are open to the most highly educated people. The difference made by education is only in regard to the activities by which these pleasures are to be obtained. Pleasures of achievement demand difficulties such that beforehand success seems doubtful although in the end it is usually achieved. This is perhaps the chief reason why a not excessive estimate of one's own powers is a source of happiness. The man who underestimates himself is perpetually being surprised by success, whereas the man who overestimates himself is just as often surprised by failure. The former kind of surprise is pleasant, the latter unpleasant. It is therefore wise to be not unduly conceited, though also not too modest to be enterprising.

Of the more highly educated sections of the community, the happiest in the present day are the men of science. Many of the most eminent of them are emotionally simple, and obtain from their work a satisfaction so profound that they can derive pleasure from eating and even marrying. Artists and literary men consider it *de rigueur* to be unhappy in their marriages, but men of science quite frequently remain capable of old-fashioned domestic bliss. The reason of this is that the higher parts of their intelligence are wholly absorbed by their work, and are not allowed to intrude into regions where they have no functions to perform. In their work they are happy because in the modern world science is progressive and powerful, and because its importance is not doubted either by themselves or by laymen. They have therefore no necessity for complex emotions, since the simpler emotions meet with no obstacles. Complexity in emotions is like foam in a river. It is produced by obstacles which break the smoothly flowing current. But so long as the vital energies are unimpeded, they produce no ripple on the surface, and their strength is not evident to the unobservant.

All the conditions of happiness are realised in the life of the man of science. He has an activity which utilises his abilities to the full, and he achieves results which appear important not only to himself but to the general public, even when it cannot in the smallest degree understand them. In this he is more fortunate than the artist. When the public cannot understand a picture or a poem, they conclude that it is a bad picture or a bad poem. When they cannot understand the theory of relativity they conclude (rightly) that their education has been insufficient. Consequently Einstein is honoured while the best painters are

left to starve in garrets, and Einstein is happy while the painters are unhappy. Very few men can be genuinely happy in a life involving continual self-assertion against the scepticism of the mass of mankind, unless they can shut themselves up in a coterie and forget the cold outer world. The man of science has no need of a coterie, since he is thought well of by everybody except his colleagues. The artist, on the contrary, is in the painful situation of having to choose between being despised and being despicable. If his powers are of the first order, he must incur one or the other of these misfortunes—the former if he uses his powers, the latter if he does not. This has not been the case always and everywhere. There have been times when even good artists, even when they were young, were thought well of. Julius II, though he might ill-treat Michael Angelo, never supposed him incapable of painting pictures. The modern millionaire, though he may shower wealth upon elderly artists after they have lost their powers, never imagines that their work is as important as his own. Perhaps these circumstances have something to do with the fact that artists are on the average less happy than men of science.

It must, I think, be admitted that the most intelligent young people in Western countries tend to have that kind of unhappiness that comes of finding no adequate employment for their best talents. This, however, is not the case in Eastern countries. The intelligent young at the present day are probably happier in Russia than anywhere else in the world. They have there a new world to create, and an ardent faith in accordance with which to create it. The old have been executed, starved, exiled, or in some other way disinfected, so that they cannot, as in every Western country, compel the young to choose between doing

harm and doing nothing. To the sophisticated Occidental the faith of the young Russian may seem crude, but, after all, what is there to be said against it ? He is creating a new world ; the new world is to his liking ; the new world will almost certainly, when created, make the average Russian happier than he was before the Revolution. It may not be a world in which the sophisticated Western intellectual would be happy, but the sophisticated Western intellectual does not have to live in it. By any pragmatic test, therefore, the faith of young Russia is justified, and to condemn it as crude can have no justification except on a basis of theory.

In India, China, and Japan, external circumstances of a political sort interfere with the happiness of the young intelligentsia, but there is no such internal obstacle as exists in the West. There are activities which appear important to the young, and, in so far as these activities succeed, the young are happy. They feel that they have an important part to play in the national life, and aims to pursue which, though difficult, are not impossible to realise. Cynicism such as one finds very frequently among the most highly educated young men and women of the West results from the combination of comfort with powerlessness. Powerlessness makes people feel that nothing is worth doing, and comfort makes the painfulness of this feeling just endurable. Throughout the East the University student can hope for more influence upon public opinion than he can have in the modern West, but he has much less opportunity than in the West of securing a substantial income. Being neither powerless nor comfortable, he becomes a reformer or a revolutionary, not a cynic. The happiness of the reformer or revolutionary depends upon the course of public affairs, but probably even while he is being executed he enjoys

more real happiness than is possible for the comfortable cynic. I remember a young Chinese visitor to my school who was going home to found a similar school in a reactionary part of China. He expected the result to be that his head would be cut off. Nevertheless he enjoyed a quiet happiness that I could only envy.

I do not wish to suggest, however, that these high-flown kinds of happiness are the only possible ones. They are in fact open only to a minority, since they require a kind of ability and a width of interest which cannot be very common. It is not only eminent scientists who can derive pleasure through work, nor is it only leading statesmen who can derive pleasure through advocacy of a cause. The pleasure of work is open to anyone who can develop some specialized skill, provided that he can get satisfaction from the exercise of his skill without demanding universal applause. I knew a man who had lost the use of both legs in early youth, but he had remained serenely happy throughout a long life; he had achieved this by writing a work in five volumes on rose blight, on which I always understood he was the leading expert. I have not had the pleasure of knowing any large number of conchologists, but from those who have I have always understood the study of shells brings contentment to those who engage in it. I knew a man once who was the best compositor in the world, and was sought out by all those who devoted themselves to inventing artistic types; he derived joy, not so much from the very genuine respect in which he was held by persons whose respect was not lightly bestowed, as from the actual delight in the exercise of his craft, a delight not wholly unlike that which good dancers derive from dancing. I have known also composers

who were experts in setting up mathematical type, or Nestorian script, or cuneiform, or anything else that was out of the way and difficult. I did not discover whether these men's private lives were happy, but in their working hours their constructive instincts were fully gratified.

It is customary to say that in our machine age there is less room than formerly for the craftsman's joy and skilled work. I am not at all sure that this is true; the skilled workman nowadays works, it is true, at quite different things from those that occupied the attention of the mediæval guilds, but he is still very important and quite essential in the machine economy. There are those who make scientific instruments and delicate machines, there are designers, there are aeroplane mechanics, chauffeurs, and hosts of others who have a trade in which skill can be developed to almost any extent. The agricultural labourer and the peasant in comparatively primitive communities is not, so far as I have been able to observe, nearly as happy as a chauffeur or an engine-driver. It is true that the work of the peasant who cultivates his own land is varied; he ploughs, he sows, he reaps. But he is at the mercy of the elements, and is very conscious of his dependence, whereas the man who works a modern mechanism is conscious of power, and acquires the sense that man is the master, not the slave, of natural forces. It is true, of course, that work is very uninteresting to the large body of mere machine-minders who repeat some mechanical operation over and over again with the minimum of variation, but the more uninteresting the work becomes, the more possible it is to get it performed by a machine. The ultimate goal of machine production—from which, it is true, we are as yet far removed—is a system in which everything uninteresting

is done by machines, and human beings are reserved for the work involving variety and initiative. In such a world the work will be less boring and less depressing than it has been at any time since the introduction of agriculture. In taking to agriculture mankind decided that they would submit to monotony and tedium in order to diminish the risk of starvation. When men obtained their food by hunting, work was a joy, as one can see from the fact that the rich still pursue these ancestral occupations of amusement. But with the introduction of agriculture mankind entered upon a long period of meanness, misery, and madness, from which they are only now being freed by the beneficent operation of the machine. It is all very well for sentimentalists to speak of contact with the soil and the ripe wisdom of Hardy's philosophic peasants, but one desire of every young man in the countryside is to find work in towns where he can escape from the slavery of wind and weather and the solitude of dark winter evenings into the reliable and human atmosphere of the factory and the cinema. Companionship and co-operation are essential elements in the happiness of the average man, and these are to be obtained in industry far more fully than in agriculture.

Belief in a cause is a source of happiness to large numbers of people. I am not thinking only of revolutionaries, socialists, nationalists in oppressed countries, as such; I am thinking also of many humbler kinds of belief. The men I have known who believed that the English were the lost ten tribes were almost invariably happy, while as for those who believed that the English were only the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, their bliss knew no bounds. I am not suggesting that the reader should adopt this creed, since I cannot advocate any happiness based upon what seem to me to

be false beliefs. For the same reason I cannot urge the reader to believe that men should live exclusively upon nuts, although, so far as my observation goes, this belief invariably ensures perfect happiness. But it is easy to find some cause which is in no degree fantastic, and those whose interest in any such cause is genuine are provided with an occupation for their leisure hours and a complete antidote to the feeling that life is empty.

Not so very far removed from the devotion to obscure causes is absorption in a hobby. One of the most eminent of living mathematicians divides his time equally between mathematics and stamp-collecting. I imagine that the latter affords consolation at the moments when he can make no progress with the former. The difficulty of proving propositions in the theory of numbers is not the only sorrow that stamp-collecting can cure, nor are stamps the only thing that can be collected. Consider what a vast field of ecstasy opens before the imagination when one thinks of old china, snuff-boxes, Roman coins, arrow-heads, and flint implements. It is true that many of us are too "superior" for these simple pleasures. We have all experienced them in boyhood, but have thought them, for some reason, unworthy of a grown man. This is a complete mistake; any pleasure that does no harm to other people is to be valued. For my part, I collect rivers; I derive pleasure from having gone down the Volga and up the Yangtse and regret very much having never seen the Amazon or the Orinoco. Simple as these emotions are, I am not ashamed of them. Or consider again the passionate joy of the baseball fan: he turns to his newspaper with avidity, and the radio affords him the keenest thrills. I remember meeting for the first time one of the leading literary men of



America, a man whom I had supposed from his books to be filled with melancholy. But it so happened that at that moment the most crucial baseball results were coming through on the radio; he forgot me, literature, and all the other sorrows of our sublunary life, and yelled with joy as his favourites achieved victory. Ever since this incident I have been able to read his books without feeling depressed by the misfortunes of his characters.

Fads and hobbies, however, are in many cases, perhaps most, not a source of fundamental happiness, but a means of escape from reality, of forgetting for the moment some pain too difficult to be faced. Fundamental happiness depends more than anything else upon what may be called a friendly interest in persons and things.

A friendly interest in persons is a form of affectionateness, but not the form which is grasping and possessive and seeking always an emphatic response. This latter form is very frequently a source of unhappiness. The kind that makes for happiness is the kind that likes to observe people and finds pleasure in their individual traits, that wishes to afford scope for the interests and pleasures of those with whom it is brought into contact without desiring to acquire power over them or to secure their enthusiastic admiration. The person whose attitude towards others is genuinely of this kind will be a source of happiness and a recipient of reciprocal kindness. His relations with others, whether slight or serious, will satisfy both his interests and his affections; he will not be soured by ingratitude, since he will seldom suffer it and will not notice when he does. The same idiosyncrasies which would get on another man's nerves to the point of exasperation will be to him a source of gentle amusement. He will

achieve without effort results which another man, after long struggles, will find to be unattainable. Being happy in himself, he will be a pleasant companion, and this in turn will increase his happiness. But all this must be genuine; it must not spring from an idea of self-sacrifice inspired by a sense of duty. A sense of duty is useful in work, but offensive in personal relations. People wish to be liked, not to be endured with patient resignation. To like many people spontaneously and without effort is perhaps the greatest of all sources of personal happiness.

I spoke also in the last paragraph of what I call a friendly interest in things. This phrase may perhaps seem forced; it may be said that it is impossible to feel friendly to things. Nevertheless, there is something analogous to friendliness in the kind of interest that a geologist takes in rocks, or an archaeologist in ruins, and this interest ought to be an element in our attitude to individuals or societies. It is possible to have an interest in things which is hostile rather than friendly. A man might collect facts concerning the habitats of spiders because he hated spiders and wished to live where they were few. This kind of interest would not afford the same satisfaction as the geologist derives from his rocks. An interest in impersonal things, though perhaps less valuable as an ingredient in everyday happiness than a friendly attitude towards our fellow creatures, is nevertheless very important. The world is vast and our own powers are limited. If all our happiness is bound up entirely in our personal circumstances it is difficult not to demand of life more than it has to give. And to demand too much is the surest way of getting even less than is possible. The man who can forget his worries by means of a genuine interest in, say, the Council of Trent, or the life history

of stars, will find that, when he returns from his excursion into the impersonal world, he has acquired a poise and calm which enable him to deal with his worries in the best way, and he will in the meantime have experienced a genuine even if temporary happiness.

The secret of happiness is this: let your interests be as wide as possible, and let your reactions to the things and persons that interest you be as far as possible friendly rather than hostile.

From *The Conquest of Happiness* (1930)

## THE ETHICS OF POWER

Being concerned with the evils connected with power, it might seem natural to draw an ascetic conclusion, and to urge, as the best manner of life for the individual, a complete renunciation of all attempts to influence others, whether for good or evil. Ever since Lao-Tse, this view has had advocates who were both eloquent and wise; it has been held by many mystics, by the quietists, and by those who valued personal holiness, conceived as a state of mind rather than as an activity. I cannot agree with these men, although I admit that some of them have been highly beneficent. But they have been so because, though they believed that they had renounced power, they had, in fact, renounced it only in certain forms; if they had renounced it completely, they would not have proclaimed their doctrines, and would not have been beneficent. They renounced coercive power, but not the power that rests upon persuasion. *desired*

Love of power, in its widest sense, is the desire to be able to produce intended effects upon the outer world, whether human or non-human. This desire is an essential part of human nature, and in energetic men it is a very large and important part. Every desire, if it cannot be instantly gratified, brings about a wish for the ability to gratify it, and therefore some form of the love of power. This is true of the best desires as well as the worst. If you love your neighbour, you will wish for power to make him happy. To condemn *all* love of power, therefore, is to condemn love of your neighbour.

There is, however, a great difference between power desired as a means and power desired as an end in itself. The man who desires power as a means has

first some other desire, and is then led to wish that he were in a position to achieve it. The man who desires power as an end will choose his objective by the possibility of securing it. In politics, for example, one man wishes to see certain measures enacted, and is thus led to take part in public affairs, while another man, wishing only for personal success, adopts whatever programme seems most likely to lead to this result.

Christ's third temptation in the wilderness illustrates this distinction. He is offered all the kingdoms of the earth if He will fall down and worship Satan; that is to say, He is offered power to achieve certain objects, but not those that He has in view. This temptation is one to which almost every modern man is exposed, sometimes in a gross form, sometimes in a very subtle one. He may, though a Socialist, accept a position on a Conservative newspaper; this is a comparatively gross form. He may despair of the achievement of Socialism by peaceful means, and become a Communist, not because he thinks that what he wants will be achieved in this way, but because he thinks that *something* will be achieved. To advocate unsuccessfully what he wants seems to him more futile than to advocate successfully what he does not want. But if his wants, other than personal success, are strong and definite, there will be no satisfaction to his sense of power unless *those* wants are satisfied, and to change his objects for the sake of success will seem to him an act of apostasy which might be described as worshipping Satan.

Love of power, if it is to be beneficent, must be bound up with some end other than power. I do not mean that there must be *no* love of power for its own sake, for this motive is sure to arise in the course of an active career; I mean that the desire for some other

end must be so strong that power is unsatisfying unless it ministers to this end.

It is not enough that there should be a purpose other than power; it is necessary that this purpose should be one which, if achieved, will help to satisfy the desires of others. If you aim at discovery, or artistic creation, or the invention of a labour-saving machine, or the reconciliation of groups hitherto at enmity with each other, your success, if you succeed, is likely to be a cause of satisfaction to others besides yourself. This is the second condition that love of power must fulfil if it is to be beneficent: it must be linked to some purpose which is, broadly speaking, in harmony with the desires of the other people who will be affected if the purpose is realized.

There is a third condition, somewhat more difficult to formulate. The means of realizing your purpose must not be such as will incidentally have bad effects outweighing the excellence of the end to be achieved. Every man's character and desires undergo perpetual modification as a result of what he does and what he suffers. Violence and injustice breed violence and injustice, both in those who inflict them and in their victims. Defeat, if it is incomplete, breeds rage and hatred; while if it is complete it breeds apathy and inaction. Victory by force produces ruthlessness and contempt for the vanquished, however exalted may have been the original motives for war. All these considerations, while they do not prove that no good purpose can ever be achieved by force, do show that force is very dangerous, and that when there is very much of it any original good purpose is likely to be lost sight of before the end of the strife. *the very good point*

The existence of civilized communities, however, is impossible without some element of force, since there

are criminals and men of anti-social ambitions who, if unchecked, would soon cause a reversion to anarchy and barbarism. Where force is unavoidable, it should be exerted by the constituted authority in accordance with the will of the community as expressed in the criminal law. There are, however, two difficulties at this point: first, that the most important uses of force are between different States, where there is no common government and no effectively acknowledged law or judicial authority; second, that the concentration of force in the hands of the government enables it, to some extent, to tyrannize over the rest of the community.

Love of power, like lust, is such a strong motive that it influences most men's actions more than they think it should. It may therefore be argued that the ethic which will produce the best consequences will be one more hostile to love of power than reason can justify: since men are pretty sure to sin against their own code in the direction of the pursuit of power, their acts, it may be said, will be about right if their code is somewhat too severe. A man who is propounding an ethical doctrine can, however, hardly allow himself to be influenced by such considerations, since, if he does, he is obliged to lie consciously in the interests of virtue. The desire to be edifying rather than truthful is the bane of preachers and educators; and whatever may be said in its favour theoretically, it is in practice unmitigatedly harmful. We must admit that men have acted badly from love of power, and will continue to do so; but we ought not, on this account, to maintain that love of power is undesirable in forms and circumstances in which we believe it to be beneficial or at least innocuous.

The forms that a man's love of power will take depend upon his temperament, his opportunities, and

his skill; his temperament, moreover, is largely moulded by his circumstances. To turn an individual's love of power into specified channels is, therefore, a matter of providing him with the right circumstances, the right opportunities, and the appropriate type of skill. This leaves out of account the question of congenital disposition, which, in so far as it is amenable to treatment, is a matter for eugenics; but it is probably only a small percentage of the population that cannot be led, by the above means, to choose some useful form of activity.

To begin with circumstances as affecting temperament: the source of cruel impulses is usually to be found either in an unfortunate childhood, or in experiences, such as those of civil war, in which suffering and death are frequently seen and inflicted; absence of any legitimate outlet for energy in adolescence and early youth may have the same effect. I believe that few men are cruel if they have had a wise early education, have not lived among scenes of violence, and have not had undue difficulty in finding a career. Given these conditions, most men's love of power will prefer, if it can, to find a beneficent or at least harmless outlet.

The question of opportunity has both a positive and a negative aspect: it is important that there shall not be opportunity for the career of a pirate, or a brigand, or a dictator, as well as that there should be opportunity for a less destructive profession. There must be a strong government, to prevent crime, and a wise economic system, both to prevent the possibility of legal forms of brigandage, and to offer attractive careers to as many young people as possible. This is much easier in a community which is growing richer than in one which is growing poorer. Nothing improves the moral level of a community as much as an increase of wealth, and nothing lowers it so much as a diminution of



wealth. The harshness of the general outlook from the Rhine to the Pacific at the present day is very largely due to the fact that so many people are poorer than their parents were.

The importance of skill in determining the form taken by love of power is very great. Destruction, broadly speaking, apart from certain forms of modern war, requires very little skill, whereas construction always requires some, and in the highest forms requires a great deal. Most men who have acquired a difficult type of skill enjoy exercising it, and prefer this activity to easier ones; this is because the difficult kind of skill, other things being equal, is more satisfying to love of power. The man who has learnt to throw bombs from an aeroplane will prefer this to the ~~humdrum~~ <sup>commonplace</sup> occupations that will be open to him in peace time; but the man who has learnt (say) to combat yellow fever will prefer this to the work of an army surgeon in war time. Modern war involves a very great deal of skill, and this helps to make it attractive to various kinds of experts. Much scientific skill is needed equally in peace and in war; there is no way by which a scientific pacifist can make sure that his discoveries or inventions will not be used to increase the destruction in the next struggle. Nevertheless, there is, speaking broadly, a distinction between the kinds of skill that find most scope in peace and those that find most scope in war. In so far as such a distinction exists, a man's love of power will incline him to peace if his skill is of the former kind, and to war if it is of the latter. In such ways, technical training can do much to determine what form love of power shall take.

It is not altogether true that persuasion is one thing and force is another. Many forms of persuasion—even many of which everybody approves—are really a

kind of force. Consider what we do to our children. We do not say to them: "Some people think the earth is round; and others think it is flat; when you grow up, you can, if you like, examine the evidence and form your own conclusion". Instead of this we say: "The earth is round". By the time our children are old enough to examine the evidence, our propaganda has closed their minds, and the most persuasive arguments of the Flat Earth Society make no impression. The same applies to the moral precepts that we consider really important, such as "don't pick your nose" or "don't eat peas with a knife". There may, for aught I know, be admirable reasons for eating peas with a knife, but the hypnotic effect of early persuasion has made me completely incapable of appreciating them.

The ethics of power cannot consist in distinguishing some kinds of power as legitimate and others as illegitimate. As we have just seen, we all approve, in certain cases, of a kind of persuasion which is essentially a use of force. Almost everybody would approve of physical violence, even killing, in easily imagined conditions. Suppose you had come upon Guy Fawkes in the very act of firing the train; and suppose you could only have prevented the disaster by shooting him; most pacifists, even, would admit that you would have done right to shoot. [The attempt to deal with the question by abstract general principles, praising acts of one type and blaming acts of another, is futile; we must judge the exercise of power by its effects, and we must therefore first make up our minds as to what effects we desire.]

For my part, I consider that whatever is good or bad is embodied in individuals, not primarily in communities. Some philosophies which could be used to support the corporative State—notably the philosophy

Data Entered

24 APR 2001

of Hegel—<sup>assign attributes belonging</sup> attribute ethical qualities to communities as such, so that a State may be admirable though most of its citizens are <sup>as stated in history</sup> wretched. I think that such philosophies are tricks for justifying the privileges of the holders of power, and that, <sup>sound</sup> whatever our politics may be, there can be no valid argument for an undemocratic ethic. I mean by an undemocratic ethic one which singles out a certain portion of mankind and says "these men are to enjoy the good things, and the rest are merely to minister to them". I should reject such an ethic in any case, but it has the disadvantage of being self-refuting, since it is very unlikely that, in practice, the supermen will be able to live the kind of life that the aristocratic theorist imagines for them.

<sup>only</sup> Some objects of desire are such as can, logically, be enjoyed by all. while others must, by their very <sup>in</sup> nature, be confined to a portion of the community. All might—with a little rational co-operation—be fairly well off, but it is impossible for all to enjoy the pleasure of being richer than their neighbours. All can enjoy a certain degree of self-direction, but it is impossible for all to be dictators over others. Perhaps in time there will be a population in which everybody is fairly intelligent, but it is not possible for all to secure the rewards bestowed on *exceptional* intelligence. And so on. 22

Social co-operation is possible in regard to the good things that are capable of being universal—adequate material well-being, health, intelligence, and every form of happiness which does not consist in superiority to others. But the forms of happiness which consist of victory in a competition cannot be universal. The former kind of happiness is promoted by friendly feeling, the latter (and its <sup>reciprocal relation</sup> correlative unhappiness) by unfriendly feeling. Unfriendly feeling can wholly in-

hibit the rational pursuit of happiness; it does so at present in what concerns the economic relations of nations. Given a population in which friendly feelings <sup>superior intelligence</sup> preponderate, there will be no clash between the interests of different individuals or different groups; the clashes which at present exist are <sup>caused by</sup> unfriendly feeling, which they in turn intensify. <sup>reference</sup> England and Scotland fought each other for centuries; at last, by an accident of inheritance, they came to have the same king, and the wars ceased. Everybody was happier in consequence, even Dr. Johnson, whose jests doubtless afforded him more pleasure than he would have derived from victorious battles.

We can now arrive at certain conclusions on the subject of the ethics of power.

The ultimate aim of those who have power (and we all have some) should be to promote social co-operation, not in one group as against another, but in the whole human race. The chief obstacle to this end at present is the existence of feelings of unfriendliness and desire for superiority. Such feelings can be diminished either directly by religion and morality, or indirectly by removing the political and economic circumstances which at present stimulate them—notably the competition for power between States and the connected competition for wealth between large national industries. Both methods are needed: they are not alternatives, but supplement each other. 23

The Great War, and its aftermath of dictatorships, has caused many to underestimate all forms of power except military and governmental force. This is a short-sighted and unhistorical view. If I had to select four men who have had more power than any others, I should mention Buddha and Christ, Pythagoras and Galileo. No one of these four had the support of the

State until after his propaganda had achieved a great measure of success. No one of the four had much success in his own lifetime. No one of the four would have affected human life as he has done if power had been his *primary* object. No one of the four sought the kind of power that enslaves others, but the kind that sets them free—in the case of the first two, by showing how to master the desires that lead to strife, and thence to defeat slavery and subjection; in the case of the second two, by pointing the way towards control of natural forces. It is not ultimately by violence that men are ruled, but by the wisdom of those who appeal to the common desires of mankind, for happiness, for inward and outward peace; and for the understanding of the world in which, by no choice of our own, we have to live.

*u.*  
From *Power, A New Social Analysis* (1938)

## THE WORLD AS IT COULD BE MADE.

In the daily lives of most men and women, fear plays a greater part than hope: they are more filled with the thought of the possessions that others may take from them, than of the joy that they might create in their own lives and in the lives with which they come in contact.

It is not so that life should be lived.

Those whose lives are fruitful to themselves, to their friends, or to the world are inspired by hope and sustained by joy: they see in imagination the things that might be and the way in which they are to be brought into existence. In their private relations, they are not preoccupied with anxiety lest they should lose such affection and respect as they receive: they are engaged in giving affection and respect freely, and the reward comes of itself without their seeking. In their work, they are not haunted by jealousy of competitors, but concerned with the actual matter that has to be done. In politics, they do not spend time and passion defending unjust privileges of their class or nation, but they aim at making the world as a whole happier, less cruel, less full of conflict between rival greeds, and more full of human beings whose growth has not been dwarfed and stunted by oppression.

A life lived in this spirit—the spirit that aims at creating rather than possessing—has a certain fundamental happiness, of which it cannot be wholly robbed by adverse circumstances. This is the way of life recommended in the Gospels, and by all the great teachers of the world. Those who have found it are freed from the tyranny of fear, since what they value most in their lives is not at the mercy of outside power. If all men could summon up the courage and the vision

to live in this way in spite of obstacles and discouragement, there would be no need for the regeneration of the world to begin by political and economic reform: all that is needed in the way of reform would come automatically without resistance, owing to the moral regeneration of individuals. But the teaching of Christ has been nominally accepted by the world for many centuries, and yet those who follow it are still persecuted as they were before the time of Constantine. Experience has proved that few are able to see through the apparent evils of an outcast's life to the inner joy that comes of faith and creative hope. If the domination of fear is to be overcome, it is not enough, as regards the mass of men, to preach courage and indifference to misfortune: it is necessary to remove the causes of fear, to make a good life no longer an unsuccessful one in a worldly sense, and to diminish the harm that can be inflicted upon those who are not wary in self-defence.

When we consider the evils in the lives we know of, we find that they may be roughly divided into three classes. There are, first, those due to physical nature: among these are death, pain, and the difficulty of making the soil yield a subsistence. These we will call "physical evils". Second we may put those that spring from defects in the character or aptitudes of the sufferer: among these are ignorance, lack of will, and violent passions. These we will call "evils of character". Third come those that depend upon the power of one individual or group over another: these comprise, not only obvious tyranny but all interference with free development, whether by force or by excessive mental influence such as may occur in education. These we will call "evils of power". A social system may be judged by its bearing upon these three kinds of evils.

The distinction between the three kinds cannot be sharply drawn. Purely physical evil is a limit which we can never be sure of having reached: we cannot abolish death, but we can often postpone it by science, and it may ultimately become possible to secure that the great majority shall live till old age; we cannot wholly prevent pain, but we can diminish it indefinitely by securing a healthy life for all; we cannot make the earth yield its fruits in any abundance without labour, but we can diminish the amount of labour and improve its conditions until it ceases to be an evil. Evils of character are often the result of physical evil in the shape of illness, and still more often the result of evils of power, since tyranny degrades both those who exercise it and (as a rule) those who suffer it. Evils of power are intensified by evils of character in those who have power, and by fear of the physical evil which is apt to be the lot of those who have no power. For all these reasons, the three sorts of evil are intertwined. Nevertheless, speaking broadly, we may distinguish among our misfortunes those which have their proximate cause in the material world, those which are mainly due to defects in ourselves, and those which spring from our being subject to the control of others.

The main methods of combating these evils are: for physical evils, science; for evils of character, education (in the widest sense) and a free outlet for all impulses that do not involve domination; for evils of power, the reform of the political and economic organisation of society in such a way as to reduce to the lowest possible point the interference of one man with the life of another. We will begin with the third of these kinds of evil, because it is evils of power specially that Socialism and Anarchism have sought to remedy. Their protest against inequalities of wealth has rested mainly



upon their sense of the evils arising from the power conferred by wealth. This point has been well stated by Mr. G. D. H. Cole:—

What, I want to ask, is the fundamental evil in our modern society which we should set out to abolish?

There are two possible answers to that question, and I am sure that very many well-meaning people would make the wrong one. They would answer **POVERTY**, when they ought to answer **SLAVERY**. Face to face every day with the shameful contrasts of riches and destitution, high dividends and low wages, and painfully conscious of the futility of trying to adjust the balance by means of charity, private or public, they would answer unhesitatingly that they stand for the **ABOLITION OF POVERTY**:

Well and good! On that issue every socialist is with them. But their answer to my question is nonetheless wrong.

Poverty is the symptom: slavery is the disease. The extremes of riches and destitution follow inevitably upon the extremes of licence and bondage. The many are not enslaved because they are poor, they are poor because they are enslaved. Yet Socialists have all too often fixed their eyes upon the material misery of the poor without realising that it rests upon the spiritual degradation of the slave.<sup>1</sup>

I do not think any reasonable person can doubt that the evils of power in the present system are vastly greater than is necessary, nor that they might be immeasurably diminished by a suitable form of Socialism. A few fortunate people, it is true, are now enabled to live freely on rent or interest, and they could hardly have more liberty under another system. But the great bulk, not only of the very poor, but of all sections of wage-earners and even of the professional classes, are the slaves of the need for getting money. Almost all are compelled to work so hard that they have little leisure for enjoyment or for pursuits outside their regular occupation. Those who are able to retire in later middle age are bored, because they have not learnt how to fill their time when they are liberty, and such interests as they once had apart from work have dried up. Yet these are the exceptionally fortunate: the majority have to work hard till old age, with the

<sup>1</sup>*Self-Government in Industry*, pp. 110-11 (G. Bell and Sons), 1917

fear of destitution always before them, the richer ones dreading that they will be unable to give their children the education or the medical care that they consider desirable, the poorer ones often not far removed from starvation. And almost all who work have no voice in the direction of their work; throughout the hours of labour they are mere machines carrying out the will of a master. Work is usually done under disagreeable conditions, involving pain and physical hardship. The only motive to work is wages: the very idea that work might be a joy, like the work of the artist, is usually scouted as utterly Utopian.

But by far the greater part of these evils are wholly unnecessary. If the civilized portion of mankind could be induced to desire their own happiness more than another's pain, if they could be induced to work constructively for improvements which they would share with all the world rather than destructively to prevent other classes or nations from stealing a march on them, the whole system by which the world's work is done might be reformed root and branch within a generation.

From the point of view of liberty, what system would be the best? In what direction should we wish the forces of progress to move?

From this point of view, neglecting for the moment all other considerations, I have no doubt that the best system would be one not far removed from that advocated by Kropotkin, but rendered more practicable by the adoption of the main principles of Guild Socialism. Since every point can be disputed, I will set down without argument the kind of organisation of work that would seem best.

Education should be compulsory up to the age of sixteen, or perhaps longer; after that, it should be con-

tinued or not at the option of the pupil, but remain free (for those who desire it) up to at least the age of twenty-one. When education is finished, no one should be *compelled* to work, and those who chose not to work should receive a bare livelihood, and be left completely free; but probably it would be desirable that there should be a strong public opinion in favour of work, so that only comparatively few should choose idleness. One great advantage of making idleness economically possible is that it would afford a powerful motive for making work not disagreeable; and no community where most work is disagreeable can be said to have found a solution of economic problems. I think it is reasonable to assume that few would choose idleness, in view of the fact that even now at least nine out of ten of those who have (say) £100 a year from investments prefer to increase their income by paid work.

Coming now to that great majority who will not choose idleness, I think we may assume that, with the help of science, and by the elimination of the vast amount of unproductive work involved in the internal and international competition, the whole community could be kept in comfort by means of four hours' work a day. It is already being urged by experienced employers that their employees can actually produce as much in a six hours' day as they can when they work eight hours. In a world where there is a much higher level of technical instruction than there is now, the same tendency will be accentuated. People will be taught not only, as at present, one trade, or one small portion of a trade, but several trades, so that they can vary their occupation according to the seasons and fluctuations of demand. Every industry will be self-governing as regards its internal affairs, and even

separate factories will decide for themselves all questions that only concern those who work in them. There will not be capitalist management, as at present, but management by elected representatives, as in politics. Relations between different groups of producers will be settled by the Guild Congress, matters concerning the community as the inhabitants of a certain area will continue to be decided by Parliament, while all disputes between Parliament and the Guild Congress will be decided by a body composed of representatives of both in equal numbers.

Payment will not be made, as at present, only for work actually required and performed, but for willingness to work. This system is already adopted in much of the better paid work: a man occupies a certain position, and retains it even at times when there happens to be very little to do. The dread of unemployment and loss of livelihood will no longer haunt men like a nightmare. Whether all who are willing to work will be paid equally, or whether exceptional skill will still command exceptional pay, is a matter which may be left to each Guild to decide for itself. An opera-singer who received no more pay than a scene-shifter might choose to be a scene-shifter until the system was changed: if so, higher pay would probably be found necessary. But if it were freely voted by the Guild, it could hardly constitute a grievance.

Whatever might be done towards making work agreeable, it is to be presumed that some trades would always remain unpleasant. Men could be attracted into these by higher pay or shorter hours, instead of being driven into them by destitution. The community would then have a strong economic motive for finding ways of diminishing the disagreeableness of these exceptional trades.

There would still have to be money, or something analogous to it, in any community such as we are imagining. The Anarchist plan of a free distribution of the total produce of work in equal shares does not get rid of the need for some standard of exchange value, since one man will choose to take his share in one form and another in another. When the day comes for distributing luxuries, old ladies will not want their quota of cigars, nor young men their just proportion of lap-dog: this will make it necessary to know how many cigars are the equivalent of one lap-dog. Much the simplest way is to pay an income, as at present, and allow relative values to be adjusted according to demand. But if actual coin were paid, a man might hoard it and in time become a capitalist. To prevent this, it would be best to pay notes available only during a certain period, say one year from the date of issue. This would enable a man to save up for his annual holiday, but not to save indefinitely.

There is a very great deal to be said for the Anarchist plan of allowing necessities, and all commodities that can easily be produced in quantities adequate to any possible demand, to be given away freely to all who ask for them, in any amounts they may require. The question whether this plan should be adopted is, to my mind, a purely technical one: would it be, in fact, possible to adopt it without much waste and consequent diversion of labour to the production of necessities when it might be more usefully employed otherwise? I have not the means of answering this question, but I think it exceedingly probable that, sooner or later, with the continued improvement in the methods of production, this Anarchist plan will become feasible; and when it does, it certainly ought to be adopted.

Women in domestic work, whether married or unmarried, will receive pay as they would if they were in industry. This will secure the complete economic independence of wives, which is difficult to achieve in any other way, since mothers of young children ought not to be expected to work outside the home.

The expense of children will not fall, as at present, on the parents. They will receive, like adults, their share of necessities, and their education will be free.<sup>1</sup> There is no longer to be the present competition for scholarships among the abler children: they will not be imbued with the competitive spirit from infancy, or forced to use their brains to an unnatural degree; with consequent listlessness and lack of health in later life. Education will be far more diversified than at present: greater care will be taken to adapt it to the needs of different types of young people. There will be more attempt to encourage initiative among pupils and less desire to fill their minds with a set of beliefs and mental habits regarded as desirable by the State, chiefly because they help to preserve the *status quo*. For the great majority of children it will probably be found desirable to have much more outdoor education in the country. And for older boys and girls whose interests are not intellectual or artistic, technical education, undertaken in a liberal spirit, is far more useful in promoting mental activity than book-learning, which they regard (however falsely) as wholly useless except for purposes of examination. The really useful education is that which follows the direction of the child's own instinctive interests, supplying knowledge for

---

<sup>1</sup> Some may fear that the result would be an undue increase of population, but such fears I believe to be groundless. See above, Chapter IV, on "Work and Pay," also Chap. VI of *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.).

which it is seeking, not dry, detailed information wholly out of relation to its spontaneous desires.

Government and Law will still exist in our community, but both will be reduced to a minimum. There will still be acts which will be forbidden—for example, murder. But very nearly the whole of that part of the criminal law which deals with property will have become obsolete, and many of the motives which now produce murders will be no longer operative. Those who nevertheless still do commit crimes will not be blamed or regarded as wicked: they will be regarded as unfortunate, and kept in some kind of mental hospital until it is thought that they are no longer a danger. By education and freedom and the abolition of private capital, the number of crimes can be made exceedingly small. By the method of individual curative treatment, it will generally be possible to secure that a man's first offence shall also be his last, except in the case of lunatics and the feeble-minded, for whom of course a more prolonged but not less kindly detention may be necessary.

Government may be regarded as consisting of two parts: the one, the decisions of the community or its recognised organs; the other, the enforcing of those decisions upon all who resist them. The first part is not objected to by Anarchists. The second part, in ordinary civilized State, may remain entirely in the background: those who have resisted a new law while it was being debated will, as a rule, submit to it when it is passed, because resistance is generally useless in a settled and orderly community. But the possibility of governmental force remains, and indeed is the very reason for the submission which makes force unnecessary. If, as Anarchists desire, there were no use of force by Government, the majority could still band themselves

together and use force against the minority. The only difference would be that their army or their police force would be *ad hoc*, instead of being permanent and professional. The result of this would be that every one would have to learn how to fight, for fear a well-drilled minority should seize power and establish an old-fashioned oligarchic State. Thus the aim of the Anarchists seems hardly likely to be achieved by the methods which they advocate.

The reign of violence in human affairs, whether within a country or in its external relations, can only be prevented, if we have not been mistaken, by an authority able to declare all use of force except by itself illegal, and strong enough to be obviously capable of making all other use of force futile, except when it could secure the support of public opinion as a defence of freedom or a resistance of injustice. Such an authority exists within a country: it is the State. But in international affairs it remains to be created. The difficulties are stupendous, but they must be overcome if the world is to be saved from periodical wars, each more destructive than any of its predecessors. Whether, after this war, a League of Nations will be formed, and will be capable of performing this task, it is as yet impossible to foretell. However that may be, some method of preventing wars will have to be established before our Utopia becomes possible. When once men *believe* that the world is safe from war, the whole difficulty will be solved: there will then no longer be any serious resistance to the disbanding of national armies and navies, and the substitution for them of a small international force for protection against uncivilized races. And when that stage has been reached peace will be virtually secure.

The practice of government by majorities, which



Anarchists criticize, is in fact open to most of the objections which they urge against it. Still more objectionable is the power of the executive in matters vitally affecting the happiness of all, such as peace and war. But neither can be dispensed with suddenly. There are, however, two methods of diminishing the harm done by them. (1) Government by-majorities can be made less oppressive by devolution, by placing the decision of questions primarily affecting only a section of the community in the hands of that section, rather than of a Central Chamber. In this way, men are no longer forced to submit to decisions made in a hurry by people mostly ignorant of the matter in hand and not personally interested. Autonomy for internal affairs should be given, not only to areas but to all groups, such as industries or Churches, which have important common interests not shared by the rest of the community. (2) The great powers vested in the executive of a modern State are chiefly due to the frequent need of rapid decisions, especially as regards foreign affairs. If the danger of war were practically eliminated, more cumbrous but less autocratic methods would be possible, and the Legislature might recover many of the powers which the executive has usurped. By these two methods, the intensity of the interference with liberty involved in government can be gradually diminished. Some interference, and even some danger of unwarranted and despotic interference, is of the essence of government, and must remain so long as government remains. But until men are less prone to violence than they are now, a certain degree of governmental force seems the lesser of two evils. We may hope, however, that if once the danger of war is at an end, men's violent impulses will gradually grow less, the more so as, in that case, it will be possible

to diminish enormously the individual power which now makes rulers autocratic and ready for almost any act of tyranny in order to crush opposition. The development of a world where even governmental force has become unnecessary (except against lunatics) must be gradual. But as a gradual process it is perfectly possible; and when it has been completed, we may hope to see the principles of Anarchism embodied in the management of communal affairs. (A)

How will the economic and political system that we have outlined bear on the evils of character? I believe the effect will be quite extraordinarily beneficent.

The process of leading men's thought and imagination away from the use of force will be greatly accelerated by the abolition of the capitalist system provided it is not succeeded by a form of State Socialism in which officials have enormous power. At present, the capitalist has more control over the lives of others than any man ought to have; his friends have authority in the State; his economic power is the pattern for political power. In a world where all men and women enjoy economic freedom, there will not be the same habit of command, nor, consequently the same love of despotism; a gentler type of character than that now prevalent will gradually grow up. Men are formed by their circumstances, not born ready-made. The bad effect of the present economic system on character, and the immensely better effect to be expected from communal ownership, are among the strongest reasons for advocating the change.

In the world as we have been imagining it, economic fear and most economic hope will be alike removed out of life. No one will be haunted by the dread of poverty or driven into ruthlessness by the

hope of wealth. There will not be the distinction of social classes which now plays such an immense part in life. The unsuccessful professional man will not live in terror lest his children should sink in the scale; the aspiring employee will not be looking forward to the day when he can become a sweater in his turn. Ambitious young men will have to dream other day-dreams than that of business success and wealth wrung out of the ruin of competitors and the degradation of labour. In such a world, most of the nightmares that lurk in the background of men's minds will no longer exist; on the other hand, ambition and the desire to excel will have to take nobler forms than those that are encouraged by a commercial society. All those activities that really confer benefits upon mankind will be open not only to the fortunate few but to all who have sufficient ambition and native aptitude. Science; labour-saving inventions, technical progress of all kinds may be confidently expected to flourish far more than at present, since they will be the road to honour, and honour will have to replace money among those of the young who desire to achieve success. Whether art will flourish in a Socialistic community depends upon the form of Socialism adopted; if the State or any public authority (no matter what) insists upon controlling art, and only licensing those whom it regards as proficient, the result will be disaster. But if there is real freedom, allowing every man who so desires to take up an artist's career at the cost of some sacrifice of comfort, it is likely that the atmosphere of hope, and the absence of economic compulsion, will lead to a much smaller waste of talent than is involved in our present system, and to much less degree of crushing of impulse in the mills of the struggle for life.

When elementary needs have been satisfied, the

serious happiness of most men depends upon two things: their work and their human relations. In the world that we have been picturing, work will be free, not excessive, full of the interest that belongs to a collective enterprise in which there is rapid progress, with something of the delight of creation even for the humblest unit. And in human relations the gain will be just as great as in work. The only human relations that have value are those that are rooted in mutual freedom, where there is no domination and no slavery, no tie except affection, no economic or conventional necessity to preserve the external show when the inner life is dead. One of the most horrible things about commercialism is the way in which it poisons the relations of men and women. The evils of prostitution are generally recognized, but great as they are, the effect of economic conditions on marriage seems to me even worse. There is not infrequently, in marriage, a suggestion of purchase, of acquiring a woman on condition of keeping her in a certain standard of material comfort. Often and often, a marriage hardly differs from prostitution except by being harder to escape from. The whole basis of these evils is economic. Economic causes make marriage a matter of bargain and contract, in which affection is quite secondary, and its absence constitutes no recognized reason for liberation. Marriage should be a free, spontaneous meeting of mutual instinct, filled with happiness not unmingled with a feeling akin to awe: it should involve that degree of respect of each for the other that makes even the most trifling interference with liberty an utter impossibility, and a common life enforced by one against the will of the other an unthinkable thing of deep horror. It is not so that marriage is conceived by lawyers who make settle-

ments, or by priests who give the name of "sacrament" to an institution which pretends to find something sanctifiable in the brutal lusts or drunken cruelties of a legal husband. It is not in a spirit of freedom that marriage is conceived by most men and women at present: the law makes it an opportunity for indulgence of the desire to interfere, where each submits to some loss of his or her own liberty, for the pleasure of curtailing the liberty of the other. And the atmosphere of private property makes it more difficult than it otherwise would be for any better ideal to take root.

It is not so that human relations will be conceived when the evil heritage of economic slavery has ceased to mould our instincts. Husbands and wives, parents and children, will be only held together by affection: where that has died, it will be recognized that nothing worth preserving is left. Because affection will be free, men and women will not find in private life an outlet and stimulus to the love of domineering, but all that is creative in their love will have the freer scope. Reverence for whatever makes the soul in those who are loved will be less rare than it is now: nowadays, many men love their wives in the way in which they love mutton, as something to devour and destroy. But in the love that goes with reverence there is a joy of quite another order than any to be found by mastery, a joy which satisfies the spirit and not only the instincts; and satisfaction of instinct and spirit at once is necessary to a happy life, or indeed to any existence that is to bring out the best impulses of which a man or woman is capable.

In the world which we should wish to see, there will be more joy of life than in the drab tragedy of modern everyday existence. After early youth, as things are, most men are bowed down by forethought,

no longer capable of light-hearted gaiety, but only of a kind of solemn jollification by the clock at the appropriate hours. The advice to "become as little children" would be good for many people in many respects, but it goes with another precept, "Take no thought for the morrow", which is hard to obey in a competitive world. There is often in men of science, even when they are quite old, something of the simplicity of a child: their absorption in abstract thought has held them aloof from the world, and respect for their work has led the world to keep them alive in spite of their innocence. Such men have succeeded in living as all men ought to be able to live; but as things are, the economic struggle makes their way of life impossible for the great majority.

What are we to say, lastly, of the effect of our projected world upon physical evil? Will there be less illness than there is at present? Will the produce of a given amount of labour be greater? Or will population press upon the limits of subsistence, as Malthus taught in order to refute Godwin's optimism?

I think the answer to all these questions turns, in the end, upon the degree of intellectual vigour to be expected in a community which has done away with the spur of economic competition. Will men in such a world become lazy and apathetic? Will they cease to think? Will those who think find themselves confronted with an even more impenetrable wall of unreflecting conservatism than that which confronts them at present? These are important questions; for it is ultimately to science that mankind must look for their success in combating physical evils.

If the other conditions that we have postulated can be realized, it seems almost certain that there must be less illness than there is at present. Population will

no longer be congested in slums; children will have far more fresh air and open country; the hours of work will be only such as are wholesome, not excessive and exhausting as they are at present.

As for the progress of science, that depends very largely upon the degree of intellectual liberty existing in the new society. If all science is organized and supervised by the State, it will rapidly become stereotyped and dead. Fundamental advances will not be made, because, until they have been made, they will seem too doubtful to warrant the expenditure of public money upon them. Authority will be in the hands of the old, especially of men who have achieved scientific eminence; such men will be hostile to those among the young who do not flatter them by agreeing with their theories. Under a bureaucratic State Socialism it is to be feared that science would soon cease to be progressive and acquire mediæval respect for authority.

But under a freer system, which would enable all kinds of groups to employ as many men of science as they chose, and would allow the "vagabond's wage" to those who desired to pursue some study so new as to be wholly unrecognized, there is every reason to think that science would flourish as it has never done hitherto. And if that were the case, I do not believe that any other obstacle would exist to the physical possibility of our system.

The question of the number of hours of work necessary to produce general material comfort is partly technical, partly one of organization. We may assume that there would be no longer unproductive labour spent on armaments, national defence, advertisements, costly luxuries for the very rich, or any of the other futilities incidental to our competitive system. If each industrial Guild secured for a term of years the advantages,

or part of the advantages, of any new invention or method which it introduced, it is pretty certain that every encouragement would be given to technical progress. The life of a discoverer or inventor is in itself agreeable: those who adopt it, as things are now, are seldom much actuated by economic motives, but rather by the interest of the work together with the hope of honour; and these motives would operate more widely than they do now, since fewer people would be prevented from obeying them by economic necessities. And there is no doubt that intellect would work more keenly and creatively in a world where instinct was less thwarted, where the joy of life was greater, and where consequently there would be more vitality in men than there is at present.

There remains the population question, which ever since the time of Malthus, has been the last refuge of those to whom the possibility of a better world is disagreeable. But this question is now a very different one from what it was a hundred years ago. The decline of the birth-rate in all civilized countries, which is pretty certain to continue whatever economic system is adopted, suggests that, especially when the probable effects of the war are taken into account, the population of Western Europe is not likely to increase very much beyond its present level, and that of America is likely to increase through immigration. Negroes may continue to increase in the tropics, but are not likely to be a serious menace to the white inhabitants of temperate regions. There remains, of course, the Yellow Peril; but by the time that begins to be serious, it is quite likely that the birthrate will also have begun to decline among the races of Asia. If not, there are other means of dealing with this question; and in any case the whole matter is too conjectural to be set up ser-



iously as a bar to our hopes. I conclude that, though no certain forecast is possible, there is not any valid reason for regarding the possible increase of population as a serious obstacle to Socialism.

Our discussion has led us to the belief that the communal ownership of land and capital, which constitutes the characteristic doctrine of Socialism and Anarchist Communism, is a necessary step towards the removal of the evils from which the world suffers at present and the creation of such a society as any humane man must wish to see realized. But though a necessary step, Socialism alone is by no means sufficient. There are various forms of Socialism: the form in which the State is the employer and all who work receive wages from it involves dangers of tyranny and interference with progress which would make it, if possible, even worse than the present *regime*. On the other hand, Anarchism, which avoids the dangers of State Socialism, has dangers and difficulties of its own, which make it probable that, within any reasonable period of time, it could not last long even if it were established. Nevertheless it remains an ideal to which we should wish to approach as nearly as possible, and which, in some distant age, we hope may be reached completely. Syndicalism shares many of the defects of Anarchism, and, like it, would prove unstable, since the need of a central government would make itself felt almost at once.

The system we have advocated is a form of Guild Socialism, leaning more, perhaps, towards Anarchism than the official Guildsman would wholly approve. It is in the matters that politicians usually ignore—science and art, human relations, and the joy of life—that Anarchism is strongest, and it is chiefly for the sake of these things that we included such more or less Anar-

chist proposals as the "vagabond's wage". It is by its effects outside economics and politics, at least as much as by effects inside them, that a social system should be judged. And if Socialism ever comes, it is only likely to prove beneficent if non-economic goods are valued and consciously pursued.

The world that we must seek is a world in which the creative spirit is alive, in which life is an adventure full of joy and hope, based rather upon the impulse to construct than upon the desire to retain what we possess or to seize what is possessed by others. It must be a world in which affection has free play, in which love is purged of the instinct for domination, in which cruelty and envy have been dispelled by happiness and the unfettered development of the instincts that build up life and fill it with mental delights. Such a world is possible; it waits only for men to wish to create it.

Meantime the world in which we exist has other aims. But it will pass away, burnt up in the fire of its own hot passions; and from its ashes will spring a new and younger world, full of fresh hope, with the light of morning in its eyes.

*From Roads to Freedom (1918)*



## NOTES

---

### ON THE VALUE OF SCEPTICISM

*On the Value of Scepticism* is the Introductory Essay to Mr. Russell's *Sceptical Essays* (1928). As Mr. Russell's entire approach to all important questions of the present time is rational, this essay which states the case for rationalism naturally forms an important part of the writer's social philosophy. Those who are interested in the subject may read with profit the following essays in the same volume: (IV) Can Men be Rational? (IX) The Harm that Good Men Do, and (XI) The Need for Political Scepticism.

- p. 1. *subversive*: likely to cause destruction or overthrow of religion, morality, principles, constitution, etc.

*clairvoyants*: those who possess the power of seeing mentally what is happening or exists out of sight.

*bookmakers*: professional betting men who accept bets from punters.

*Pyrrho*: disciple of Anaxarchus and founder of the Sceptical or Pyrrhonian School of Philosophy. He taught that we can know nothing of the nature of things, but that the best attitude of mind is suspense of judgment which brings with it calmness of mind. Consistent Pyrrhonists were said even to doubt that they doubted.

- p. 2. *Einstein*: Albert (b. 1879), great German mathematician and Nobel Prize-winner for Physics, now a professor at one of the leading American universities. His famous Theory of Relativity has upset many of the accepted notions in physics and other sciences. He has shown that time is a co-ordinate of space, that distances in the universe are relative, not absolute, and that the universe itself is constantly expanding or contracting in size.

- p. 3. *Except in China*, . . . : Mr. Russell is a great admirer of China and her people. He spent some months in China as a professor and the outcome of his stay there is his *The Problem of China* as well as several essays on different aspects of Chinese life.

*pound sterling*: legal tender of the United Kingdom. The term was much used in 1931 when Great Britain abandoned the gold standard. The pound sterling, instead of the sovereign of gold, became the standard by which debts overseas were paid. Its value in gold was about 15s. 6d.

- p. 4. *Dr. Rivers*: William Halse (1864-1922), noted British Psychopathologist. He was the University Lecturer at Cambridge in the Physiology of the Senses. He founded the Cambridge school of Experimental Psychology. He visited South India in 1902

and published *The Todas* (1906). His *History of Melanesian Society* (2 Vols., 1914) was the outcome of his visit to Melanesian islands.

*anthropological data*: material collected from the study of the physical, psychological and cultural peculiarities of the people.

*Melanesia*: one of the three great divisions of the oceanic islands in the central and western Pacific. It embraces north-east of New Guinea, Solomon, Santa Cruz, New Hebrides, Fiji and several other islands. They are inhabited by the Papuan and its allied tribes.

- p. 5. *Westermarck*: Hermann (b. 1862). Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Finland. He wrote *History of Human Marriage* (London, 1891) which has been translated into many languages.

- p. 6. *belligerent countries*: countries engaged in conflict.

*the Quakers*: a cant name given to the Society of Friends, a religious fellowship founded in the middle of the 17th century by George Fox (1624-1691). It has no formulated creed and no priesthood or outward sacrament. Fox emphasized the importance of repentance and personal striving after truth and insisted on the possibility in this life of complete victory over sin. The Quakers are averse to military service and are noted for their philanthropy.

- p. 7. *a collective insanity* . . .: The rise of Shintoism, Nazism and Fascism has given ample evidence of the truth of this statement.

*The part played by intellectual . . . psychologists*: Contemporary psychology has developed tremendously in recent years and there are in existence at the present day several schools of psychological thought. They are Behaviourism, Formalism or "Gestalt", Psycho-analysis and the "Two factor" theory. All these systems simply investigate behaviour, or the mental processes underlying behaviour.

- p. 8. *volition*: exercise of the will.

*the three R's*: reading, writing and arithmetic.

- p. 10. *Freudians*: followers of Sigmund Freud, the father of modern psycho-analysis.

- p. 11. *If the French . . . in the Ruhr*: Ruhr, the great industrial district of Germany was occupied in January 1923 by the French as Germany failed to pay the money agreed upon as reparations. This led to a good deal of trouble between the French and the people of the district. The French remained there till 1925.

*If Napoleon . . . Amiens*: A treaty was signed in March 1802 between England and France at Amiens. Napoleon's ambition to humiliate England, however, would not allow him to stick to the treaty. The first rupture of the peace of Amiens came with his attacks on Holland and other countries. Next he made vast preparations for the invasion of England and at the same time seized Hanover.

- p. 12. *exhortations*: addresses strongly urging people to behave in a certain manner.

*ductless glands*: There are several glands in the body which yield up their secretions (hormones) to the blood without the intermediary of a duct. The secretions of these glands govern nutrition, growth and metabolism of the body. Both physical perfection and mental make-up are affected by their functioning. Defects may be remedied by administering glandular preparations or by surgical removal of portions of the glands.

- p. 13. *Leibniz*: (1646-1716), great German scholar and philosopher.

*Shakespeare puts "the . . . compact"*: The reference is to *Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene I, l. 4 . . .

The Lunatic, the Lover, and the Poet,  
 Are of imagination all impact.  
 One sees more devils than vast hell can hold:  
 That is the Madman. The Lover, all as frantic,  
 Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.  
 The Poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,  
 Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven.

*"The Trojan Women"*: a tragedy by the great tragedian, Euripides. In the scene referred to in the text, the Greeks are shown to have hurled Astyanax, the son of the great Trojan hero Hector and Andromache, down from the walls, that he might not restore the Kingdom of Troy.

*Euripides*: (480 B.C.-406 B.C.), one of the three great Greek tragedians. He wrote a large number of tragedies, but only 18 of them are extant today.

*blockade*: the closing of the ports and coasts of a country during war time by preventing ships from reaching and leaving it. During the first Great War, Germany declared the coasts of England to be in a state of blockade and tried to enforce this by the use of submarines. Great Britain replied to this in March 1915 with a blockade of Germany which contributed very much to end the war.

- p. 14. *homicidal maniac*: a mad person whose madness lies in making him kill others.

*atrophied*: wasted away through imperfect nourishment.

*Our instinctive apparatus . . .*: The human instincts have been arranged under two main heads, according as they are more directly concerned with the claims of others or with those of self. In other words we have instincts of co-operation and those of competition. In the first group are the instincts relating to group-maintenance, which can be considered under the three heads of mating, nursing and herding. In the second group are the instincts relating to self-maintenance, and these also can be treated as threefold, according as they are con-

cerned with self-protection, self-assertion, or self-sustenance. These instincts have been developed as instruments of racial survival and as such they ought not to pull against each other, but must pull together.

p. 15. *Utopian*: visionary, noble but impracticable.

## THE UNIVERSITY

*The University* is the 18th Chapter of Mr. Russell's ON EDUCATION (Especially in Early Childhood). He has divided the book into three parts. Firstly he considers the aims of education, and in discussing them he attaches great weight to modern psychological discoveries, which have shown that character is determined by early education to a much greater extent than was so far thought. He then proceeds to make a distinction between education of character and education in knowledge. The former, he says, ought to be complete by the age of six, because the building up of character should be mainly a matter for early years. Mr. Russell then goes to the third part which he calls Intellectual Education and discusses the sort of curriculum and conditions under which education should be given. Throughout this discussion he lays great stress on the importance of initiative and individual work and emphasizes the necessity of creating among the students throughout their education a sense of intellectual adventure.

p. 16. *Mozart*: (1756-1791), German opera-writer and composer. He made his first professional tour through Europe when he was six years old.

p. 17. *Renaissance*: the revival of learning in Europe after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453.

*industrial plutocracy*: the wealthy class which has arisen in recent times as a result of the growth of modern industry.

*Reform Bill* . . . : The Reform Bill in 1832 introduced adult franchise for the first time in England and thus paved the way for the democracy as it exists today. The Corn Laws were repealed by Peel in 1849, because he had been converted to Free Trade by Cobden and Bright.

p. 18. "*Useless*" learning: pursuit of knowledge, as Mr. Russell points out in another essay, for its own sake and not with a utilitarian purpose.

"*art for art's sake*": the ideal of several Victorian writers like Pater who looked upon art as an end in itself.

*Renaissance tradition*: See Mr. Russell's essay, "*Useless*" Knowledge for a detailed explanation.

p. 19. *brewing*: making of beer and other drinks by infusion, boiling and fermentation.

p. 21. *but, like Charles II, . . . about it*: The reference is to the famous remark of Charles II, "I am afraid, gentlemen, I am an unconscionable time a-dvying."

*mechanical conformity to system*: mechanically following the rules laid down by an institution.

*Montessori*: Madam (b. 1870), Italian doctor and teacher. In 1898 she became head of an institution for children of weak intellect. But now her methods have been taken up in many countries as a means of educating normal children. Her system aims at developing the child's individuality in every possible way. The child is taught to look after itself in every way. Physical training, gardening, open-air work as well as manual work is encouraged.

*The teacher should . . .*: The methods suggested are being regularly followed at Oxford, Cambridge and other universities. In India the method seems to have been adopted only by some post-graduate teachers and that too not quite successfully.

- p. 22. *Sabbatical year*: a year in which the usual work is not to be done. According to the Bible, S. year was the seventh year in which Israelites were to cease tilling and release debtors and slaves.

*Weierstrass*: Karl (1815-1897), German mathematician. He is known for his work on the theory of functions.

- p. 24. *a beckoning beauty . . . torment*: Great artists and scientists are attracted by some ideal, vague at first, which drives them to ceaseless activity and even makes them sacrifice several pleasures of life, but which, nevertheless, fills their minds with great happiness.

## THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE CITIZEN

After discussing in his *ON EDUCATION* the broad principles on which education should be given, Mr. Russell considers, in his *EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER* (1932), some of the undesirable factors in the present system of education. He thinks that religion, nationalism, class-feeling, sex, competition, propaganda—all these factors in modern education tend towards social disaster because, instead of encouraging virtues, they produce in the young insanity, stupidity, economic injustice and ruthlessness. As an educationalist Mr. Russell is primarily concerned with the development of the student's personality, but he knows at the same time that education in citizenship is essential especially because, on account of the unifying tendencies of the modern world, it would be both impossible and foolish for a country to follow an isolationist policy. In *The Individual versus the Citizen*, which is the first Chapter of this book, he proposes the question: Can the fullest individual development be combined with the necessary minimum of social coherence? He believes that a greater harmony between the seemingly incompatible Individuality and Citizenship is possible provided sane methods are employed in educating children.

- p. 25. *cleavage*: acute difference of opinion.

*psyche*: soul, spirit, mind. In Greek mythology Psyche is the beloved of Cupid or Eros, the God of Love.



*Hegelian tendencies:* Hegel (1770-1831), great German philosopher, was one of the foremost exponents of the philosophical system known as Idealism. After the French Revolution, the Hegelian School of political thought was the most dominant in Europe. As against the glorification of *laissez-faire* and private initiative, the Hegelian doctrine glorified the power and authority of the state. The state was, indeed for Hegel, a mystical being, which individuals must serve to the best of their capacity and in which they themselves would realize the best in life.

*Goethe:* (1749-1832), one of the greatest of the German writers.

*James Watt:* (1736-1819), English inventor whose experiments gradually led to the evolution of the modern steam engine.

- p. 26. *Leibniz's monads:* Leibniz, the German scholar and philosopher, expounded Monadism, a system in which substance consists of atoms or monads, each self-contained and individual, the whole forming a perfect harmony with its centre and creator, God.

*camera obscura:* a kind of photographic-apparatus, projecting on paper, for the purpose of tracing the image of a distant object.

*cognitive:* concerning the faculty of knowing, perceiving and conceiving.

- p. 27. *Three Persons of the Trinity:* According to Christian belief, three persons viz. Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are united in one Godhead.

*Stoics:* followers of the ancient school of philosophy, Stoicism, founded by Zeno in Athens. The essential doctrine of the system may be summed up in the aphorism, Virtue alone brings happiness.

- p. 28. *Pythagoras:* Greek philosopher and mathematician.

*status quo:* unchanged position, state of society, government, etc. as it exists at any particular time.

*Washington:* (1732-1799), great American soldier and statesman. In 1788 he was elected the first President of the United States of America.

*Jefferson:* (1743-1826), Third President of U.S.A.

*Boadicea:* the queen of Prasutagus, king of a tribe, in ancient Britain. After his death, the Romans seized his kingdom and insulted Boadicea and her daughters, whereupon she incited the Britons to rebellion and defeated the Romans. Eventually defeated by the Romans, she poisoned herself in A. D. 62.

*Scotland Yard:* Headquarters of the City of London Police.

- p. 30. *genteel:* (ironical) belonging to the upper classes.

*Constantine:* (274-337), the great Roman Emperor became a Christian in A.D. 312 and the next year issued the edict of Milan which gave civil rights and toleration to Christians throughout the Empire. Christianity became a state religion in A.D. 324 and the pagan temples were closed.

*The anarchic origin of Christianity:* Christianity began as a reform movement within the bosom of the Jewish church and had been purely a nationalist movement which in the beginning had threatened the rulers of the Jewish state.

*Cathari:* (Cathars, Catharists) a widespread heretical sect of the middle ages.

*Albigenses:* a religious sect of the 12th century. The members believed that matter was wholly evil and that only by rigorous self-denial could men reach a good life. They denied that Christ had ever had a material existence and strongly opposed the whole teaching of the Church of Rome. The sect was later ruthlessly suppressed by the Pope.

*Franciscans:* order of mendicant friars founded in 1210 by St. Francis of Assisi. Formally approved by the Pope, they laid special stress on preaching and ministering to the body.

*Apostles:* the twelve men sent forth as messengers by Jesus Christ to preach the Gospel.

*Early Fathers:* the writers who lived in the early ages of Christianity and whose writings are regarded as only of less importance than those in the Bible.

31. *Confucius:* (551 B.C.-478 B.C.), the Latinised form of the Chinese name of Kung Fu-tsze, Chinese politician and philosopher. It is often said that Confucianism is a system of morality without religion and it is quite true that Confucius is essentially a moral teacher, his golden rule being "What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others." Nevertheless there was a religious sanction behind his high morality and the religious side of his system perpetuates national animism and ancestor worship.

*Tibet:* The head of the government of Tibet is the Dalai Lama who is also the religious head of the Tibetans.

*Mahomet:* (Mohammed), the great Prophet of Islam. At the beginning he simply preached the new religion, but finding himself bitterly opposed by his enemies and despised as "impostor" he assumed in A.D. 622 at once the position of highest judge, law-giver and ruler of Medina and two powerful tribes.

*The Caliphs:* The Caliph was the title applied first in A.D. 632 to Mohammed's successor Abu Bekir as head of the Islamic State and defender of the faith. The title passed to Turkey in 1352 and was retained by its Sultans until 1922. In 1924 the Caliphate was abolished by the National Assembly at Angora.

*Byzantine tradition:* Byzantium on the Bosphorus was the capital of Constantine's Roman Empire and the term Byzantine generally denotes the East Roman Empire. Christianity was the state religion of this empire which lasted over a thousand years. The Byzantine Empire made rich contributions to art, especially in architecture and letters. In 1453 Constantinople was captured by the Turks from the last Byzantine emperor, Michael Palacologus.

- p. 33. *those who pay . . . tune*: those who finance the universities should lay down the educational policy of the universities.
- the General Strike*: In 1926, for the first time in England, there was a general strike. declared by the trade unions to support the coal mines. In a few days the strike collapsed.
- p. 34. *Many revolutionaries in their day-dreams . . .*: The violent attacks which were made on the aristocratic classes during both the French and the Bolshevik Revolutions amply prove the truth of this statement.
- p. 35. *British Admiralty*: The improvements in the British navy are comparatively modern. Iron was introduced as a protection at first and in 1860 it was used for constructional purposes, to be replaced later by steel. As science progressed the navy took full advantage of the scientific developments.
- p. 36. *dogmatist*: one who deals in positive unsupported assertions.
- p. 37. *pragmatists*: followers of the philosophy of William James. According to Pragmatism, the truth of a conception is to be tested by its practical value, or its workableness. It has been described as a revolt against the over elaborated idealism of the metaphysicians.
- Leigh Hunt*: (1784-1850), well known English essayist of the 19th century. He was the editor of the journal, *Examiner* in which he published a libel on the Prince Regent, the eldest son of George III and afterwards George IV, by calling him "a corpulent Adonis of fifty". After several Government prosecutions Hunt was sentenced to a fine of £500 and to two years' imprisonment.
- p. 38. *Latin America*: South America except Guinea. It contains the great republics once under Spanish or Portuguese rule. They are Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, etc.
- absence of any vivid sense of citizenship . . .*: The second World War has proved that, in spite of their different nationalities, the Americans can unite and show a strong sense of citizenship.

## THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN A LIBERAL EDUCATION

This essay, which was first published in two parts in 1913, was later included in Mr. Russell's collection of essays, *MYSTICISM AND LOGIC*, 1918.

- p. 41. *radio-activity*: an atomic process which neither heat nor pressure nor any other that we know can hasten or retard. It is the quality of emitting spontaneously radiations having great penetrating power. Substances such as radium, uranium, thorium and their compounds emit radiations having the power of penetrating opaque objects.

*modern alchemy*: Alchemy was the term applied to the early form of chemistry associated with magic. It was mainly concerned with the transmutation of baser metals into gold or silver. In the 16th and 17th centuries, however, the alchemists became akin to the chemists of today. It was not till the end of the 18th century, however, that the modern science of chemistry was founded by Robert Boyle.

*almost as a casual incident*: The discovery of the modern wonder-drug Penicillin may be pointed out as the best illustration of this statement.

5. *Faraday*: (1791-1867), great English chemist and physicist whose researches laid the foundations of electro-chemistry and were followed by many important discoveries in electro-dynamics and chemistry.

*Maxwell*: (1831-1879), British physicist, best known by his investigations of the kinetic theory of gasses.

*Hertz*: (1857-1894), German physicist who investigated the connection between light and electricity.

p. 43. *I have not myself enjoyed . . .*: As Mr. Russell was privately educated at home during his childhood, he did not learn Greek and Latin which he would have been forced to study in a public school. This was indirectly a blessing, for according to certain writers, the lack of a classical education has enabled Mr. Russell to be a great master of a simple and limpid English prose style.

p. 44. *the more pugnacious atmosphere of the West . . .*: The controversy between the champions of a classical education and those of a scientific education has been going on in the British universities for a long time. Long ago Swift was inspired to treat the subject with satirical humour in his *The Battle of the Books*. To some extent the same controversy seems to have disturbed the atmosphere of several Indian universities.

*"education"*: The word comes from the Latin word *educare*, meaning, to draw out.

7 *Elementary education . . . arithmetic*: popularly known as the three R's.

p. 45 *queen-bee*: It has been proved by those who have studied the life of the bee that these insects have an elaborate organization. There are three classes of bees in a hive, the queen bee, who is the one fertile bee, the drones, who are males, and the workers, who are sterile females.

p. 46. *Calvanistic horror*: John Calvin (1509-1564) was a great French Protestant social reformer who settled in Geneva and tried to improve the city in many ways. He aimed at making it a place where righteousness was paramount and where those who transgressed Calvin's rules of good life, either in creed or conduct,

were severely punished. The central idea of his religious belief is the doctrine of predestination which comes from the belief that everything that happens is due to the will of God. Calvin would not accept the idea that man is naturally good, for his doctrine was based on the idea of eternal salvation for some and eternal damnation for others.

- p. 48. *the irrelevance of human passions . . . is concerned*: According to Mr. Russell, human feelings, personal desires and motives are of no importance and ought not to be of any value in the discovery of scientific truth.

*it seems even to depend upon . . . destroy*: This statement appears to be especially true of poetry. The literature of every country shows that at the beginning excellent poetry is produced, because the minds of the poets are unsophisticated by the progress of civilization. Their minds are full of strong feelings, simplicity and straightforwardness which are destroyed as the country progresses. That is why, according to some writers, the age of great poetry is gone for ever.

*a certain peevishness and undue . . . the eccentric*: To some extent, at least, the truth of this statement is illustrated by certain writers at the end of the Victorian age. In the eighteenth-seventies several writers took refuge from the present in the Pre-Raphaelite movement, while others like Oscar Wilde wrote books which missed being good literature because these writers mistook mere cleverness and unorthodox behaviour and ideals for originality.

*Galileo*: (1564-1642), the great Italian astronomer who, as a student of medicine, came to disbelieve and despise the prevailing Aristotelian philosophy. As a professor of mathematics, first at Pisa and later at Padua he made some valuable discoveries in physical science and astronomy. There was, no doubt, some scientific activity before Galileo, but he was the first scientist to isolate clearly certain fundamental scientific ideas and the first to present them forcibly to the mind of his time.

49. *ever-accelerating velocity*: ever-increasing speed.

50. *trite truism*: commonplace obvious truth.

*Aristotle*: (384 B.C.-322 B.C.), one of the greatest among the Greek philosophers.

*Malthus's doctrine of population*: Malthus (1766-1834), the English Economist, published in 1798 anonymously *An Essay on the Principle of Population* which set out to prove that increase in population was dependent upon the presence of warmth and food, and would only be checked by the lack of these things, or by such positive checks as disease, epidemics, wars and plagues.

51. *it was to him that Darwin . . . selection*: Darwin said, on reading Malthus's work, that natural selection was the inevitable

result of the rapid increase of all organic beings, for such rapid increase necessarily leads to the struggle for existence.

*Malthus's outlook*: The problem taken by Malthus had been handled before him by Franklin, Hume and others. Malthus simply crystallised the views of those writers and presented them in a systematic form with elaborate proofs derived from history.

*Darwinism*: Darwin (1809-1872), the British scientist, rejected the theory of the origin of man as explained in the *Genesis* and proved in his *The Origin of Species* (1859) and *The Descent of Man* (1871) that man is related to the lower animals and that in animal life there is a continuous struggle for existence. This leads, he said, to the natural selection of those qualities that are most useful to preserve and continue the life of the species. This is the famous doctrine of the survival of the fittest, or natural selection. In his days, Darwin's theories were fiercely attacked by philosophers and theologians, but now they are the truisms of science.

*ions*: particles of moving matter carrying a unitary charge of positive or negative electricity.

*germ-plasm*: constituent of germ cells responsible for the transmission of hereditary characters.

### "USELESS" KNOWLEDGE

"*Useless*" Knowledge and *In Praise of Idleness* are the first two essays in Mr. Russell's *IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS AND OTHER ESSAYS* (1935). This collection of essays emphasizes, as the author says in his Preface, "the dangers of too much organization in the realm of thought and too much strenuousness in action", while what is wanted, according to him, in our very complex modern society is calm consideration, a courage refusing to be blindly led by dogmas and freedom of mind to do justice to the most diverse points of view. In the first two essays mentioned above, however, the writer is concerned with the utilitarian trends in modern education and with the problem of leisure which the increasing mechanization of our life is bound to create. He wants to fight the utilitarian tendencies in education by encouraging people to develop a contemplative turn of mind, while he advises them to utilize their leisure in acquiring what he calls elsewhere "goods of the mind." It would be interesting in this connection to remember that one of his objections against Communism is its undue glorification of manual against brain workers.

P. 54. *Sir Thomas Browne*: (1605-1682), English writer and physician, author of the well-known book *Religio Medici*.

*Pope Sylvester II*: Sylvester (930-1003) was a great student of chemistry, mathematics and philosophy.

*Prospero*: the exiled and dethroned King in Shakespeare's *Tempest*. He was an accomplished magician and could control the spirits in the island where he was staying.

*necromancers*: magicians.

*Homer*: the greatest of the ancient Greek poets, the author of the great epics the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

p. 55. *joie de vivre*: the joy of living.

*Hobbes*: (1588-1679), English philosopher.

*the forged decretals* . . . *Constantine*: There is a legend that Emperor Constantine who was smitten with leprosy received absolution and baptism from Pope Silvester, and in gratitude he is supposed to have granted to that Pope and his successors for ever not only spiritual supremacy, but also temporal dominion over Rome, Italy and other countries in the West. The famous document known as *Constitution Constantini* is now universally admitted to be a gross forgery, fabricated at Rome between the middle and end of the 8th century.

*the Vulgate*: the Latin version of the Bible, prepared by Jerome in the latter part of the 4th century.

*the Septuagint*: the Greek translation of the Old Testament (known by the symbol LXX). It is traditionally ascribed to about 72 scholars working in the first half of the 3rd century B.C.

*Jesuits*: the popular name for the religious order known as the Society of Jesus. The order was founded in the middle of the 16th century with the purpose of converting the heathen, but the members of the order mixed very much in political affairs. In England, for instance, they were prominent in the attacks on Elizabeth's throne.

p. 56. *Hippocrates*: (about 460 B.C.-377 B.C.), Greek physician called the father of medicine.

*Galen*: (about A.D. 130-A.D. 200), Greek physician. He was physician to Emperor Marcus Aurelius and to many prominent Romans.

*Paracelsus* (1493-1541), German physician. He was a successful practitioner and was appointed lecturer at Basle University. But his objectionable habits, study of alchemy and mysticism and violent temper brought about his expulsion and for several years before his death he was a wanderer. He is the subject of Browning's long poem, *Paracelsus*.

*Hellenic*: Greek. Hellenism is a term used for the culture of ancient Greece.

p. 57. *Sun Yat-Sen*: (1867-1925), Chinese reformer and maker of modern China. He organised the revolutionary party in 1893 and overthrew the Manchu dynasty. He became the first president of the Chinese republic. His most important writings are *Plans for National Reconstruction*, *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, and *The Three Principles of the People*.

*Basic English*: a simple and well-controlled form of English invented by Prof. Ogden. A complete language in itself it is made up of 850 words which may be used for all purposes and of which the meaning is fixed. Basic cannot take the place of

good normal English, but it is meant to give non-English-speaking people a working knowledge of English.

*dialectical materialism*: the term by which the philosophy of Karl Marx is generally known.

*bourgeois*: belonging to the middle class.

- p. 58. *integration of society*: an instrument of making the present imperfect society perfect.

*except those for the very rich*: the English public schools such as Eton, Harrow, etc.

*such as have become . . . antiquity*: The oldest British Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have been allowed a free hand by the State and have, more or less, continued their educational traditions even to this day.

- p. 60. *The men who directed German . . . Allies*: During the First World War, the German High Command thought that it would conquer the Allies through an intensive submarine warfare in the Atlantic. But the immediate effect of this step was that some American ships were torpedoed and consequently in 1917, U.S.A. joined the Allies against Germany.

- p. 62. *the hunting of Jews in Germany*: One of the items in the programme of the Nazis in Germany was the elimination of the Jews from Germany. How ruthlessly and thoroughly the programme was carried out is now a part of history.

*Kulaks in Russia*: Kulaks were the landowners in Russia before the Russian Revolution of 1916. When the Bolsheviks came into power, the Kulaks were deprived of all their property and all resistance was violently suppressed.

*lynching*: the term applied to the system by which the people take the law into their own hands. Lynching appears to flourish where racial antagonism is strong and authority weak. There were several cases of lynching in U.S.A. some years ago when Negroes were severely beaten and finally burnt alive by infuriated mobs of whites. Charles Lynch was an American farmer in the 18th century who was the leader of the whites in their summary vengeance on black men for crimes against the whites.

- p. 63. *Mephistopheles*: the evil spirit in Goethe's great drama, *Faust*. Faust who was a young student of philosophy and magic is shown in the drama to have entered into a pact with this spirit bartering away his soul for the pleasures of this life.

*Bergson*: Henri (1859-1945), one of the greatest among French philosophers; author of *Creative Evolution*, *Laughter* and several other philosophical works. Bergson attacked the materialist mechanism of his own times, because he felt that we cannot catch the flow and essence of life by mere thinking and the intellect. Life is that which makes efforts, which pushes upwards, and hence what is important is unceasing action and freedom. Bergson said that all that we are and do is the voice and the current of the *Elan Vital*—the vital urge—in us. It



is clear that Mr. Russell, with his intellectualism and sceptical outlook on life, has no sympathy with Bergson's philosophy.

*by windows into . . . cosmos:* by studying and contemplating upon the great problems of the life and the universe.

- p. 64. *Descartes:* (1596-1650), French philosopher and mathematician.
- Louis IX:* Jerusalem was taken from the Christians by the Sultan of Egypt in 1244 and this provoked the Seventh Crusade in which St. Louis, the King of France, took a leading part. Taken prisoner in Egypt he was ransomed in 1250.
- Brutus:* Brutus was a friend of Julius Caesar, the Roman Emperor, but he was persuaded to join the conspiracy to murder Caesar. In Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* he is presented as a noble and dignified person.
- King Kaniska:* the chief among the monarchs of the Kushan dynasty which ruled most of North India about the 2nd century. He was a great and vigorous promoter of Buddhism.
- p. 65. *Burton:* Robert (1577-1640), English writer who was a keen student of many branches of learning.
- p. 66. *abysses of interstellar space:* the vast empty spaces between the stars.

### IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS

- p. 69. *bootlegger:* the man who sells intoxicating liquor in countries where its sale is prohibited. The term comes from the practice of traders in U.S.A. of carrying bottles of liquor in the tops or legs of their boots during the years of Prohibition.
- p. 70. *gospel of work:* the advice constantly given to people about the blessings of industriousness and the dangers of idleness.
- the Industrial Revolution:* The phrase describes the change that came over industry in Great Britain between about 1750 and 1850. It is marked by steam being substituted for hand labour and by the construction of factories all over the country for the manufacture of articles formerly made at home. The invention of the steam engine gave a great impetus to this change.
- except in the South . . . War:* In 1861 the United States of America were engaged in a Civil War in which the northern federal States fought with the southern confederate States. The southern States contained very large cotton plantations on which thousands of negro slaves were employed. The main question between the two sides was whether the southern States had a right to secede and to keep their slaves. The treatment of the slave-workers on the plantations in the south was very bad and it was with the emancipation of the slaves after the victory of the north over the south that their conditions were considerably improved.
- p. 71. *Athenian slave-owners:* In ancient Athens the system of keeping slaves was very common, especially amongst the aristocratic classes. As most of the work of the household was done by the

slaves, the slave-owners or patricians got plenty of leisure which they wisely utilized in the development of literature and the arts.

- p. 75. *plutocracy*: rule of the wealthy.

*moreover authority still . . . Materialism*: When the Communists came into power in Russia, the church was to some extent suppressed, but Marxism took the place of religious teaching. Here Mr. Russell, with his impatience of all authority, takes an opportunity to have a fling at the Russian Communists.

*proletariat*: lit., the lowest class of a community; at present the term signifies the poor working classes as against the privileged classes.

*feminists*: supporters of Feminism. This movement, started in the 19th century and continuing even today in some countries, aims at putting women on an equality politically, legally and economically, with men. Up to the beginning of the World War I, feminists had to fight long and hard to achieve their objects. Since 1914, however, women have secured a large number of the rights for which they had been fighting.

- p. 76. *have professed a religion . . . the rich*: Probably Mr. Russell is thinking here of the following passage in St. Mark, 10. "But Jesus answereth again, and saith unto them, Children, how hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the Kingdom of God!"

*revivalist appeals*: Among the Christians efforts are from time to time made to create religious interest among the people through meetings, etc. In Russia similar efforts were made to impress on the people the importance of work.

- p. 77. *fresh schemes*: When the present essay was first published in 1932, the Five-year Plan for the industrial and social reconstruction of Russia, was in progress. It was, as Mr. Russell predicted, followed in 1933 by another Plan which was much more ambitious than the first.

- p. 80. "*high-brow*": a slang term from U.S.A., meaning highly intellectual.

- p. 81. *poachers*: trespassers; those who capture game by unsportsman-like methods.

*milieu*: surroundings, environment.

*pot-boilers*: works of literature written merely to make a living.

## IS HAPPINESS STILL POSSIBLE ?

*Is Happiness Still Possible ?* is the 10th chapter of Mr. Russell's *THE CONQUEST OF HAPPINESS*. He tells us in the Preface that the book is not addressed to the learned and that the recipes offered in it are "confirmed by my own experience and observation, and that they have increased my own happiness wherever I have acted in accordance with them". In the first part of the book Mr. Russell considers several causes of unhappiness which, according to him, are Byronic Unhappiness,

Competition, Boredom and Excitement, Fatigue, Envy, the Sense of Sin, Persecution Mania and Fear of Public Opinion. In the present chapter with which the second part of the book begins, the writer impresses, however, on the minds of his readers that in our life happiness is not all an impossibility. He then proceeds to describe with considerable gusto the causes that can bring happiness and they are Zest, Affection, The Family, Work, Impersonal Interests and Effort and Resignation.

p. 83. *the Seventh Day Adventists*: followers of an American sect who hold that the coming of Christ is at hand and maintain that the Sabbath is still the seventh day of the week.

p. 84. *Scotland Yard*: headquarters of the City of London Police.

*Bolsheviks*: The term Bolshevik means great and was applied during the First World War to those who formed the majority of the Communist Party. Bolsheviks were looked upon with considerable suspicion by the British government.

*the heroes of Valhalla*: According to the Norwegian legends Valhalla is the great hall of God Odin and the dwelling place of the souls of warriors killed in battle. The hall contains 540 great gates, through which they issue daily to engage in battle, returning at nightfall to feast with Odin and the Gods.

p. 85. *de rigueur*: rigorously.

p. 86. *coterie*: a set or circle of persons associated by exclusive interests.

*Michael Angelo*: Michelangelo (1475-1564), the greatest of the Renaissance painters of Italy.

p. 87. *sophisticated Occidental*: the European with his complex mentality.

*pragmatic*: practical. In philosophy, pragmatism is the doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upon human interests.

*Being neither powerless . . . revolutionary . . .*: The truth of this statement is borne out by the conditions in several dependent countries, both in the East and the West, where young people are driven to revolutionary ideals, socialism or communism.

p. 88. *conchologists*: students of shells and shell-fish.

p. 89. *cuneiform*: writing on ancient inscriptions of Persia, Assyria, etc. which resembled wedges or arrow-heads.

*mediaeval guilds*: In the middle ages workers in the same trade formed guilds or associations which controlled the trade, regulated the supply of apprentices, and acted very much as modern trade unions do.

p. 90. *Hardy's philosophic peasants*: Most of the characters in the novels of Thomas Hardy are simple but serious-minded peasants from the southern part of England, called Wessex by him.

*the lost ten tribes*: ten tribes comprising the Kingdom of Israel who were carried into captivity by the Assyrians about 721 B.C. and whose identity was lost probably by assimilation with their captors.

*Ephraim and Manasseh*: Both these were the sons of the patriarch Joseph. Ephraim who was the younger son was exalted over his elder brother Manasseh in the father's blessing. His descendants formed two of the tribes of Israel established in Northern Palestine. The descendants of the elder brother were established in Samaria and other places.

- p. 91. *flint implements*: Prehistoric man made his implements and weapons of hard stone. They have been discovered in several places.

*Volga*: a great Russian river.

*Yangtse*: the great river of Central China.

*Orinoco*: river of Venezuela in South America.

*the baseball fan*: the American who is keenly interested in baseball, the national game of America.

- p. 93. *the Council of Trent*: Trent is a town in Southern Tirol in Italy where a General Council of the Roman Church was held between 1545 and 1563 in three sessions. It dealt with various doctrinal matters and has deeply influenced that church ever since.

## THE ETHICS OF POWER

In his *POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS* (1938) Mr. Russell tries to prove that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in Physics. He shows that orthodox economists were mistaken in supposing that economic self-interest could be taken as the fundamental motive in social sciences. He discusses at length, in a major portion of this book, the various forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, etc., which Power takes and shows by several historical examples how it is passing from any one of its forms into any other. Impatient as Mr. Russell is of all arbitrary power, he discusses in *The Ethics of Power*, the 15th chapter of the book, the ways in which power can be employed for human welfare, while in the last chapter of his book he considers the more important question of the taming of Power.

- p. 95. *Lao-Tse*: Lao-Tse, a Chinese philosopher who lived in the 6th century B.C. and was the author of a work called *Taoteh-king*, one of the sacred books of the Chinese.

*quietists*: believers in Quietism, a form of mysticism, the fundamental tenet of which is that the final state of union with God is reached when the soul is in a state of perfect inaction, and that in this union the soul is purely passive under the action of the Divine Light.

- p. 96. *Christ's third temptation*: When Jesus Christ was a young man he passed 40 days in retirement in the wilderness where several times he was tempted by the Devil, cf. St. Matthew, Ch. 4.

*apostasy*: the abandonment of one's principles or vows.

- p. 98. *innocuous*: not harmful.

- p. 99. *congenital disposition*, . . . *eugenics*: There are certain persons

who are mentally and physically defective from their very childhood. How to improve such persons is a problem for eugenics, the science which studies the factors that may improve the physical and mental racial qualities of future generations.

*legal forms of brigandage*: the exploitation which systematically goes on in the present capitalistic form of society and which the law allows is called by Mr. Russell a sort of robbery.

p. 100. *at the present day*: Mr. Russell's *Power: A New Social Analysis* was first published in October, 1938, when war clouds were threatening the political horizon of Europe. The Munich Pact which postponed the Second World War by a year had just been concluded, but the fear and suspicion of the Axis powers which included Japan still remained.

p. 101. *Guy Fawkes*: one of the conspirators in the Gunpowder Plot. The purpose of the plot was to blow up the Houses of Parliament on 5th November, 1605, the day on which King James I was to open Parliament. Guy Fawkes, a brave but desperate soldier of fortune, was entrusted with the actual execution of the plot. He was discovered in the cellars of the Houses of Parliament, later confessed and was executed.

p. 102. *I mean by an . . . " . . . to them"*: Probably Mr. Russell is thinking here of the Nazis who considered the Germans as the chosen race destined to rule over the world.

p. 103. *England and Scotland . . . King*: The history of Great Britain is full of wars between England and Scotland. In 1603, however, both the countries were united when James I became King of both the countries. The son of Mary, Queen of Scots, he ruled Scotland for 20 years, before becoming also the King of England on the death of Queen Elizabeth.

*Dr. Johnson*: (1709-1784), famous English man of letters and maker of the first English Dictionary. His biography by Boswell records his hatred of Scotsmen. It is full of his table-talk in the club which he founded and which he frequented.

*aftermath of dictatorships*: The World War I was followed in Europe by the establishment of dictatorships in several countries, especially Italy, Turkey, Germany, Spain and Russia.

*Pythagoras*: (582 B.C.-500 B.C.), Greek philosopher. He founded a moral and religious school and gathered round himself an enthusiastic band of followers. He began investigations into the theory of numbers and is believed to have first discovered the principle laid down in the 47th proposition of Euclid. His teaching emphasizes the importance of a life of moral abstinence and purification.

## THE WORLD AS IT COULD BE MADE

This is the last chapter in Mr. Russell's *ROADS TO FREEDOM* which was written in April 1918 and published in November the same year. As the writer had not visited Russia till then, he could not obviously judge how far the splendid picture of society painted by him in

this chapter could stand comparison with the actual conditions in that country. It is clear, however, that his visit to Russia sometime after the publication of his book disillusioned him completely and made him so angry with that country for her suppression of free speech and free press that he found a great satisfaction in the illiteracy of the Russian people. Mr. Russell is evidently not a communist, because in the essay, *Scylla and Charybdis*, in his book, *IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS* (1935), he has compared Communism and Fascism and found that he cannot accept both. With all his sympathies towards Russia and her people as a convinced socialist, what he has strongly objected to in Russian Communism is the means employed by the Russian Government in carrying out their programme. The present Chapter, however, makes interesting reading and should induce many a reader to compare the actual conditions in pre-war Russia with the idealistic picture so optimistically drawn by Mr. Russell.

p. 105. *the Gospels*: the first four books of the New Testament. Together they give practically all the known facts and teaching of Jesus Christ.

p. 107. *Socialism and Anarchism*: In *Roads to Freedom* Mr. Russell defines Socialism as "the advocacy of communal ownership of land and capital", and Anarchism as "the theory which is opposed to every kind of forcible government".

G. D. H. Cole: (b. 1889), University Reader in Economics, Oxford, and a versatile writer.

p. 109. *the best system . . . Kropotkin*: In one of the earlier chapters of *Roads to Freedom*, Mr. Russell describes the system advocated by Kropotkin in his books, *Fields, Factories and Workshops* and *The Conquests of Bread*. The system demands a very great improvement in the present methods of production. Under it the whole system of wages is to be abolished; there is to be no obligation to work and all things are to be shared in equal proportions among the whole population; work is to be made pleasant; there is to be no compulsion, no law, no government exercising force; there will still be acts of the community, but these are to spring from universal consent.

*Kropotkin*: (1842-1921), Prince, Russian geographer, author and revolutionary. While in the service of the Russian government, he did much geographical exploration, but in 1872 he associated himself with the extremist section of the International. He was several times arrested in Europe, but escaped to England and settled there from 1883 to 1917, when he returned to Russia.

*Guild Socialism*: It aims at "autonomy in industry; with consequent curtailment, but not abolition, of the power of the State".

p. 112. *The Anarchist plan of a free distribution . . .*: According to the Anarchist plan as explained by Mr. Russell, ordinary commodities would be granted to every one, without any obligation, while the rarer commodities, of which the supply cannot easily be indefinitely increased, would be rationed and divided equally among the population. Socialism, on the other hand, "would

retain payment for work done or for willingness to work, and, except in persons incapacitated by age or infirmity, would make willingness to work a condition of subsistence, or at any rate of subsistence above a certain very low minimum."

- p. 114. *the whole of that part . . . obsolete*: Under the system elaborated by the writer, private property will not exist in the same form as today; consequently there will be little need for the part of the Penal Code which now deals with crimes connected with property.

*Those who nevertheless . . . wicked*: Since the development of modern psychology and especially of psycho-analysis, there has been a tendency in all civilized countries to deal with criminals on scientific lines and not treat them as incurably vicious. Better treatment and opportunities for improvement are being given to all criminals and every attempt is made to make them useful members of society.

- p. 115. *ad hoc*: special, arranged for this purpose.

*Whether, after this war, . . . foretell*: *Roads to Freedom* was first published in 1918 when the League of Nations had not been formed.

*The practice of government . . . criticize*: Anarchism demands that government shall require the consent of all the governed, and not only of a majority, because the rule of a majority may be hostile to freedom.

- p. 116. *by placing the decision . . . that section*: It may be remembered that under the system existing at present in the Indian Central Legislative Assembly, members of other communities do not generally vote when the resolution or the bill under discussion affects any particular community.

- p. 118. *a sweater*: a sweating employer.

*Whether art will . . . disaster*: The truth of this statement can be tested by studying the development of art and literature under the Soviet rule. Conflicting views have been presented by different writers on this subject.

*When elementary needs . . .*: The views expressed by the writer in this and the next paragraph are fully explained by him in his *Marriage and Morals*.

- p. 120. *"sacrament"*: a sacred ceremony which is one of the channels by which God, through the priest, confers His grace or authority upon men. Marriage is one of the seven sacraments.

- p. 121. *to "become as little children"*: The reference is to St. Matthew, Chap. 18. "And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them. And said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven":

*Godwin*: William (1756-1836), English novelist and miscellaneous writer. He was a dissenting minister, but his faith was shaken by the study of French philosophers. His most important work is *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, 1793.

p. 122. "*vagabond's wage*": wages which are sufficient for existence, but not for luxury.

p. 123. *The decline of the birth-rate* . . . : The falling birth-rate in several European Countries including England has been engaging the attention of the authorities for the last many years.

*that of America is likely* . . . *immigration*: Immigration is not likely to effect a great increase in the population of U.S.A. for since 1921 this country has adopted the system of quotas in its immigration policy. Each year a quota is fixed for each nation but the total number of persons allowed is very small. For instance in 1933 about 23,000 from all nations were allowed to settle in U.S.A.

*the Yellow Peril*: The expression employed by the daily papers in Europe and U.S.A. to describe the yellow people, especially the Japanese and the Chinese, when they invaded the field of white labour several years ago.

p. 124. *Anarchism*: Anarchism has arisen within the Socialist movement as its extreme left wing. While orthodox Socialism believes that the individual will be free if the State becomes the sole capitalist, Anarchism fears that in that case, the State may be as tyrannical as the private capitalist. Hence Anarchism wants firstly, to curtail the powers of the State and ultimately, abolish it. Liberty is the supreme good in the Anarchist creed.

*dangers and difficulties*: In Chap. II of *Roads to Freedom*, the author discusses the darker side of Anarchism. He says that while in the general Anarchist creed there is nothing essentially violent, the general tone of the Anarchist press is very bitter. Again, according to him, the revolt against law leads to a relaxation of all the usually accepted moral rules and to a bitter spirit of retaliatory cruelty. It is also found that Anarchists are inclined to canonize all who suffer for it, forgetting that some of these sufferers are not genuine Anarchists. Lastly "Anarchism attracts to itself much that lies on the border land of insanity and common crime".

*Syndicalism*: This movement arose in France as a revolt against political socialism. It considers man as producer rather than consumer. Hence it is concerned with reforming actual work and the organization of industry, not merely with securing greater rewards for work. Its essential doctrine is the class war to be conducted by industrial rather than political methods. Its chief methods are the strike, the boycott and sabotage.

p. 125. *from its ashes will spring* . . . : Mr. Russell is evidently thinking here of the mythical bird *Phoenix* which lived for many centuries and at the end of its life burnt itself on its nest, a new phoenix arising from the ashes.





---

*If you have enjoyed this book by*  
**BERTRAND RUSSELL**  
*you will also like his other works*

---

*VOLUMES OF ESSAYS*  
**MYSTICISM AND LOGIC**

Contains the famous essay which gives the title of the book and the equally famous "A Free Man's Worship".

**SCEPTICAL ESSAYS**

"It is a good deal more than difficult to find another book in which felicities, both mental and verbal, abound in such profusion."—*Glasgow Herald*.

**IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS**

"Every line is lucid and alive, stimulating agreement and disagreement. This is the most considered as well as the most tolerant and subtle of Mr. Russell's recent collections."—*Time and Tide*.

*EDUCATION*  
**ON EDUCATION: ESPECIALLY IN  
EARLY CHILDHOOD**

"One of the most stimulating books that we have seen. . . . It is enlivened by flashes of brilliant humour. We advise everybody . . . to buy and study carefully this most able and interesting book."—*Education*.

**EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER**

"Sentence after sentence that could be written in the teacher's golden treasury of wisdom."—*Observer*.

*Published by* **GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD**

---

---

## *Books by* BERTRAND RUSSELL

### SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

#### PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

"Mr. Bertrand Russell has written a thoroughly mischievous book, and it is all the more mischievous because, being a cultivated man, he has at his service a felicitous literary style which may possess some attractions for the unwary minds of prejudiced partisans and loose thinkers."—Lord Cromer in *Spectator*.

#### ROADS TO FREEDOM: SOCIALISM, ANARCHISM, AND SYNDICALISM

"A remarkable book by a remarkable man. . . . Mr. Russell is avowedly an Anarchist, but his anarchism is of a kind with which a good many people who are not Anarchists will sympathise."—*Times*.

#### THE PROSPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION

(WITH DORA RUSSELL)

"It is perhaps the cleverest book that he has published will not please all Socialists, though it will be extremely for them."—*New Leader*.

#### FREEDOM AND ORGANIZATION 1814-1914

"This invaluable book should be called a History of Nineteenth Century Mentality by a First Rate Mind. It is an oasis in a desert of Histories of Human Humbug by people with no minds at all."—G. Bernard Shaw.

## *Books by* **BERTRAND RUSSELL**

### **FREE THOUGHT AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA**

"A champion of free thought."—*Times Literary Supplement*

### **MARRIAGE AND MORALS**

"An audacious and provocative book, in which truths are spiced with half-truths, and Mr. Russell's scepticism and his dogmatism wage their familiar conflict."—*New Statesman*.

### **THE CONQUEST OF HAPPINESS**

"Beautifully planned and written. . . . The author knows just what he wants to say, and says it brilliantly. . . . A definitely helpful book."—*Spectator*.

### **POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS**

"His book is rich in advice to the average man who wants a government but not a tyranny."—*The Times*.

### **PHILOSOPHY**

#### **AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY**

"At once important and delightful."—*Manchester Guardian*

#### **THE ANALYSIS OF MIND**

*Library of Philosophy*

"A most brilliant essay in psychology."—*New Statesman*.

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD:

Bo. आह्वान करणांक :—

यह पुस्तक ~~पुस्तक~~ INQUIRY INTO  
MEANING AND TRUTH

"Its brilliance and subtlety, thought great, are no more than we should have expected from its author."—*Times Literary Supplement*.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE  
EXTERNAL WORLD

AS A FIELD FOR SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

THE SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK

"Full of life and wit and gaiety and, let us add, wisdom and knowledge . . . the whole book is important."—*Manchester Guardian*.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ

*New edition with a New Preface by the Author*

A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


AND ITS CONNECTION WITH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES  
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY.

MATHEMATICS

THE PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS

New Edition 2 Banasthali Vidyapith the Author

15679



104 S31S

MATE

Central Library

HY

*Library of Philosophy*

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

Data Entered

29 APR 2001

